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ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS: THE PROBLEM OF
NEGATIVE RIGHTS IN A POSITIVE STATE
SETH F. KREIMERt
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INTRODUCTION
Half a century ago, the New Deal officially inaugurated govern-
ment's active participation in the regulation and provision of economic
benefits. The emergence of this positive state has led roughly a genera-
tion of constitutional scholars to wrestle in earnest with its implications
for the Bill of Rights.'
' The previous generation of constitutional scholars took as its central challenge
the justification of governmental intervention in free market transactions despite Su-
preme Court opposition in such cases as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
and Hammer v. Dagenhart (Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See, e.g., Mer-
rill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-2 to 8-7 (1978).
When the Supreme Court abandoned its opposition, with West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), attention shifted to the impact governmental intervention
might have on personal constitutional rights to political liberty or equality. The earli-
est, and in many ways most insightful, discussion of the constitutional impact of gov-
ernment largesse is to be found in Professor Chafee's examination of government facili-
ties, funding, and licensing in the communications field: Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT
AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947).
Several articles have dealt specifically with the impact of attaching unconstitu-
tional conditions to the allocation of governmental benefits. See, e.g., French, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961); Hale, Unconstitutional
Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Note, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another Look at Un-
constitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968).
During the McCarthy era considerable writing was prompted by the conditioning
of government licenses and employment on loyalty oaths or political orthodoxy. See,
e.g., W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS
(1956); Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1956); Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41
VA. L. REV. 27 (1955); Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Condi-
tioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955); Note, Judicial Acquiescence in
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights Through the Expansion of the Conditioned Privi-
lege Doctrine, 28 IND. L.J. 520 (1953); Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amend-
ment, 78 YALE L.J. 842 (1969); cf Note, Denying the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation to Public Officers, 64 HARV. L. REv. 987 (1951).
[Vol. 132:1293
ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
In the past, much constitutional thinking centered on limiting the
use of coercive force or criminal sanctions through which government
has traditionally exerted its authority to deter undesirable conduct.
However, this conception of negative rights as freedom from coercive
violence has questionable value in shaping constitutional restraints on a
government that more often exerts its power by withholding benefits
than by threatening bodily harm. Whether conditioning federal funds
for hospitals on the provision of approved treatment for genetically de-
fective newborn children,2 requiring colleges to eschew discrimination
as a condition of access to student loans or tax exemptions,3 or ex-
tracting promises of silence as a condition of government employment,4
increasingly visibl6 governmental actions substantially impinge on indi-
vidual lives without invoking the threat of mayhem or incarceration.
More recent scholarship has been prompted by modern legislation that has admin-
istered public employment or welfare benefits on conditions at war with constitutional
rights. See K. DAvIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 162-87 (1969); T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 161-246 (1970); Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Ju-
dicial Review, and the Constitutional Problems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND.
L.J. 183 (1964); Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on
Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 (1965); O'Neil, Unconstitutional
Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAUrF. L. REV. 443 (1966);
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne,
The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses
of an Old Analogy, 16 UCLA L. REv. 751 (1969); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
2 See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C.
1983) (striking down regulation that conditioned federal funds for hospitals on provi-
sion of life support systems for genetically defective newborn children without regard to
parental consent).
3 See Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1223 (1984) (requiring compli-
ance with Title IX as condition of federal support); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (tax exemption denied to university with explicit policy forbid-
ding interracial dating or marriage); Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(challenge to tax exemption for racially discriminatory private school), cert. granted
103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983); cf. Doe v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 937 (D. Minn.
1983), cert. granted sub nom. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Boe, 104 S. Ct. 522 (1984) (chal-
lenge to Solomon Amendment, 50 U.S.C.A. § 462f (West Supp. 1982), which requires
draft registration as condition of eligibility for student loans).
I President Reagan recently ordered a lifelong requirement that all government
employees with access to confidential information obtain prior government approval for
any speech or publication, including fiction, that touches on knowledge gained through
such access. His directive also authorizes random polygraph examinations of govern-
ment employees, both at hiring and throughout employment. See National Security De-
cision Directive - 84 on Safeguarding National Security Information (Mar. 11, 1983),
cited in H.R. REP. No. 578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 n.2 (1983). The General Account-
ing Office estimates that this directive will affect roughly 2.5 million government em-
ployees and an additional 1.3 million employees of Defense Department contractors.
The overinclusiveness of such regulation is extraordinary. In 1982 the government dis-
covered only 21 unauthorized disclosures of information; to combat this, it administered
23,000 polygraph exams. Id. at 8, 14.
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The greatest force of a modern government lies in its power to regulate
access to scarce resources. 5
Government agencies, for example, employ from fourteen to
twenty percent of the workforce,' and the combined expenditures of
both local and federal governments range from thirty to thirty-five per
cent of the Gross National Product." With government's increased reg-
ulation of and participation in the economy and its inheritance of edu-
cational and welfare functions from the church and family, opportuni-
ties abound for governmental intrusion through allocation of benefits.
While allocational sanctions may not always be as drastic as criminal
ones, they are more pervasive. Potential victims need not be sought out;
they come to the state seeking benefits.'
Courts encounter difficulties when imposing constitutional re-
straints on governmental allocations. A primary justification for re-
straint government's monopoly on the legitimate use of force--is not
' The manipulation by government of material inducements to control behavior is
not unique to the United States. See, e.g., E. ETZIONI-HALEVY, POLITICAL MANIPU-
LATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1979) (examining
Australia, Britain, Israel, and the United States); Isaacs, Reproductive Rights 1983:
An International Survey, 14 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 311, 317-18 & nn. 42-45
(1982-83) (discussing government manipulation of financial incentives, housing priori-
ties, and maternity and childcare benefits to reduce birth rates in China, India, Korea,
Singapore, Thailand, and elsewhere).
8 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 303, 376 (103d ed. 1982) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT] (federal, state, and local governments employ 16 million of a total em-
ployed workforce of 100 million). This phenomenon is not new. The percentage of the
workforce employed by the public sector has exceeded 15% for nearly 45 years. See T.
STANBECK, JR., P. BEARSE, T. NOYELLE & R. KARASEK, SERVICES: THE NEW ECON-
OMY 12-13 table 1.2 (1981).
1 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 273, 416 (total government ex-
penditure of $959 billion comprised 32% of the Gross National Product in 1981). Pro-
fessor Gellhorn has noted that particular sectors of the economy may be especially vul-
nerable to government restraints. Over half of all hardback books in the United States
were bought by government agencies or adapted pursuant to their instructions. See W.
GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 78 (1956).
' As the Court has recognized, the necessity of going to the state to obtain a bene-
fit or fulfill a requirement may itself be a burden. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 387 & n.12 (1978) (parents of children from prior marriage must obtain court
order certifying their ability to support those children not in their custody before re-
marrying; burden of obtaining the order itself infringes constitutionally protected
rights). Imposing conditions on desirable benefits eases enforcement of the conditions.
See, e.g., Law Tying Draft Registration to College Aid Gains Results, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 22, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (registration for draft, previously enforced by criminal
penalty, rose from 90% to 99% after enactment of the Solomon Amendment (see supra
note 3)); ef. Lavin, Registration Drive, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1983, at 47 (suggesting
that 18-year olds be required to register for the draft when they obtain driver's
licenses).
Government's monopoly on legitimate violence enables it to accomplish the
greatest possible harm; no individual or private entity could have laid waste to Viet-
[Vol. 132:1293
ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
as clearly applicable when the government buys, sells, and bribes
through the use of concededly legitimate powers. Conferring benefits,
even selectively, seems to increase individual liberty by expanding the
choices available. Any surrender of individual rights in exchange ap-
pears to be voluntary and without need for judicial supervision.
Nor do courts have as logical a role in reviewing allocational deci-
sions as they do in reviewing criminal sanctions. Most governmental
applications of force already occur through the judicial system. Al-
though police are authorized to apply force directly in emergencies, co-
ercive sanctions are usually preceded by criminal prosecutions. Courts
are thoroughly familiar, in this area, both with doctrine and with prac-
tical ramifications. By contrast, benefits are allocated directly by execu-
tive or legislative acts; any constitutional restraint requires positive ju-
dicial intervention. Courts must reach out and affirmatively intrude
into unfamiliar territory."l Such affirmative intervention forces courts
to forego the pretense of neutrality. Any remedial decree specifically
orders a specific allocation, rather than merely forbidding one alterna-
tive and leaving democratic processes to choose from the remainder.
And courts are notoriously poor at allocating resources."'
In recent years, the difficulties raised by the indirect constitutional
infringements of the positive state have appeared on the Supreme Court
docket with increasing frequency.12 Legislators and administrators of
nam. Government's ability to use force also insulates it from opposition, effectively
checking even the most powerful private parties. Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 538-39.
10 As Professor Chafee put the matter,
The Court will, I think, be somewhat more reluctant to upset postal re-
strictions on discussion than criminal convictions for speaking and writing.
Here, the fact that the postal service is a great and complicated business
does have significance. . . . In judicial matters the Justices know their
way around-"born and bred in a brier patch." They are well aware of
the consequences of reversing a decision below. They can go far because
they are well acquainted with the precise point where they ought to stop
before going too far. . . . It is, quite otherwise if the Court upsets a ruling
by the Postmaster General, especially if the ruling represents an habitual
practice, and not just an isolated case.
Z. CHAFEE, GOvERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 281 (1947).
1 See, e.g, Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 93-97.
12 For an example of a conflict between constitutional rights and provision of gov-
ernment funds and services, see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (conflict
between right to abortion and restricted medicaid funding); supra note 3.
For examples of conflicts between ordinances regulating access to government
property and first amendment rights, see, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (restricting distribution of religious
materials at public fair); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (voiding statute prohib-
iting residential picketing).
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all political stripes are acutely aware of the usefulness of allocational
sanctions as tools for influencing behavior.1 s The Court, however, has
yet to adopt a coherent framework for analyzing the constitutionality of
these sanctions.
The problem, of course, is not new, as the pedigree of the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine attests. Examination of the doctrine's de-
velopment, however, suffers from a disorienting quality. While the
same arguments are made today as at the doctrine's inception, over the
last century, the arguments have migrated across the spectrum of politi-
For examples of conflicts between unemployment compensation provisions and
freedom of religion guarantees, see, e.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457
U.S. 393 (1982) (reversing invalidation of requirement that teachers in church affili-
ated schools contribute to state unemployment compensation program); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding requirement that Amish employer pay social
security tax despite religious objections); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(holding unemployment compensation may not be denied to plaintiff who refused to
work on military equipment when such work violated his religious beliefs).
For examples of conflicts between control of school facilities and equal protection
and first amendment rights, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(refusal of school library to purchase certain books); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (public education may not be denied children of illegal aliens); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university may not deny use of facilities to religious
group).
The right to travel has been infringed by government largesse. See Zobel v. Wil-
liams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (striking down Alaskan scheme to distribute oil royalties on
basis of length of residence); cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983) (upholding requirement that government contractors hire
local workers against commerce clause challenge). And postal restrictions have con-
flicted with first amendment rights. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (upholding regulation that prohibits deposit of
unstamped mail in private mailboxes).
18 Certainly the desire to influence behavior with allocational sanctions lies behind
the legislation restricting abortion funding. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)
(upholding restrictions). A number of state courts have voided such restrictions as im-
permissible infringements of state constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Committee to De-
fend Reproductive Rights v. Meyers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981);
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982); Fischer v. Department of
Pub. Welfare, 497 Pa. 267, 439 A.2d 1172 (1982). The United States Supreme Court
cases in this area seem to me particularly heartless and misguided in their result. But
in this I am biased, having been one of a team of counsel in Fischer.
Examples of allocations intended to influence behavior are numerous in other
areas as well. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 52
U.S.L.W. 4187, 4191 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 81-2110) (requirement that 40% of
employees of municipal contractors be local residents); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (federal regulation conditioning funds
for family planning clinics on requirement that they notify parents when prescribing
contraceptive devices for minors); National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (denying tax exempt status to racist publication); see also Philadel-
phia Inquirer, Mar. 4, 1984, at 3-A, col. 3 (Salvation Army loses over four million
dollars in city contracts for refusing to pledge non-discrimination against homosexuals).
[Vol. 132:1293
ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
cal views in counterpoint to the Court's political center of gravity. 4
Justice Rehnquist is the legatee of the doctrine used by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis in their efforts to immunize social legislation
from judicial review, 5 while Justice Brennan wields an analysis forged
by Justices Sutherland and Day in their attempts to contain the growth
of government regulation of corporate interests.1 6
To be sure, not everything is so neat. The first Justice Harlan,
though hardly sympathetic to entrenched interests, aligned himself
strongly with efforts to limit government's power to allocate favors,
1 7
and Justice Holmes's long career saw occasional retreats from his gen-
erally deferential approach to governmental powers.1" But even in these
4 During the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), constitutional
rights primarily protected property. Government regulation of corporate interests fell
victim to constitutional scrutiny, and doctrines that limited the scope of Supreme Court
review permitted greater regulation. See, e.g., Beck, Nullification by Indirection, 23
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1910) (need for doctrine to confine regulation); Oppenheim, Un-
constitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MICH. L. REv. 176, 179 (1927) (doc-
Strine of unconstitutional conditions "bloomed in fields where federal protection of wide-
spread corporate property rights was essential").
At least one early commentator argued against the expansion of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine, believing that allowing government to exert allocative, but
not criminal, authority over otherwise unregulable enterprise was an appropriate com-
promise with constitutional limitations on the government power left over from an ear-
lier era. See Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879, 889-91
(1929).
However, in the years following World War II, as the Court's enforcement of
constitutional rights leaned toward personal liberties, conservatives took up the fight for
government's ability to allocate favors free of the constraints of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. These partisans defended the government's ability to impose con-
straints on its citizenry by means of conditional benefits, even though the constraints
would be impermissible if adopted by criminal regulation. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding civil service regulation prohibiting any member
of subversive group from teaching in public school); infra text accompanying notes 41-
48, 69-74.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 32-48, 69-74.
1" See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926) (striking statute requiring that private carriers become public carriers in return
for privilege of using road); supra text accompanying notes 164-78.
117 See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 (1910). Justice Harlan joined
Justice Day in opinions sharing this sentiment. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart (Child
Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding unconstitutional prohibition of interstate
trade in products of child labor); Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246,
266-67 (1906) (Day & Harlan, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that state cannot condition
business license on surrender of right to remove lawsuits to federal court). But even
Justice Harlan occasionally changed sides. See, e.g., Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207
(1903) (upholding federal wage and hour restrictions on laborers employed by govern-
ment contractors); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 542
(1899) (government may allocate tax revenues to schools as it sees fit).
1s See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 435 (1926) (striking
statute suspending license "of in-state insurance companies that remitted premiums out
of state); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437-38 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Postmas-
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anomalous cases, the Justices did not so much repudiate their prior
positions as simply exchange them for the analyses of their opposite
numbers.19
Given the continued prevalence of these traditional doctrines, anal-
ysis logically begins by recounting their origins and examining their use
by the Court. This is the enterprise of part I.
I seek to draw two conclusions from historical analysis. First, the
use of allocational sanctions is subject to constitutional constraint. Al-
though an old lesson, it is one that deserves periodic reiteration. On a
regular basis, Supreme Court opinions begin and end with invocation
of the traditional doctrines that preclude active judicial review of alloca-
tional sanctions. Such claims of immunity are both pernicious and
unfounded.
Second, when the Court does undertake active review, there are no
easy answers to be found. Despite its undoubted attractions, an inquiry
into governmental purpose is both analytically and practically flawed.
Nor can the problem be circumvented by the belief that there is no
difference between what the government may achieve with carrots or
with sticks. Offers and threats differ, in at least some circumstances,
and such differences need not be left to ad hoc balancing.
Rather, I suggest in part II that the problem of allocational sanc-
tions must be analyzed in two stages. First, courts must distinguish be-
tween threats and offers. Threats are allocations that make a citizen
ter ought not be given unreviewable authority to deny access to mails); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918) (state may not intervene in interstate
commerce by requiring broker's admittance to tickertape service).
" For a particularly illustrative example of this minuet, see Missouri ex rel.
Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924) (requiring that states allow nation-
ally chartered banks to become executors in state courts). Justice Holmes, writing for
the majority, vindicated federal power at the expense of the state. He discounted the
state's general power over its courts, noting that "[tihe States cannot use their most
characteristic powers to reach unconstitutional results" and citing two unconstitutional
conditions cases from which he had dissented. Id. at 24. Justice Sutherland, as the
author of Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926),
echoed Justice Holmes in Burnes in writing that a state might not bring about results
outside its power "by imposing the unconstitutional requirement as a condition prece-
dent to the enjoyment of a privilege." 271 U.S. at 592. But, in Burnes, Sutherland
dissented, arguing that, because the state could have excluded both federally chartered
banks and trust companies, it had the discretion to admit either. See 265 U.S. at 28-29.
For a more recent instance of this exchange, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982). Justice Blackmun, normally a critic of allocational sanctions, writing for
the majority and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White, repeated
Justice Sutherland's Burnes reasoning: because Congress could have preempted state
regulation of utilities entirely, its imposition of conditions on the state regulation was
constitutional. See 456 U.S. at 765. Justices Burger, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, usually
receptive to government's claim to unrestrained prerogatives, adopted the earlier argu-
ments of Justice Holmes in Burnes in rejecting this rationale. See 456 U.S. at 777-81.
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worse off than she otherwise would be because of her exercise of a
constitutional right. Offers merely expand her range of options, leaving
the citizen better off. For example, an offer by the National Endow-
ment for the Arts to provide grants to citizens who choose to write
symphonies rather than jazz differs fundamentally from a threat to
withdraw welfare payments if the citizen chooses jazz over symphonies.
Both allocations influence a constitutionally protected choice, but a
threat abridges first amendment rights in ways an offer does not. The
crucial task is to specify an appropriate baseline against which to deter-
mine whether the proposed allocation improves or worsens the citizen's
situation. The first section of part II proposes three baselines and offers
an analytic framework for assessing the constitutionality of allocational
sanctions that use the proposed baselines.
Threats are subject to constitutional constraints, although courts
may find compelling governmental interests that justify prima facie in-
fringements. Offers will not be subject to restraint unless, proceeding to
.the second step of the analysis, courts find that the rights discouraged
are inalienable. If so, then the government should be prohibited from
offering to buy the rights no less than from threatening to punish their
exercise. The second section of this part of the Article considers the
constitutionality of allocational sanctions that impinge upon inalienable
rights.
The difficulties of neatly categorizing allocational sanctions are
rooted both in our conception of constitutional rights and in the way we
view the nature of government's responsibility for the welfare of its
citizens. The analysis developed in part II seeks to provide a frame-
work within which to order discourse and to test judicial intuition. My
hope is not to build a system that automatically resolves all of the cases,
for hard cases abound. Rather, the analysis set forth succeeds if it at
least gets the easy cases right, explains why the hard cases are hard,
and allows argument to center on the appropriate factual and legal
issues.
I. PRIOR ANALYSES OF ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
A. Introduction -
Even a government that does no more than impose criminal sanc-
tions retains the opportunity to trade its protection for the relinquish-
ment of other rights. Most elements of the modern unconstitutional
conditions conundrum surfaced long before the emergence of a positive
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state. In 1821,0 the Tennessee legislature attempted to circumvent the
prohibition that states not issue paper money as legal tender21 by pass-
ing a statute that delayed execution on any plaintiff's judgment in a
civil case for two years unless the creditor agreed to accept notes issued
by Tennessee as payment. The Tennessee Supreme Court's considera-
tion of that statute in Townsend v. Townsend22 prefigured a century
and a half of subsequent argument.
The state argued that it had not made its notes legal tender but
had merely offered speedier execution to creditors who would accept it
as such. According to the state, the availability of execution in less than
two years, was purely a gratuitous benefit. "The assembly. . . have a
right to suspend execution, because they may place the terms of the
Court at such a distance form each other as to make it impossible for a
creditor to entitle himself to execution in less than two, three, or more
years . ",2.
The Tennessee court was unpersuaded. As to the voluntary nature
of the acceptance, Judge Haywood noted, "Whatever he is not bound to
receive, [the creditor] cannot be punished for refusing. . . .Suspension
of execution is a penalty if, but for the Act, the creditor would be enti-
tled to it . . "..- Since timely execution had previously been availa-
ble, denial of that execution constituted an impermissible penalty for
declining to accept the scrip.
Even granting the state's claim that the right to execution might be
suspended or conditioned by the legislature, the court held that the con-
dition would be void: "By such inventions every constitutional right
may in succession be bartered away. Constitutional rights are vested,
unexchangeable, and unalienable. They belong to posterity as well as to
the present generation. We may use and enjoy, but not transfer them;
and every such condition is utterly void."
'25
" The general problem of misuse of conceded power is substantially older. Com-
pare 2 Samuel 11:1-27 (David orders Uriah sent to a dangerous combat position where
Uriah is killed. David marries his widow.) with Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local
Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (draft exemption revoked in retaliation for antiwar
protest).
• U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
' 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1 (1821).
23 Id. at 15, Peck at 18.
24 Id. at 9, Peck at 11-12.
I d. at 10, Peck at 12. The other positive activity undertaken by the "minimal"
antebellum federal government-postal service-was subject to similar manipulations.
In 1835 President Andrew Jackson urged Congress to withdraw the privilege of using
the mails from antislavery propagandists. The bill that would have implemented the
suggestion was rejected by Congress on free speech grounds, as was a similarly moti-
vated measure to bar from the mails any item that the state of the recipient had
banned. Immediately before the Civil War, the Postmaster General unilaterally ordered
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Similar clashes occurred two generations later with the attempts to
establish loyalty oaths as conditions for obtaining state or federal li-
censes and positions.28 Proponents emphasized that barring non-oath
takers was not a criminal penalty and that the government had plenary
authority to deny the licenses and positions entirely.27 Opponents suc-
cessfully argued that any decrease in the opportunities available to a
citizen was a penalty within the contemplation of the ex post facto and
bill of attainder clauses and that all governmental functions must be
undertaken within constitutional constraints.28
At the turn of the century, the flowering of the substantive rights
of business under the contract clause and the fourteenth amendment
clashed with attempts by state populists to contain emerging corporate
the nondelivery of certain abolitionist newspapers. During the War, the taint of south-
ern sedition was used to bar delivery of critical newspapers, still without congressional
authorization. See D. FOWLER, UNMAILABLE 26-34 (1977); Deutsch, Freedom of the
Press and of the Mails, 36 MICH. L. REv. 703, 717-27 (1938); Rogers, The Postal
Power of Congress: A Study in Constitutional Expansion, 34 JOHNS HOPKINs UNIV.
STUD. IN HIsT. & POL. ScL, No. 2, 1, 103-15 (1916); Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A
Developing Right, 54 GEO. L.J. 30 (1965).
Similarly, from 1851 to 1875, within a generally subsidized system of newspaper
delivery by mail, subscribers who lived within 100 miles of where the paper was
printed were provided with lower mailing rates than were available to those who were
beyond that radius. The explicit intention of the discount was to protect rural readers
from the "poisoned sentiments of the city,. . . concentrated in their papers. . . ." W.
FULLER, THE AMERICAN MAIL: ENLARGER OF THE COMMON LIFE 114 (1972); I. DE
SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 79 (1983).
Early cases tended to accept the proposition that "[t]he legislative body in thus
establishing a postal service may annex such conditions to it as it chooses." Public
Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 506 (1904). See United States ex rel. Milwau-
kee Soc. Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921) (upholding revo-
cation of second class mail permit for criticism of the government); Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727 (1877) (government may exclude unfit material from the mails).
Cases during the last 40 years, however, have largely voided governmental restric-
tions on the use of the mails. See, e.g., Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (striking
down Postmaster's censorship scheme as lacking sufficient first amendment safeguards);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down statute prohibiting
delivery of communist propaganda except on written request of recipient); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (striking down revocation of second class mail per-
mit for material deemed vulgar by Postmaster). As ever, the best analysis of this pro-
gression is also one of the earliest: Z. CHAFEE, supra note 10, at 276-366. See also I.
DE SOLA POOL, supra, at 79-91; Deutsch, supra; Sigler, supra.
26 See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). But see Ex parte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122 (1867)
(upholding oath). See generally H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JusTIcE UNDER
LAW 373-85, 551 (1982); H. HYMAN, ERA OF THE OATH: NORTHERN LOYALTY
TESTS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1954).
27 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 353, 356-57 (1867); Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 2932-94 (1867).
Is See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 340-48 (1867); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 286-89 (1867).
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power.2" Constitutionally prohibited from direct criminal regulation of
business, states adopted allocational sanctions. Across the West, state
legislatures attempted to parlay their conceded authority over the right
of foreign corporations to do business within their jurisdictions into
limitations on corporate activities-limitations they could not have im-
posed directly.
As earlier studies have noted, these cases manifested an inconsis-
tency so marked as to make a legal realist of almost any reader.30 Yet it
was these decisions that gave birth to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrines embraced by modern jurists. Therefore, an attempt to come to
terms with the problem of allocative sanctions appropriately begins by
accounting for the durability of these earlier doctrines, and recounting
their weaknesses.
B. Doctrines of Judicial Deference
1. The Classical Doctrine of the Greater and the Lesser
Although courts have occasionally defended allocational sanctions
on the ground that the victim retains the choice of noncompliance,"1 the
:9 See L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-1, at 433 (1978).
0 For the classic analysis, see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitu-
tional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935). For other analyses, see G. HENDERSON,
THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTrI oNAL LAW
- [ch.5] (1918); French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234
(1961); Merrill, supra note 14; see also Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd., 451
U.S. 648, 656-667 (1982) (reviewing history of unconstitutional conditions attached to
state licensing of corporations and attempting to modulate sine-wave swings into a
smooth progression); Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Ec-
onomic" Compulsion, 35 COLuM. L. REv. 150 (1935).
A particularly vivid example of this inconsistency is provided by the line of cases
that alternately permitted and prohibited the conditioning of insurance company li-
censes on the applicant insurer's repudiation of its right to remove cases to federal
court. See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874) (invalidating condi-
tion); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876) (permitting revocation of li-
cense in retaliation for removal of suit); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887) (fol-
lowing Morse; license may not be revoked for removal); Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906) (following Doyle and upholding revocation); Terral v.
Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (overruling Prewitt and Doyle).
"I Defenders of governmental prerogatives have long grasped the rhetorical advan-
tages of characterizing governmental intervention as an offer of benefits rather than as
a threat of sanctions. The government, it was said, did not violate constitutional rights
simply by offering a benefit for favored conduct. The citizen retained the choice of
complying or not. Thus, dissenters in the Civil War loyalty oath cases defended the
oath's constitutionality on the ground that "[n]o person is pointed out in the act of
Congress . . . . The oath is only required of those who propose to accept an office or
to practise law . . . . It is not, then, the act of Congress, but the party interested, that
tries and condemns." Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 389-90 (1867)
(Miller, J., dissenting).
In cases concerning corporate regulation, proponents-both successful and unsuc-
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most resilient defense is that "[e]ven in the law the whole generally
cessful-of state authority distinguished situations in which the state compelled conduct
in violation of constitutional rights from those situations in which the state made such
conduct a condition of corporate access to a benefit. The majority, in Doyle v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876), denied the dissenters' accusation that it had per-
mitted the states to force corporations to forego their federally guaranteed right of ac-
cess to federal courts, arguing: "This is an 'inexact statement.' The effect of our
decision in this respect is that the State may compel the foreign company to abstain
from the Federal courts, or to cease to do business in the State. It gives the company the
option." 94 U.S. at 542. See also Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246,
252 (1906); Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U.S. 420, 422 (1903) ("The company cannot
complain of being taxed for the privilege of doing a local business which it is free to
renounce."); cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 21 (1915) ("To ask a man to agree, in
advance, to refrain from affiliation with the union while retaining a certain position of
employment is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is
free to decline the employment on those terms.").
Justice Holmes also took up this theme: "The whole matter is left in the Western
Union's hands . . . .If the Telegraph Company chooses to pay the fee [on intrastate
business] out of its other earnings that is its affair. It is master of the situation and can
stop if it sees fit." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
Although the argument has long been discredited in the area of corporate regula-
tion, see Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532-33 (1922), it continued to be a
viable rationale for the infringement of personal liberties. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) (Military training may be re-
quired as a condition of attendance at state university: "California has not drafted or
called them to attend the university. They are seeking education offered by the State
.... ); see also id. at 266 (Cardozo, J., concurring) ("If they elect to resort to an
institution for higher education maintained with the state's money, then and only then
are they commanded . . ... "); cf. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
631-32 (1943) (holding unconstitutional requirement that public school students salute
American flag; the Court distinguished Hamilton, noting that attendance at public
school was required, while university attendance was elective).
A similar analysis underlay decisions sustaining "loyalty" programs of the Mc-
Carthy era. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (public school
teachers barred from subversive activities retain the choice of working subject to restric-
tions or of maintaining "their beliefs and associations and go[ing] elsewhere"); Ameri-
can Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 403-04 (1950) (requirement that
union officials sign affidavit denying communist allegiance does not violate first amend-
ment: the officers may maintain their beliefs "subject only to possible loss of posi-
tions"); cf. Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 405 (1958) (inquiry into
teachers' political beliefs justified by nature of their position).
Such reasoning, that those on whom a condition is imposed retain the choice to
avoid the condition, has been largely unavailing in modern personal rights cases. See,
e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating statute that barred ministers
from public office); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating
loyalty oath requirement for teachers); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a requirement that state employees declare belief in God). But see
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142 (1947) (upholding
Hatch Act prohibition of public employees from political activity against tenth amend-
ment challenge); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1250-62,
1252 n,205 (1977) (choice of noncompliance sufficient for tenth amendment purposes).
Nonetheless, the argument is not dormant. The Court continues to argue, on occa-
sion, that no right has been violated because the state has not forbidden its exercise.
See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971) (conditioning welfare benefits
1984]
1306 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
includes its parts. If the State may prohibit, it may prohibit with the
privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way."32 If the govern-
ment may deny the claimant at will, the claimant appears no worse off
when the government exercises that denial because of the claimant's
failure to comply with a condition attached to the entitlement.
Justice Holmes made this point repeatedly. In rejecting a claim
that the refusal to allow a rally on the Boston Commons infringed free-
dom of speech, he asserted,
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid pub-
lic speaking in a highway or public park is no more an in-
fringement of the rights of a member of the public than for
the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house ...
[T]he Legislature may end the right of the public to enter
upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to
public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting the
public use to certain purposes. 33
Speaking in dissent fifteen years later, Holmes reiterated his inability
to understand how a condition can be unconstitutional when
attached to a matter over which a State has absolute arbi-
trary power ...
The consequence is the measure of the condition. When
on consent to home inspection by social worker; "[T]he visitation in itself is not forced
or compelled and . . . the beneficiary's denial of permission is not a criminal act. If
consent ... is withheld, . . . [t]he aid then never begins or merely ceases."); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 650 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that to
condition welfare benefits on residency does not bar right to travel).
This argument has surfaced in recent Terms. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell,
104 S. Ct. 1211, 1223 (1984) (conditioning federal funds on nondiscrimination does not
infringe first amendment rights; "Grove City may terminate its participation in the
... program and thus avoid the requirements .... Requiring Grove City to comply
... infringes no First Amendment rights."); Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 440
(1982) (union officials dismissed for supporting insurgent union candidate;
"[Pletitioners allege only an indirect interference [with their first amendment rights]
• . . maintaining that they were forced to 'choos[e] between their rights of free expres-
sion . . . and their jobs.' ") (quoting Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (D.D.C. 1969)); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309
(1981) (upholding revocation of passport for unpatriotic activity; denial was only "an
inhibition of action, rather than of speech. . . . Agee is as free to criticize the United
States Goveinment as he was when he held a passport.") (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 16 (1965)) (emphasis supplied by Court).
Such blithe dismissal of constitutional protections is far too simplistic. See infra
text accompanying notes 220-96 for my attempt to construct an appropriate framework
of analysis.
' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
" Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43
(1897).
[Vol. 132:1293
ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
the only consequence of a breach in a result that the State
may bring about directly in the first place, the condition can-
not be unconstitutional."
Justice Holmes has not been alone in his analysis. The state of
Tennessee, in Townsend v. Townsend,35 unsuccessfully argued that, be-
cause the legislature could deprive plaintiffs of execution of their judg-
ments by closing the courts entirely, execution could be denied to those
who insisted on being paid in hard currency. Years later, Civil War
loyalty oaths were defended, with mixed success, on the similar theory
that the oaths were preconditions to privileges the government might
deny entirely."
In 1876, this doctrine of the "greater and lesser" provided the ba-
sis for the holding that a state could withdraw the business license of a
foreign corporation in retaliation for the corporation's invocation of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction. 7 To a dissenting claim that the state had
imposed an "unconstitutional condition" on the right to do business,"
the majority replied, "If the State has the power to cancel the license
[i]t has the power to determine for what causes and in what man-
ner the revocation shall be made." ' This doctrine prevailed intermit-
tently in the field of foreign corporations for the next sixty-five years. 0
" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). The argument that an absolute power necessarily includes the power to impose
conditions recurs elsewhere in Justice Holmes's reasoning. See, e.g., Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 602 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("'[T]he power to exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition
... ' ") (quoting Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924)); City and County of
Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 196-97 (1918) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (City may require water company to dose altogether; therefore, it may set
water rates at any price.); ef. Hammer v. Dagenhart (Child Labor Case), 247 U.S.
251, 277-81 (1918) (prohibition of interstate trade in products of child labor held un-
constitutional) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (if government has a power, it cannot be cur-
tailed because of its indirect effects).
Similar reasoning led Justice Holmes to reject an antitrust challenge to the tying
of patented and non-patented products. He argued that absolute control over the pat-
ented product justified conditions on its availability. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1 (1821).
36 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
37 See Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
Id. at 543 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 542; see also cases cited supra note 34.
40 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876), was effectively reversed by
Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887) (state may not prohibit foreign corporation
from removing suit to federal court as condition of doing business). This, in turn, was
overruled by Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 257 (1906) (license
to do business may be revoked for removal; "As a state has poiver to refuse permission
to. . .do business at all,. . . it has the power to withdraw that permission when once
given without stating any reason for its action ....").
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Similar reasoning sustained arbitrary governmental actions in
other constitutionally sensitive areas until the last years of the Warren
Court.41 Later Justices usually appended a disclaimer that the exercise
of a governmental prerogative could not, "of course," discriminate on
the basis of race, religion, or political affiliation.42
Nonetheless, the ghost of Justice Holmes's greater and lesser argu-
ment continues to brood over much constitutional analysis. 43 In the
criminal area echoes of the doctrine have rung down forcefully even
during the last Term.44 Elsewhere, Justice Rehnquist has consistently
Identical reasoning is found in cases upholding a state's right to tax foreign corpo-
rations doing in-state business. See Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673,
678 (1945) ("'The State, having the power to exclude entirely, has the power to
change the conditions of admission at any time . . . .'") (quoting Philadelphia Fire
Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 119 (1886)); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302
U.S. 22 (1937); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Horn Silver Mining Co. v.
New York, 143 U.S. 305 (1892); Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110,
119 (1886); cf. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd., 451 U.S. 648 (1981) (foreign
corporations doing business in California must pay "retaliatory tax" equal to that
charged California corporations doing business in the foreign corporation's home state).
41 See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (medical li-
censes); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (state university
attendance); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931) (naturalization);
Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (public works employment); Bailey v. Richard-
son, 182 F.2d 46 (1950) (same), affd mem. by equally divided court, 341 U.S. 819
(1951).
42 See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (practice of
medicine is within sphere of state's regulation, but regulation must be reasonable);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (public employees may be
restrained from political activity but could not be subjected to racial or religious restric-
tions); cf. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952) (government may bar
Communists from teaching positions, but it may not abridge their freedom of speech in
general); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402-05 (1950) (re-
quirement that union officials sign affidavit denying communist allegiance does not vio-
late first amendment).
41 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
103 S. Ct. 1365, 1378-79 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that because
newspapers could constitutionally be required to pay a more costly sales tax, imposition
of a "lesser" special tax on newsprint should be acceptable).
A related species of the greater and lesser argument is the right-privilege distinc-
tion. If a certain benefit is found to be a privilege, and not a right, then it may be
denied entirely at the government's discretion. This greater power then justifies the
imposition of conditions. Professor Van Alstyne's announcement of the demise of this
right-privilege distinction, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion, 81 HARV. L. R v. 1439, 1458-64 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, Right-
Privilege Distinction]; see also Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Em-
ployees, 16 UCLA L. REV. 751, 754 n.14 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne,
Public Employees], was more hopeful prediction than accomplished fact. The distinction
has continued vitality. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319 (1971) (because wel-
fare is a privilege, not a right, benefits may be conditioned on consent to home
inspections).
41 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983) (power to require
motorist to undergo breathalizer test includes lesser power to use refusal to take op-
tional test as evidence against a criminal defendant); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67
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been attracted to the idea that when the government acts in a proprie-
tary capacity, its conceded power to dispose of property includes the
"lesser" power to restrict its use for selected first amendment activi-
ties.45 He maintains, with decreasing success, that government's power
to define the terms upon which benefits are offered includes the capac-
ity to exclude due process protections.'6 In a reincarnation of cases
from over a hundred years ago,'7 Justice Rehnquist argues that a
state's right to prohibit business incorporation carries a concomitant
right to permit incorporation only on the condition that it renounce first
(1975) (greater authority to search car at time of arrest justifies lesser infringement of
warrantless search at police station); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)
(authority to impound car justifies lesser intrusion of warrantless search).
45 See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 129 (1981) (proprietary power over mailboxes justifies exclusion of all unstamped
mail); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125-26
(1977) (proprietary power over prisons includes power to prohibit prisoner unioniza-
tion); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 283 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (hospital management, unlike traditional government functions, is essen-
tially the provision of a private facility on which government is free to impose limita-
tions); see also Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 368 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (accusing majority of ignoring "common-sense maxim" that greater includes
lesser).
Justice Rehnquist has not been alone. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (If a total ban on billboards
is permissible, content neutral exceptions should be subject to lesser scrutiny.); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (Stewart, J., majority opinion) (arguing that government
as property owner may restrict first amendment rights on military base).
48 Justice Rehnquist first staked out this position in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (Claimants "must take the bitter with the
sweet" by accepting whatever due process limitations accompany the provision of a
benefit.). This approach appeared to have gained the support of a majority of the Court
in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (refusing to apply due process rights to the
dismissal of a government employee). However, Justice Rehnquist has found himself
increasingly among dissenters as the Court explicitly has rejected the proposition that
the power to grant a benefit comprehends the power to define the procedures by which
it may be denied. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-32
(1982) (applying due process requirements to government fair employment practices
review); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490 n.6 (1980) (explicitly rejecting Arnett plu-
rality); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (scrutinizing procedures in Social
Security statute for due process violations).
For the latest commentary on the interaction between the definition of property
and the due process protections it entails, see Alexander, The Concept of Property in
Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis,
82 CoLum. L. REV 1545 (1982); Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP.
CT. REv. 85; Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1982); Terrell,
"Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction between Definition and Theory in Le-
gal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861 (1982); Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem
of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL Sru. 3 (1983).
47 On the efforts by states to condition the right of corporations to do business
within their jurisdictions, see cases and sources included in supra note 30.
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amendment rights.4"
On the other side of the aisle, in Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission v. Mississippi4 9 [FERC], Justice Blackmun used the greater
and lesser argument to defend federal action that allowed states to reg-
ulate natural gas only on the condition that they comply with federal
requirements. "Congress could have pre-empted the field . . . [there-
fore, the statute] should not be invalid simply because, out of deference
to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme and al-
lowed the States to continue regulating [on condition]."5 In other con-
texts, the Couirt was unanimously receptive to the argument that the
greater power of Indian tribes to exclude oil drilling included the lesser
power to impose a severance tax51 and was unanimously perplexed by
the proposal that there was a difference between removing books from
a school library and not buying them in the first place.52
The durability of the argument that the greater includes the lesser
is a tribute to its prima facie intuitive appeal. Even defenders of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine have been apologetic in their criti-
cism of the argument. Professor Hale commented that the "doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, as so stated, is difficult to support logically.
If I have no ground for complaint at being denied a privilege abso-
lutely, it is difficult to see how I acquire such a ground merely because
the state . . . offers me an alternative, however harsh."5' Such defer-
ence is unwarranted, for despite its distinguished lineage and superfi-
cial plausibility, the argument in defense of government's unbridled
prerogative to condition allocations is deeply flawed.
First, for seventy-five years it has been clear that the argument
that the greater includes the lesser does not work as syllogism." All
4" See First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825-27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
9 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
50 Id. at 765. Justice O'Connor strongly dissented in part in FERC, calling the
greater and lesser argument an absurdity that would dissolve all constitutional limits on
federal regulation of state action. See id. at 781 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Last Term, however, Justice O'Connor relied on the greater and
lesser argument to defend the admissibility of evidence of a drunk driver's refusal to
take a blood alcohol level test. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 (1983)
(The "state could legitimately compel the suspect ... to accede to the test .... [T]he
action becomes no less legitimate when the state offers a second option of refusing the
test, with the attendant penalties . . ").
See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144, 159, 186 (1982).
See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
s Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLum. L.
REV. 321-22 (1935). See also Alsehuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 652, 699 (1981) ("There seems to be no direct and satisfying answer to
the a fortiori logic of the old right/privilege distinction.").
"' Professor Powell dissects the argument as follows:
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that can be deduced logically from the power to deny a benefit abso-
lutely is the power to deny it absolutely. If the power to deny condi-
tionally is, by definition, subsumed in the power to deny absolutely,
then the argument is valid, but trivial. If one does not accept the pre-
mise that the power of conditional denial is an element of the power of
absolute denial, then the former cannot be deduced from the latter. But
this alone does not disqualify the argument. The underlying question is
whether the conditional denial is qualitatively different. Legal reason-
ing relies more on the persuasiveness of analogy than on the validity of
a syllogism.55 Yet even as an analogy the argument is flawed.
Two defects are illustrated by Justice Holmes's explication that
"the consequence is the measure of the condition" and the condition is
legitimate when the only consequence of its breach is a result the state
may bring about directly. First, the argument assumes that the only
aspects of governmental action subject to review are its consequences.
[Justice Holmes] implies that the power of total exclusion is a "whole," of
which the power to impose any burdens whatsoever on those admitted is a
"part." The fallacy here will appear if the proposition is put in syllogistic
form.
Major Premise. There is a class of corporations "A". .. over which
the state has the power of absolute exclusion.
Minor Premise. The X corporation is an "A" corporation.
Conclusion. Therefore the X corporation is one upon which the state
has power to impose any burden whatsoever.
Plainly the only legitimate conclusion is that the X corporation is one
over which the state has the power of absolute exclusion .... [Justice
Holmes] has a different predicate in his conclusion from that in his major
premise. . . . The "power of absolute exclusion" is a term not identical
with the "power of relative exclusion" or the "power to impose any bur-
dens whatsoever."
Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 99, 110-11 (1916) (foot-
notes omitted). See also French, supra note 30, at 239-42; O'Neil, Unconstitutional
Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAuF. L. REv. 443, 461
(1966); Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the
Forfeiture of Another, 66 IowA L. REv. 741, 747 n.20 (1981).
Although these writers have demonstrated that the greater and lesser argument
fails deductively, the argument is not left without any force; it may work inductively or
as a persuasive analogy. Such forms of reasoning, though invalid in formal logic,
predominate in legal and practical argument. See C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW AND
ARGUMENT 148-61 (1980) [hereinafter cited as C. PERELMAN, LAW AND ARGUMENT];
cf. S. HANDELMAN, TItE SLAYERS OF MOSES 52-57 (1982) (describing persuasive force
of greater and lesser style argument in rabbinic thought; contrasting it with deductive
syllogisms prevalent in Greek thought). See generally C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF
JusTIcE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT (1963) [hereinafter cited as C. P. nL-
MAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE].
5' See C. PaRELMAN, THm IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 156; Burton, Com-
ment on Empty Ideas: Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J.
1136 (1982); Murray, The Role of Analogy in Lega[Reasoning, 29 UCLA L. REv.
833 (1982); Christie, Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REv. 715 (1982) (reviewing C. PER-
ELMAN, LAW AND ARGUMENT, supra note 54).
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This assumption is misguided. Many, if not most, constitutional con-
straints on government concern not the consequences of its decisions,
but the processes by which they are made. Not only the destination, but
the path, is crucial in constitutional analysis. Whether a prisoner has
been convicted in accordance with due process or as the result of a
coerced confession, the consequence of imprisonment is identical, but it
cannot be said that the Constitution is unconcerned with the method by
which the result is achieved. For the broad class of cases where consti-
tutional norms constrain the means by which government may achieve
its ends, the argument of the greater and lesser is wholly inapplicable.56
A second shortcoming of Holmes's argument is its generally re-
stricted interpretation of the scope of consequences to be evaluated.
From one vantage, the consequence of excluding blacks from a swim-
ming pool may be no different for those excluded than the consequence
of closing the pool entirely. In neither case can blacks swim. Yet, a
more realistic evaluation of the consequences recognizes that they differ
in at least one dimension: the benefit extended to whites. Blacks in the
latter case lack a claim of comparative injustice that blacks in the for-
mer case can assert. This may not be the only claim available, but it
seems clear that being denied an advantage granted to others differs
from being harmed in isolation.57 Likewise, the consequence of know-
ing that unemployment compensation will be denied a Seventh Day
Adventist if she refuses to work on Saturday is significantly different
from knowing that no unemployment compensation program exists.
The "pressure upon her to forego [her] religion" is a consequence of
the former situation that is absent in the latter.58
56 See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 509-11 (1982) (state
may limit or prohibit liquor license in proximity of churches and schools, but it may
not delegate that power by giving churches a veto); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Constitution fixes
allocation of decisionmaking authority; "Surely the truly technical restrictions of Article
III are not. met or respected by a beguiling phrase that the greater power here must
necessarily include the lesser.").
57 See also infra text accompanying notes 258-91. Compare Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing rather than integrating public swimming pool does not
violate equal protection clause) with Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1950)
(provision of separate state law school for blacks violates equal protection despite lack
of obligation to provide legal education in the first place).
Although Professor Westen has argued that equality is an empty and misleading
principle when divorced from any set of legal rights or values, he nevertheless finds
some content in claims of comparative injustice. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equal-
ity, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 551-54 (1982); cf. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 205-07 (1980) (A recipient may prefer to receive greater benefits on a
condition of inequality that others be better off than he, rather than an absolute equal-
ity in which everyone, including the recipient, receives fewer benefits.).
" Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963); ef. O'Neil, supra note 54, at
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If, in evaluating consequences, attention is focused not simply on
the denial of benefits, but on the state of the world after the denial,
Justice Holmes's dictum that the consequence is the measure of the
condition becomes not a pat defense for allocational sanctions, but a
demanding test to scrutinize governmental action. It translates into the
claim that an impact on constitutional rights is sufficient to invalidate
an allocation.5"
Justice Holmes's greater and lesser analogy has a more fundamen-
tal failing. Part of the argument's charm is its implicit assertion that
the government is not aggrandizing its power. The government could
have wielded the greater power of denying the benefit entirely, accord-
ing to the argument, and therefore its more restricted exercise of that
power, in the form of a conditional grant, gives the government no ad-
ditional power. The difficulty with this position is its assumption that
the government could have, in fact, wielded the greater power.60
Often it is only by ripping a problem from its historical context
that selective denial can be viewed as a lesser power.61 In reality, selec-
tive deprivation may be the less controlled and hence the more danger-
ous power. In many situations, the government's absolute denial of a
benefit is not practically or politically feasible, absent overwhelming
public necessity. It is only this practical or political resistance that
makes the government's possession of the greater power at all tolerable.
Allowing the government to deny benefits to some, but not all, of the
populace gives it a power that is nowhere implicit in the power to deny
benefits absolutely.62 Conversely, the selective denial of a benefit may
be more onerous to a population accustomed to the benefit than the
failure to grant it in the first place.
The Townsend court recognized this in rejecting the inference that
the legislature's power to set court terms authorized it to delay execu-
462 (psychological impact of conditioned benefit may be greater than that of absolute
denial).
59 If the consequence is to be the measure of the constitutionality of the condition,
then legislatures may not accomplish indirectly by conditioning privileges what they
cannot accomplish directly by criminal sanctions. See infra text accompanying notes
164-97.
60 See O'Neil, supra note 54, at 463-64 (questioning extent of greater power).
"I Neither is it clear that a conditioned benefit is in any way a less potent sanction
or a lesser power. Compelling psychological suasion or dire necessity for sustenance
may render the withdrawal of a benefit highly coercive. See O'Neil, supra note 54, at
462, 471-73.
62 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
103 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (1983) ("When the State singles out the press [for special taxa-
tion], though, the political constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling
taxes of general applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes be-
comes acute.").
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tion because a more selective denial would not arouse "[t]he indignant
disapprobration of the people."63 Even Justice Holmes, at times, ac-
knowledged the distinction." Nonetheless, sixty years later, judges con-
tinue to argue for the a fortiori permissibility of questionable govern-
ment activities on the basis of the theoretical availability of alternative,
and putatively greater, powers.6 5 Seductive arguments, however, are not
necessarily sound. Unless these alternatives are practically available,
the lesser exercise of selective denial can gain no support from hypo-
thetically greater powers of absolute denial. Selective denial warrants
recognition as a separate and potentially encroaching state power.
2. Two Emerging Errors: Negative Rights in a Positive State
The greater and lesser. doctrine sees in the affinity between the
concededly permissible greater power and the lesser power at issue a
warrant for immunizing the lesser power from judicial review. Two
lines of doctrine emerging from contemporary courts and commentators
also insulate allocational sanctions from active review, but do so by fo-
cusing on particular reasons that the greater power is thought to be
permissible.
The first doctrine defines the greater power as the power to con-
trol and dispose of property. A private individual may manage property
as she sees fit, free of constitutional limitations. So too, runs this argu-
ment, the government's proprietary actions are not constitutionally
"3 Townsend, 7 Tenn. at 15, Peck at 19.
Compare Justice Holmes's admission that habitual reliance on a benefit may
justify constitutional protection in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (If the government chooses to offer postal service, it may do so on condi-
tion, "which is well enough when neither law nor the habit that the Government's
action has generated has made that means the only one. But when habit and law com-
bine to exclude every other it seems to me that the First Amendment in terms forbids
such control of the post.") with Justice Holmes's more usual attitude in City and
County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 197 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that because city could theoretically require water company to re-
move its pipes from the city's streets, it may set water rates at a level that does not
permit a fair return on the water company's investment).
" See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 .U.S. 742, 765-67 (1982) (federal govern-
ment may preempt state utilities regulation; therefore, it may impose requirements);
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 126-
27 & n.5 (1981) (government may abandon postal service altogether; therefore, it may
attach conditions and restrictions). The Court, at times, has acknowledged the extreme
improbability that the government would exercise its putatively greater power, al-
though not admitting this to be a weakness in the greater-lesser argument. See, e.g.,
FERC, 456 U.S. at 767 (unlikely that states would abandon utilities regulation to fed-
eral government); City and County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S.
178, 197 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (admitting city's greater power of ordering
water company to remove its pipes from the streets was merely theoretical).
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constrained.
Several members of the Supreme Court seem increasingly attracted
to this distinction between proprietary and sovereign governmental ac-
tivities. While sovereign activity is subject to constitutional constraint,
the government in its proprietary persona is as free, or almost as free,
as a private proprietor in disposing of its property. If one of the most
effective means of social control at the disposal of a modern government
is the allocation of benefits,"6 then this proprietary/sovereign distinction
portends the disintegration of constitutional review. Careful analysis
suggests, however, that nothing in the government's role as proprietor
warrants such deference.
A second doctrine draws from liberal political philosophy. It ex-
plains the results of the cases by viewing constitutional liberties as neg-
ative rather than positive freedoms. Negative freedoms require only
that a government not interfere in their exercise. A government that
simply refuses to extend a benefit is passive and has no obligation to do
more. Distinguishing action from inaction is appealing, but misguided.
The line between nonfeasance and misfeasance is theoretically prob-
lematic and difficult to maintain.
a. The Sovereign/Proprietary Distinction
Having a constitutional right to perform a given act means, at
least, that one may perform that act without governmental interfer-
ence.67 The problem, however, is to define "interference." The task of
constitutional law may be to identify a limited set of impermissible
sanctions that abridge constitutionally protected rights and that there-
fore may be labeled as interferences. Application of a sanction from
outside that set of interferences would not violate the right in ques-
tion.6 8 And, for one contemporary position, the set of sanctions that can
"' See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
67 This approach toward constitutional protections is in accord with those theories
of freedom that define it as freedom from constraints on, or barriers to, potential
human endeavors. As Isaiah Berlin characterizes it, "freedom. . . entails . . . the ab-
sence of obstacles to possible choices and activities-absence of obstructions on roads
along which a man can decide to walk." I. BEaUN, FoUR ESSAYS ON LIaRTY xxxix-
xl (1969). Accord, e.g., J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 202 (1971).
If this is so, disagreements regarding negative and positive liberty are not disagree-
ments about some fundamental difference. They are merely differences regarding the
range of agents, preventing conditions and actions involved in the statement "x is (is
not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z." See MacCallum, Negative and
Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REv. 312 (1967).
6" This is distinct from a theory that, in certain circumstances, government's pro-
prietary interests may be invoked to justify a prima fade infringement of constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1113-21 (1980). If allocational sanctions do
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impinge on constitutional rights does not include sanctions invoked by
the government in its proprietary capacity. This seems to be the thrust
of Justice Powell's comment in Maher v. Roe.69
There is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an al-
ternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitu-
tional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to im-
pose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage
actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far
broader.70
Similarly, for Justice Rehnquist only sovereign interference is forbid-
den interference.
7 1
This thinking has surfaced in other areas. It has appeared else-
where in Justice Powell's decisions, as a suggestion that relations be-
tween state and citizen should be subject to less stringent requirements
when the state plays a "private" role.72 Justice Rehnquist has been an
indefatigable exponent of the position that "the role of government as
sovereign is subject to more stringent limitations than is its role of gov-
ernment as employer, property owner or educator."17 ' And Justice
not even call into play demands for constitutional justification, then the strength of the
government's justification for those sanctions is irrelevant.
69 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
70 Id. at 475-76 (footnote omitted), quoted in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315
(1980). It is possible to read Justice Powell as distinguishing not between sovereign and
proprietary actions, but between actions that discourage and those that encourage. For
a discussion of the distinction between offers and threats, see infra text accompanying
notes 220-42.
71 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002-03
(1983) (quoting Maher v. Roe) ("Congressional selection of particular entities or per-
sons for entitlement . . . 'is obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to
judicial review unless in circumstances which here we are not able to find.' ") (quoting
Cincinatti Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 317 (1937)).
712 See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (Powell, J.) (public
defender's malpractice not state action where her "functions and obligations [are] in no
way dependent on state authority," and relationship with plaintiff was "identical to
that existing between any other lawyer and client"); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348,
356 n.13 (1980) (Powell, J.) (government as employer authorized to impose speech
restrictions "reasonably necessary to promote effective government" in contrast to
higher standards generally imposed); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (Stew-
art, J.) (" 'The State, no less than a private owner of property, has the power to pre-
serve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.' ")
(quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)); cf. Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he . . . . CIA [may] protect substantial
government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in
other contexts might be protected by the "First Amendment.").
7' Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 908-10 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Rehnquist first established this position in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
203 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). For subsequent expressions in this vein by
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Blackmun seemed attracted to the notion during his early years on the
Court .
Nonetheless, the bulk of modern cases quite properly rejects this
line of argument.7 5 However plausible at first glance, the sovereign/
Rehnquist, see Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law,
12 GONZ. L. Rxv. 1, 10-12 (1976) (suggesting separate categories for government as
employer and as property owner); see also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 571 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (lowered scrutiny of a
refusal to allow "Hair" to play in a municipal auditorium because "[hiere we deal with
municipal action by the City of Chattanooga, not prohibiting or penalizing the expres-
sion of views in dramatic form by citizens at large, but rather managing its municipal
auditorium"); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 283 (1974) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (stating that refusal of medical care to indigent immigrants was
permissible because "mere entry into the State does not invoke criminal penalties").
Justice Rehnquist repeated the point more explicitly in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 290-91 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part):
The limits imposed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments on govern-
mental action may vary in their stringency depending on the capacity in
which the government is acting. . . . [C]ases which deal with the govern-
ment as employer or proprietor are not fungible with those which deal
with the government as a lawmaker enacting criminal statutes applying to
the population generally.
Last Term, these views resurfaced. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representa-
tion, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2000-02 (1983) (taxing power subject to less constitutional re-
striction than criminal statutes).
74 See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (ex-
empting government policy limiting announcements on bus billboards from full first
amendment scrutiny because it is "part of [a] commercial venture"); Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971) (defending a requirement of home visits to welfare recipients
against fourth amendment attack because "the visitation in itself is not forced or com-
pelled, and. . . the beneficiary's denial of permission is not a criminal act"). Professor
Smolla also takes this position. See Smolla, supra note 46, at 112-15.
Justice White, on occasion, has expressed the opinion that the government has
greater leeway as an employer than as a regulator. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 103 S.
Ct. 1684, 1689-90 (1983); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Let-
ter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973). Justice White has adopted a similar stance
when the government acts as a property owner. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 958 (1983); cf. Southeastern Promotions, 420
U.S. at 567-69 (White, J., dissenting). Both Justices White and Blackmun, however,
have expressed serious reservations about the sovereign/proprietary distinction. In dis-
sent from an opinion upholding a regulation requiring that at least half of the
workforce on city funded construction projects be local residents, Justices White and
Blackmun argued that the effect would be "virtually identical to the effect of a conven-
tional market regulation" and expressed concern about "using the tremendous power of
the state treasury directly to impede the free flow of. . . commerce." White v. Massa-
chusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1042, 1048-54 (1983) (Black-
mun & White, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court seems to be
moving toward agreement with these reservations. Recently, an identical statute was
held to be subject to invalidation as violating the privileges and immunities clause. See
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 52 U.S.L.W. 4187 (U.S. Feb. 21,
1984) (No. 81-2110).
7' For a discussion of cases decided through the mid-1960's that rejected this sov-
ereign/proprietary distinction, see Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector:
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proprietary distinction proves on examination to be, at best, obscure."8
The government as proprietor is no less dangerous to liberty than
as sovereign. While there is a contemporary philosophical school that
attaches unique status to rights of bodily integrity and freedom from
physical force,7 7 it is hard to imagine any modern constitutional theorist
taking the position that only a direct threat of violence would violate
constitutional rights. The Court has long recognized that fines may de-
ter no less thoroughly than the threat of prison and taxes no less effec-
tively than fines."8 From this recognition, it is only a short step to ac-
knowledging that the deprivation of a monetary benefit by the
government acting in its proprietary capacity may be an equally effec-
tive deterrent.
Revocation of access to the U.S. mails, for example, would more
effectively silence a dissident news magazine than either a fine or a
Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 (1965); Van
Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 43. The rejection of this distinction has
continued in recent cases. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (conditions
on interstate travel); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (conditions on use of
state university); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (conditions on government em-
ployment); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (conditions on public office); Lefko-
witz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (conditions on government contracts); Bond v.
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (conditions on admission to legislature).
7 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644 n.26 (1980) (Referring
to the non-governmental/governmental quagmire, the Court stated, "'A comparative
study of the cases in the forty-eight states will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More
than that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmonious, and disclose the inevi-
table chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound.' ") (quot-
ing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (on rehearing)); Wells
& Hellerstein, supra note 68, at 1136 ("The terms 'governmental' and 'proprietary'
are best viewed as labels expressing the conclusion that particular legal government
activity should be accorded a particular legal status and not as standards to be used in
reaching such a conclusion.").
7 See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 30-32 (1978); R. NozIcK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 32-33 (1974) ("Political philosophy is concerned only with cer-
tain ways that persons may not use others; primarily physically aggressing against
them. . . . This root idea [of human dignity]. . . leads to a libertarian side constraint
that prohibits aggression against another."); Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice:
A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979) (natural right of liberty under-
stood as "freedom from force and falsehood"); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); cf. T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN chs. 14, 21 (rev'd Amer. ed.
1950) (Liberty is "freedom from chains and prison" or absence of "external impedi-
ments to motion.").
78 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S.
Ct. 1365, 1372 (1983) (threat of burdensome and selective tax may effectively censor
freedom of the press); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-48 (1936)
(holding newspaper revenue tax invalid and recounting historical instances of censor-
ship through taxation of press); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (tax on
sale of liquor found to be penalty to enforce prohibition); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922) (tax on interstate trade in
products of child labor found to be penalty for employment of children beyond author-
ity of Congress).
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prison sentence for the editor. Even a revocation of subsidized second
class mail rates could be as effective.79 And an employee who cheerfully
risks a misdemeanor conviction by asserting her free speech rights
might be reluctant to hazard her pension in a similar cause.
If the effectiveness of the deterrents available to government is at
issue, then there is no a priori reason that sovereignty should equate
with danger. Indeed, the converse may be true. The effectiveness of any
sanction will be a function of both its magnitude, and its ease of imple-
mentation. Not only is the magnitude of proprietary sanctions often
greater than of sovereign ones, but they are often much more easily
brought to bear. A government that employs criminal sanctions must
first find the violators, then prosecute them. On the other hand, recipi-
ents of benefits must themselves come to government on a regular ba-
sis.8 0 Sanctions can be applied through administrative mechanisms al-
ready in place. Limitations attached to allocational sanctions need not
be drawn with the narrow specificity of criminal statutes, and in most
cases, sanctions may be applied with only a fraction of the due process
protections required in criminal prosecutions. In short, the government
that encourages nonexercise of constitutional rights by using alloca-
tional sanctions may be quite as dangerous as the government that "at-
tempts to impose its will by force of law."81
Arguments about the relative forcefulness of criminal and alloca-
tional sanctions may, however, miss the point. Most constitutional theo-
rists would agree that a $10 fine for criticizing the President is no more
constitutional than a $10,000 fine or a ten-year prison sentence. So, too,
7 See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 434-35 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Revocation of second
class mail privilege is "in effect a very heavy fine."); cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327
U.S. 146, 156 (1946) (Denial of second class mail rate implicates constitutional rights.)
80 See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (conditioning welfare pay-
ments on consent to home inspections); see supra note 8.
81 Maher, 432 U.S. at 476. Similarly, one may claim that private competition
serves to limit proprietary governmental actions in ways that make them less dangerous
than sovereign actions. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 46, at 115-16. This is plausible
only in limited circumstances. Even in a perfect market, a government willing to ex-
pend sufficient tax-generated resources could effectively purchase most constitutional
rights. Given substantial (or even minimal) market failures, the claim that private com-
petition will check government excesses becomes weaker still. In many cases the govern-
ment has a legal monopoly (e.g., postal services) or a strong oligopolistic position (e.g.,
school textbooks or aerospace engineers). Even in competitive situations, market disci-
pline will often be lacking. If hostility to the exercise of a constitutional right is widely
felt, the private sector will not provide much of a check on government. McCarthy era
blacklists, for example, are hardly reassuring instances of the private stewardship of
constitutional rights in a free market. Similarly, if only a minority of beneficiaries value
some constitutional rights, the private sector may not find efforts to establish a competi-
tive service to be worthwhile.
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a government offer of $5 million to run an advertisement in the public
interest violates no rights of the newspaper that receives it. 2 The issue
is not the magnitude of the incentives that the government may bring to
bear, but their nature.
One might argue that government's actions in its proprietary ca-
pacity are, by nature, intrinsically less offensive to constitutional norms
than are actions in its sovereign capacity. Enforcement of a criminal
statute requires direct invocation of the government's monopoly on co-
ercive violence-a monopoly requiring special control. Similarly, be-
hind the tax collector stands the armed might of the state. On the other
hand, one might argue, a public university-one manifestation of the
state as proprietor-has no greater power at its disposal than any other
property owner; like the corner grocer, it hires and fires its
employees.83
This defense, however, collapses on examination, for the tax col-
lector also stands behind the university. No public enterprise, however
proprietary, can claim the same genealogy as a private enterprise.
Somewhere along the line it rests on the sovereign taxing power, and it
cannot plausibly claim to be the unsullied product of freely adopted
private choices.8 4
82 Freedom of the press may not be the only reason why government should be
constitutionally constrained from issuing advertisements. Should the advertisements
contain racial slander, for example, or should the government seek to inhibit rights
considered inalienable, they might be opposed on other grounds. Cf infra text accom-
panying notes 333-64.
83 Cf. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983) ("[O]rdinary dismissals
from government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable statute or regula-
tion are not subject to judicial review."). It is no longer clear that private parties are
altogether free from constraint. Courts have begun to grant causes of action to employ-
ees discharged from private employment without good cause. See, e.g., Novosel v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Co., No. 82-1600 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 1983) (employee discharged for refus-
ing to help employer's political cause); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947)
(teacher dismissed for serving on jury), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947), Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See generally Note, Protecting
At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
" The normative justification that private property simply represents the result of
combining free private choices with natural attributes of personality is unavailable
when the property is obtained through the taxing power.
In an ideal free market economy, more resources should accrue to those who more
efficiently produce desirable goods and services. There is, therefore, a widely discussed
efficiency justification for the ordering of economic power that results from private ac-
tion. No such claim can be made for aggregations of capital formed through govern-
ment's power to tax and appropriate funds.
Moreover, the efficiency argument merely justifies the existence of some property
rights, not of a particular distribution scheme that vests particular rights in the govern-
ment. It provides more plausible support for the sovereign/proprietary distinction that
has recently gained currency in commerce clause litigation. See, e.g., White v. Massa-
chusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1042, 1048 (1983); Reeves, Inc.
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The tenuousness of the proprietary/sovereign distinction is well-
demonstrated by a recent opinion by the foremost contemporary propo-
nent of the distinction: Justice Rehnquist. In United States Postal Ser-
vice v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,5 the Court upheld a
federal statute making it a crime to deposit unstamped material in a
mailbox that received mail from the post office. The statute was chal-
lenged as an unconstitutional limitation on freedom of speech by a com-
munity organization that wished to leave its newsletter in the mailboxes
of its members.
In disposing of that claim, Justice Rehnquist relied on the maxim
that "[t]he state, nQ less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is law-
fully dedicated."" 6 A private owner may lock her mailbox to exclude
unwanted mail, therefore, the government may do likewise. With a sin-
gular lack of imagination, Justice Rehnquist proclaimed, "[I]t is diffi-
cult to conceive of any reason why this Court should treat a letterbox
differently. . . than it has in the past treated the military base. . the
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 809-10 (1976). If one believes that, as an historical matter, the commerce clause
was not designed to limit state economic enterprises or that the proper and efficient
functioning of national markets requires a lack of constraints on market participants,
the distinction may make some sense. The economy responds relatively smoothly to
alterations in demand and supply conditions manifested by market participants. On the
other hand, flat prohibitions by a government acting as sovereign may generate greater
disruption. Likewise, there may be a sound policy reason for attempting to ensure that
states are not placed at a competitive disadvantage.
Even in the commerce clause area, the Court apparently does not take the position
that the state's proprietary machinations are without constitutional limit. See White,
103 S. Ct. at 1046 n.7 ("[T]here are some limits on a state or local government's ability
to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the govern-
ment transacts business."). Even for immediate participation, moreover, it seems incon-
ceivable that a state that has socialized its telephone service may discriminate against
out of state businesses seeking to conduct interstate commerce. And here too, cracks are
beginning to appear in the proprietor/sovereign distinction. Having exempted the resi-
dency requirement for contractors' employees from scrutiny in White, the Court re-
versed direction in United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 52 U.S.L.W.
4187, 4191 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 81-2110) ("[T]he fact that Camden [with an
identical requirement] is merely setting conditions on its expenditures for goods and
services in the marketplace does not preclude the possibility that those conditions violate
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.").
There is instruction to be gained from the fact the current doctrine also permits
discrimination against aliens in sovereign employment while banning it in the case of
economic state actions. Two generations earlier, the doctrine" had permitted discrimina-
tion in "distribution or regulation of the public domain" but not in sovereign actions
intervening in the market. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436-41 (1982).
8453 US. 114 (1981).
SB Id. at 129-30 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (citing Ad-
derley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)).
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jail or [the] prison."'8 7
One reason, which Rehnquist chose not to conceive of, for treating
letterboxes differently was that the post office neither owned nor locked
the boxes in question. If the proprietary/sovereign distinction was de-
terminative, the crucial element should have been the lack of any gov-
ernmental proprietary interest. But the government did not buy exclu-
sive access to the boxes. Instead, it made it a crime to deposit
unstamped mail-a quintessentially sovereign act. The statute did, of
course, achieve the same effect: no one stuffed the boxes with un-
stamped mail. This equivalence of effect is not surprising. It is no new
insight that property rights, no less than tax liabilities, ultimately rest
on the threat or application of coercive violence.88
What is remarkable is Justice Rehnquist's further claim that the
government's action should be held to a lower standard of constitutional
review because the state is merely acting like an owner of private prop-
erty. Justice Rehnquist runs the Shelley v. Kraemer89 principle in re-
verse, transmogrifying a criminal statute into an exercise of proprietary
power. This effectively demonstrates the identity of sovereign and pro-
prietary power, but, absent some ground for distinguishing the two, it
would seem to demonstrate that both powers should be constrained
identically. °
Modern claims of legitimacy for property rights rest either on a
theory of private appropriation that legitimates the invocation of force91
or on a desire to establish centers of choice independent of the govern-
ment. 2 Neither of these theories support any immunity of proprietary
s7 453 U.S. at 129 (citations omitted).
11 See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 19; M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON
LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 188-201 (M. Reinstein & E. Shils, ed. & trans.
1954); Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553 (1933); Cohen, Property
and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Hale, Force and the State: A Compari-
son of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 149 (1935);
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q.
470 (1923); Mensch, Book Review, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 753, 763 (1981).
81 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90 See infra text accompanying notes 329-32 for a discussion of the imaginative
treatment of waiver in the case. The reverse manipulation is also possible. For exam-
ple, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290-94 (1975) (Justice Rehnquist, concurring in
part and dissenting in part), Justice Rehnquist began by distinguishing the proprietary
from the sovereign power. He then classified the federal campaign statute at issue,
which allocated federal funds to major political party election campaigns, as a sovereign
act of Congress. Despite the fact that Congress was merely allocating subsidies, the
statute was placed in a position where it was "most vulnerable to First Amendment
attacks" because it was adopted "with a view to the regulation of the citizenry as a
whole."
91 R. NOZICK, supra note 77, at 149-82.
92 Private property is argued to be an important shield for individual autonomy
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government action from countermajoritarian constitutional guaranties
of autonomy. Thus, the government as property owner stands on no
higher footing than the government as sovereign, for the former cannot
exist without invoking the latter. 3 There is no particular reason to
consider any exercise of economic power that infringes constitutionally
protected interests with anything but a jaundiced eye.
A final oblique support for the proprietary/sovereign distinction is
the suggestion reiterated by Justice Rehnquist that proprietary power
is less problematic because it is not imposed on all citizens;9" criminal
and regulatory powers, being broader, are more subject to abuse. There
is an element of empirical truth to this assertion. Those who can be
compelled by any given allocational sanction are fewer in number than
those who can be affected by any given criminal control. Every citizen
stands at risk should she choose to violate a criminal statute, but only
recipients of government benefits can be coerced by allocative sanctions.
This difference, however, is hardly comforting, for allocational
sanctions affect a sizable proportion of the population.95 Equally im-
portant, this formal distinction may make the allocational power even
more dangerous, for it enables the government to circumvent more eas-
ily the virtual representation guaranties of the Constitution.9" By limit-
ing allocative sanctions to particular benefit programs, the government
can tailor its inducements to forego constitutional rights so they affect
only the least popular or politically efficacious groups. It would proba-
bly raise equal protection difficulties to pass a statute taxing only indi-
gent women who undergo abortions. By attaching conditions to a bene-
and as a check on government's powers. See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFrcIINcY 38-
39 (1975); Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law:
The Ideology of the Sdentific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1594-
96 (1982); Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORA-
TION IN MODERN SociETY 72 (E. Mason ed. 1970); Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 764-68 (1964).
" Although it is not clear that he has proved to be descriptively accurate, Profes-
sor Linde was surely right as a normative matter in commenting that "[qar from giving
government greater discretion, public ownership carries into the management of prop-
erty the constitutional restraints that bind government generally." Linde, Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH.
L. REV. 10, 42 (1965).
" See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 201-03 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
"4 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 327 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that in 1969 alone approximately $127 billion was spent on social welfare pay-
ments and that recipients constituted a significant percentage of the population); see
also supra notes 5-7.
" See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). If the majority of citizens
have no desire to engage in the particular activity, then virtual representation is not
especially helpful.
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fit program used only by indigents, Congress was able to achieve the
same result without quite so obvious a discrimination.
97
b. Positive and Negative Rights: The Problematic Distinction
Between Action and Inaction
A second strand of recent analysis claims that constitutional liber-
ties are concerned with negative rather than positive freedoms." A con-
1 Cf Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (upholding statute requiring
public office holders to resign in order to run for legislative office; those legislators who
passed the statute were not included in the requirement).
11 The most extensive and scholarly articulation of the implications of the negative
and positive rights thesis for allocational sanctions is Appleton, Beyond the Limits of
Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamen-
tal-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 754
(1981). Professor Appleton relies on previous work by Professor Charles Fried, but
Professor Appleton's reliance on Professor Fried's distinction between positive and neg-
ative rights is probably misplaced. Professor Fried defines a positive right as a claim to
some share of scarce goods, while a negative right is defined "as the right not to be
wronged intentionally in some specified way." C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110-12
(1978). Under this formulation, a withholding of benefits may be a violation of both
negative and positive rights. In giving the example of a government that withholds
police protection from a disfavored rally, Professor Fried notes that this could be char-
acterized as both an intentional omission and as a violation of negative rights.
So long as there is a right to any call for protection at all, whatever basis a
government may have for limiting that affirmative claim upon it for pro-
tection, one basis which it may not use is its desire to restrict the speech of
the claimant. The illegitimacy of this basis for apportioning of the scarce
resource has its ground in the negative right against the government.
Id. at 112 n.*.
Professor Fried's distinction is grounded in his conception that a "moral" right
must, of necessity, be categorical and indefeasible. Absolute positive rights would inevi-
tably conflict with each other, while absolute negative rights would not. Given that
constitutional rights need not be absolute, it is not clear why the distinction should be
transplanted from the moral into the legal sphere.
The distinction between positive and negative liberty offered by Isaiah Berlin also
provides no grounds for exempting allocational sanctions from scrutiny. For Berlin,
"negative liberty" addresses the question "How far does government interfere with
me?" while "positive liberty" responds to the question "By whom am I ruled?" I.
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 130 (1969). Serious
doubts have been expressed about the viability of Professor Berlin's distinction. See,
e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, Berlin's Division of Liberty, in DEMOcRATIc THEORY: ES-
SAYS IN RETRIEVAL 95 (1973); MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL.
REV. 312 (1967).
Apart from these more general problems, however, Berlin's definition of negative
liberty includes the failure to open doors or possibilities for choice because of deliberate
human action. See I. BERLIN, supra, at 130 n.1, 122-23, xl, xlvii,-xlvii. This definition
undermines any attempt to separate positive from negative rights in the context of gov-
ernment's allocations of resources; even in demands for the most positive of governmen-
tal actions, the failure to open an opportunity is exactly what is complained of. Nor is
Berlin's occasional distinction between liberty and "the conditions for its exercise," see
id. at lii-liv, any more helpful; it is both inconsistent and mechanical. See C.B. MAC-
PHERSON, supra, at 102-04.
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stitutional right is said to be a mandate that the government not act to
interfere with its citizens. Merely declining to confer a benefit is inac-
tion that would not constitute a violation of constitutional rights. The
rightholder retains the option of exercising the right free of affirmative
opposition, and government is under no obligation to lend its assistance.
As it stands, the distinction is far too coarse to capture the reality
of allocational sanctions. For example, when the government refuses
first class mailing privileges to a publication that has criticized the
president, it could be said that the government has merely declined to
confer a benefit rather than affirmatively interfered with publication.99
Yet it is implausible that such inaction would not violate the first
amendment.' 00 So too, a state that denies a foreign corporation a busi-
ness license as retaliation for the corporation's exercise of its right to
remove a case to federal court may be described as actively interfering
with the corporation's business or as only passively declining to grant a
license.' 0 ' A school that removes a book from its library may simply be
ending its active provision of the book, or it may be affirmatively reduc-
ing the range of information previously available to students.'0 2
This distinction between action and inaction is notoriously difficult
to make, 03 yet, it is central to contemporary efforts to distinguish be-
tween positive and negative rights. Absent strong conceptual underpin-
nings, the distinction is neither robust nor useful. Appropriate verbal
manipulations can easily move most cases across the line. By definition,
in the case of alocational sanctions, the government is both acting to
Professor Clark, at certain points, seems to espouse a similar distinction, which he
bases on the difficulty of ascertaining the motives for inaction, and he offers the rather
tautological comment that the Constitution limits governmental rather than private ac-
tion. See Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. Ruv. 953, 1014-16 (1978). Elsewhere in the article, however,
he interprets "action" as those governmental activities or inactivities that alter the sta-
tus quo ante. Id. at 1018. While this approaches one appropriate analysis, see text
accompanying notes 243-57, it cannot be interpreted as a "mere" application of the
distinction between private and state conduct.
9 Cf Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156-58 (1946) (withdrawal of
second class postage permit infringes first amendment).
100 See id.
101 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
102 Cf Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
103 Cf Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J.). According to Frankfurter,
'Negative' has really been an obfuscating adjective in that it implied a
search for a distinction-non-action as against action-which does not in-
volve the real considerations on which rest [the decisions at issue]. 'Nega-
tive' and 'affirmative,' in the context of these problems, is as unilluminat-
ing and mischief-making a distinction as the outmoded line between
'nonfeasance' and 'misfeasance.'
Id. at 141-42 (footnotes omitted).
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provide resources to one claimant and passively declining to provide
resources to others.
In the era of Lochner v. New York,104 when states were thought to
be limited to acting within clearly discernible boundaries, it may have
been possible to distinguish state action that hindered the exercise of
constitutional rights from action that exceeded those boundaries and af-
firmatively promoted such rights.
Denial of the protection of or access to courts because of the exer-
cise of a constitutional right would easily be construed as a violation of
negative constraints. Conversely, in matters outside the boundaries of
required government action-such as the provision of education or of
social services-denial of the benefit because of the exercise of a right
would be construed simply as a failure to act.
In contemporary America, however, the boundaries are much
harder to discern. Government has neither a clear obligation to protect
property rights defined by natural law nor a mandate to avoid the
fields of private action. Indeed, the reach of legitimate government ac-
tion has extended far into areas previously reserved to the family, mar-
ket and church, and this extension confounds easy definition of positive
and negative rights. In a positive state, all rights are to some extent
positive, for the government is often in a position to deal mortal blows
to the exercise of rights by simply ceasing to intervene. If we are to
distinguish sensibly among allocations that result in impacts on the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights, the mere invocation of a line between
positive and negative rights will not do the job.'0 5
C. Doctrines of Active Review
Both classical and modern doctrines supporting judicial deference
to allocational sanctions prove, on examination, to be flawed. The ques-
tion remains whether the lenses through which courts actively review
allocational decisions are any more helpful.
The implicit challenge of the greater and lesser argument is to
identify the manner in which the selective provision of benefits differs
from absolute denial. The doctrines most consistently used for active
review of allocational decisions respond by focusing on two of the dif-
ferences discussed in the context of judicial deference. One argument
starts from the proposition that the "consequence is not the measure of
the condition," and concludes that an unconstitutional purpose behind
10 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
.0. For my efforts to build a better mousetrap, see infra text accompanying notes
220-320.
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an allocational decision invalidates it. The other argument looks to con-
sequences, adopting the maxim that the government may not bring
about indirectly any limitation on freedom that it could not accomplish
directly. Both arguments can claim a longer line of antecedents than is
generally adduced, and both continue to influence decisions. Neither,
however, provides an adequate framework for active review of alloca-
tional sanctions.
1. Unconstitutional Purpose
In many areas the Constitution restricts the powers of government,
not with substantive, but with procedural or structural limitations. Pro-
cedural due process, separation of powers, doctrines of federalism, and
doctrines of delegation constrain not the consequences of the outcome,
but the legitimacy of the paths by which the outcome is reached. Simi-
larly, one interpretation of the currently reigning equal protection doc-
trine focuses on the intent behind government action as the criterion of
the constitutionality of that action.'06
For such limitations, Justice Holmes's challenge to scrutinize con-
sequences is no challenge at all. Analysis begins and ends with the ob-
servation that, however uncoercive the outcome, the decision to seek it
was adopted by illegitimate means.
A long line of cases involving government allocational decisions af-
fecting constitutional rights have given decisive weight to whether the
government sought to bring about that effect. The easiest solution to the
dilemma of distinguishing a legitimate absolute denial from an uncon-
stitutional condition is to appeal to invidious purposes in the decision to
impose the conditions that are absent in the denial.
a. Purpose Analysis and Constitutional Rights: The History
In the Civil War loyalty oath case of Cummings v. Missouri,'0 7 a
priest was excluded from the practice of his ministry. His counsel,
David Dudly Field, argued that even if the government had the power
to regulate the ministry, the oath was illegal because it was intended to
be a punishment for past disloyalty. The Court's opinion striking down
the oath requirement seemed to accept this argument:
The purpose of the lawmaker in the case supposed would be
openly avowed; in the case existing it is only disguised. The
legal result must be the same, for what cannot be done di-
' See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
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rectly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with
substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was levelled at the
thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the citizen
should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by leg-
islative enactment, under any form, however disguised. 08
The case has been so interpreted by a solid line of subsequent cases.109
An analogous argument was advanced in the struggle over state
power to impose conditions on the licensing of intrastate business by
foreign corporations. Dissenting from a decision that approved the con-
ditioning of a license on the corporation's surrender of its right to in-
voke federal diversity jurisdiction, Justice Bradley maintained,
The argument used, that the greater always includes the less,
and, therefore, if the State may exclude the appellees without
any cause, it may exclude them for a bad cause, is not sound.
It is just as unsound as it would be for me to say, that, be-
cause I may without cause refuse to receive a man as my
tenant, therefore I may make it a condition of his tenancy
that he shall take the life of my enemy .... "0
This argument prevailed in Barron v. Burnside,' only to be sup-
planted again by the greater and lesser argument. 11 2 Some commenta-
tors, alarmed by the possibility that the greater and the lesser argument
might be used to justify increased state and federal regulation of corpo-
rations, urged a return to motive analysis.' The years surrounding
World War I saw a revival of reference to unconstitutional motives in
the invalidation of regulatory legislation and taxation.
1 4
108 Id. at 325.
'0' Cummings is frequently cited for the proposition that the determination of
whether a legislative act is a punishment turns not on how it is labelled, but on its
substance and objectives. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-
69 (1963) (intent determines whether statute denying citizenship to those who leave the
country to evade military service is a punishment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 &
n.19 (1958) ("In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based
its determination upon the purpose of the statute.") (footnote omitted).
Despite Professor Tribe's announcement of the demise of the punitive motive test
after United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), see L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-4 to 10-6 (1978), the news does not appear to have reached the
Supreme Court. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475-84
(1977).
110 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543-44 (1876).
121 U.S. 186, 197 (1887).
112 Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906).
11s See, e.g., Beck, supra note 14; cf. Oppenheim, supra note 14, at 183 ("When
the state seeks to exercise its recognized powers, it must not use them as a camouflage
in attaining a constitutionally tabooed end.").
14 See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S.
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By the 1920's, even Justice Holmes, a perennial proponent of the
greater and lesser argument, regularly found an "unlawful end" to be
an invalidating characteristic." 5 A comparison of his approach in Davis
v. Massachusetts"' with his approach in the Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Foster 7 is instructive. In Davis, Justice Holmes upheld the
city's plenary power to bar speeches on the Boston Commons, while in
Western Union, he invalidated a state's effort to exclude a price-cutting
broker from a private tickertape service. Speaking for the Court in
Western Union, Holmes struck down the regulation as an interference
with interstate commerce:
It is suggested that the State gets the power from its power
over the streets which it is necessary for the telegraph to
cross. But if we assume that the plaintiffs . . . could be ex-
cluded from the streets, the consequence would not follow.
Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to
accomplish an unlawful end, and a constitutional power can-
not be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional
result.11 8
The constitutional revolution of the later 1930's curtailed inquiry
into the purposes behind legislative actions.1 9 This is perhaps better
understood, however, as a substantive change in the law, expanding the
scope of legitimate federal power; the use of purpose analysis in deci-
sions affecting other constitutionally protected areas continued to be
crucial in the loyalty programs of the era following World War II.12 °
20, 38 (1922) (holding unconstitutional tax on products of child labor because it was
intended to regulate commerce); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (tax
intended as punishment for violation of prohibition).
115 Justice Holmes relied on the greater and the lesser argument in both Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519-21 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the tying of patented and nonpatented products
would not violate antitrust laws) and Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 75-76
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (state's power to exclude foreign corporations entitles it
to raise taxes on in-state business at any time). Nevertheless, he used motive analysis in
several subsequent cases. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426,
434-35 (1926) ("IT]he most absolute seeming rights are qualified, and in some circum-
stances become wrong. One of the most frequently recurring instances is when the so-
called right is used as part of a scheme to accomplish a forbidden result.").
I's 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
117 247 U.S. 105 (1918).
118 Id. at 114 (citations omitted).
119 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); Sonzinsky v.
United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).
120 Thus, in upholding the exclusion of a pacifist from the Illinois bar, the Court
stated, "Of course, under our Constitutional system, men could not be excluded ...
simply because they belong to any of our religious groups . . . .[But we] cannot say
that any such purpose to discriminate motivated the action of the Illinois Supreme
1984] 1329
1330 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:1293
During the middle and late 1960's, purpose analysis was generally
eschewed. In United States v. O'Brien 2 1 and Palmer v. Thompson,
1 22
the Court explicitly disavowed inquiry into governmental purpose as a
legitimate form of constitutional review. 2 s
Court." In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 571 (1945).
Again, the Court sustained a statute excluding Communists from the leadership of
labor unions because, although there was a "discouragement" of certain political per-
spectives, the statute was not "frankly aimed at suppression of dangerous ideas" and
could not "'be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of
views.'" American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402-03 (1950)
(quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939)) (footnote
omitted). Cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) ("This is not to say, how-
ever, that Congress may exercise its power to modify the statutory scheme [of social
security] free of all constitutional restraint."); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 100 (1947) ("Congress may not enact a regulation providing that no Republi-
can, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall
attend Mass."). Compare Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16 (holding unconstitutional ordi-
nance forbidding distribution of handbills and holding of public meetings in streets
because of purpose to suppress free expression) with Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S.
43 (1897) (upholding similar because of purpose to promote convenience in public fa-
cilities). A more "frankly aimed" denial of tax benefits to those who decline to take a
non-communist oath was struck down because of that frankness, see Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958), while a denial of deductions for lobbying expenditures was
held permissible, despite its discouragement of political speech, on the ground that it
was not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas," Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959), quoted with approval in Regan v. Taxation with Represen-
tation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2001 (1983).
In the following Term, Justice Frankfurter invalidated the Tuskeegee gerryman-
der, invoking Justice Holmes's admonition that "'[a]cts generally lawful may become
unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end."' Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114
(1918)) (citation omitted). Conversely, a literacy test that had the effect of excluding
blacks was held to be lawful because of its licit intent. See Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 54 (1959).
121 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
122 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
13 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84; Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-26; see also United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-60 (1965); A. BicaEL, TiH LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 208 (1962) ("The established view is that inquiries into motive are not open
in the Supreme Court."); cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (im-
proper motives cannot defeat legislative immunity from civil liability for conduct in
legislative proceedings).
Not all cases so explicitly abandoned purpose analysis. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969), danced nimbly around the question in finding that the exclusion of
newly arrived out-of-state indigents from welfare benefits infringed the constitutionally
protected right to travel. The Court spoke both in terms of purpose and effect. Compare
id. at 628 ("There is weighty evidence that exclusion. . . of the poor who need or may
need relief was the specific objective of these provisions.") and id. at 651-52 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting) ("We do not attribute an impermissible purpose to Congress if the
result would be to strike down an otherwise valid statute.") with id. at 634 (noting
classification "serves to penalize the exercise of [right to travel]") and id. at 644 (Stew-
art, J., concurring) (State interest must be compelling "'to justify the deterrent effect
on the free exercise . . . of their constitutionally protected right.' ") (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).
ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
Yet, even as inquiry into the processes of governmental decision-
making disappeared from one line of cases, it appeared in another. The
ban against content discrimination in regulations of free speech 24 blos-
somed into a generalized obligation of neutrality, which at least some
Justices interpreted as regulation without hostility. 25 The dramatic
renaissance of invidious intent as a determining factor in equal protec-
tion analysis126 coincided with the reemergence of unconstitutional pur-
pose as an express consideration in review of government allocational
decisions. In recent years the constitutionality of social security alloca-
tion conditions that affected the right to travel 127 or the right to
Subsequent cases during the early 1970's characterized the intent interpretation of
Shapiro as a "fundamental misunderstanding of the law." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 339 (1972). See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56
(1974) (interpreting Shapiro as effects analysis). But cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (no issue is raised nor is judicial scrutiny required unless constitutional
rights have been intentionally infringed); Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 285 (Rehnquist,
-J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court should examine. . . whether the challenged requirement
erects a real and purposeful barrier to movement . . . or whether the effects . . . are
merely incidental and remote.").
114 This prohibition against regulations of speech that vary with the views ex-
pressed was first articulated in Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
Earlier cases already recognized that personal bias on the part of public officials
toward certain views could not justify censorship of those views. See, e.g., Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (state may not prefer one religious group to
another); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951) (impermissible prefer-
ence for certain religions in access to public parks); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 961-64 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (re-
counting history of content discrimination cases).
For a discussion of the content neutrality doctrine, see Farber, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo L.J. 727 (1980); Karst, Equal-
ity as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1976);
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. Rnv. 113
(1981); Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Rv.
203 (1982); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189 (1983); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978); Note, Content
Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1854 (1983).
12' See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 556 n.8 (1975); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 315-
17 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972); cf.
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.6 (1980) (striking statute banning residen-
tial picketing as content discrimination).
128 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
27 Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177 (1978) (although admitting inci-
dental impact on constitutional right to travel, upholding termination of social security
payments for recipients who leave the country).
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marry1"8 and government employment conditions that affected freedom
of speech 29 have all turned on whether the action in question sprang
from illegitimate state objectives."'
This analysis was triumphant in Board of Education, Island
Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico."' All members of the
Court, but one, agreed that the ,propriety of the removal of books from
a school library "depends upon the motivation behind petitioners' ac-
tions. If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respon-
dents access to ideas with which petitioner disagreed, and if this intent
was the decisive factor in petitioners' decision, then petitioners have ex-
ercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution." ' 2 And in last
Term's affirmances of the right of a school board to deny a union ac-
cess to teachers' mailboxes33 and of the right of the government to pro-
vide tax relief for veterans' lobbying,'" a touchstone of the Court's
opinions was the lack of invidious purpose.
1l See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 n.11 (1977) (loss of benefits as a result
of marriage acceptable because the regulations were not an attempt to interfere with
freedom or a "governmental seek[ing] to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling").
1'9 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.)
(patronage dismissal of government employee offends first and fourteenth amendments).
The Court stated, "Regardless of the nature of the inducement, . . . [i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 'no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox.'" Id. at 356 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Stressing the centrality of purpose, Justice Brennan contin-
ued, "[G]overnment, however, may not seek to achieve an unlawful end either directly
or indirectly." Id. at 359 n.13. "The denial of a public benefit may not be used by the
government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may
not command directly." Id. at 361.
130 See also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (access to mailboxes may be restricted in absence of intent to
inhibit the expression of a particular view).
131 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
1" Id. at 871 (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.). "To permit such intentions to
control official actions would be to encourage the precise sort of officially prescribed
orthodoxy unequivocally condemned in Barnette." Id. (referring to Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). See also Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2814 (Blaclunun, J., con-
curring) ("[S]chool officials may not remove books for the purpose of restricting access
to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that action is moti-
vated simply by the officials' disapproval of the ideas involved."); id. at 883 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("The unresolved factual issue. . . is the reason or reasons
underlying the school board's removal of the books."). Justice Rehnquist dissented,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, but conceded that narrow partisan
or political motives would be impermissible. See id. at 907-08; ef. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1381-82 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The tax is not a calculated device with illicit purpose;
absent improper legislative motive, it cannot be construed as violating [the] first
amendment.").
18 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 956-57
(1983).
18 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (1983).
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b. The Attraction of Purpose
To a court reviewing allocational decisions, the appeal of purpose
analysis is manifest. First, it responds to the greater and lesser argu-
ment with a plea of confession and avoidance. The government may
admittedly have the power to deny benefits, but, like any governmental
action, the basis for denial must always be legitimate. The argument
seems particularly strong when first amendment rights are threatened.
Whatever else they may embody, the guarantees of free speech and
press are clearly directed against intentional censorship. When the ac-
tions and priorities of government itself are to be determined by the
outcome of competing viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas, attempts
by public officials to intervene in the workings of that market involve a
logical contradiction and a grave political danger.
A second appealing aspect of purpose analysis lies in the appear-
ance that emphasis on government purposes minimizes intrusion into
the political arena by the courts. Such analysis purports not to con-
strain the goals or methods chosen by government except insofar as it
excludes constitutionally suspect purposes. Any decision is prima facie
permissible, so long as illegitimate purposes do not determine it. The
courts do not require of the government any affirmative acts-they
merely forbid one among many means of decisionmaking. Nor does the
analysis require that courts establish a scale of values against which to
judge the appropriateness of governmental actions or the consequences
of those actions. The courts, therefore, are not vying with the legisla-
ture to establish priorities for governmental allocation decisions, but
simply are identifying one impermissible set of criteria. They need not
weigh interests, but only assay purposes.
c. The Problems of Purpose
In 1877, Justice Hunt opined that "[a]n unconstitutional reason or
intention is an impracticable suggestion, which cannot be applied to the
affairs of life."113 5 His diagnosis has a distressingly contemporary ring,
for purpose analysis runs aground on difficulties of definition and im-
plementation. In simple cases-as where an individual official denies a
benefit out of avowed hostility to the recipient's politics-the test func-
tions adequately. But in a number of circumstances, it falls to address
the crux of the problem."'
185 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 541 (1877) (permitting state to
revoke business license in retaliation for removal to federal court).
126 This discussion in the text focuses on the motivational analysis that is preva-
lent in both modem and earlier doctrine. A parallel solution to the greater-lesser prob-
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Definition-The first difficulty lies in identifying those purposes
that are proscribed. Granting, in first amendment contexts, that censor-
ship is the paradigm of a constitutionally impermissible action, what
charactizes censorship? Is it the purpose of reducing the amount of in-
formation available to citizens or the purpose of disfavoring unorthodox
views? Must the proscribed purpose involve hostility to a given view-
point, the desire to suppress a certain subject of discussion (whatever
the viewpoint), or a distinction in the topic's treatment that can be
taken to manifest a preference for a given type of discussion? Each of
these candidates for the proscribed intent finds support in recent
cases.
1 37
Second, as in the equal protection area,"'8 there is continuing un-
lem lies in a "first amendment due process" analysis that concedes the power to deny
benefit for any reason, but, in areas with substantial impact on first amendment rights,
requires special procedural protections. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Pro-
cess," 83 HAnv L. Rnv. 518 (1970). Although this route was in vogue in the late
1950's and the 1960's, its appeal seems largely to have subsided with the demise of the
irrebutable presumption doctrine. But cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983)
(striking for lack of adequate safeguards a statute permitting police to demand reliable
identification from those with suspicious appearance).
137 Government may not attempt to reduce the amount of information available to
citizens. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 773 (1976); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980). Government may not disfavor unorthodox views, see Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 514 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976), nor may it proscribe
speech because of hostility to a given viewpoint, see Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 870-72 (1982); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 n.8
(1975). Government may not take as its objective the suppression of certain subjects of
discussion, regardless of viewpoint. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 538;
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). Neither may government give preference to certain types of
discussion or methods of treating a topic. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277
(1981). But cf Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
"1 The evolution of the Court's approach to equal protection, beginning with its
rejection of intent analysis in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971),
through its adoption of the analysis in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48
(1976), and the subsequent ebbs and flows, has spawned a legion of commentary at-
tempting to eliminate the Court's apparently endemic confusion regarding what consti-
tutes intent, who must possess it, and how it must be proven. See, e.g., Brest, The
Supreme Court 1975 Term Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 Hsv. L. REv. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle];
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95 [hereinafter cited as Brest, Unconstitutional Legis-
lative Motive]; Clark, Legislative Motive and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953 (1978); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977);
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970); Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828
(1983); Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 31 (1982); Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation The-
ory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv.
1041 (1978); Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal
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certainty about the individual or institution that must harbor the pro-
scribed purpose and the way in which that purpose is to be discovered.
The paradigm case would be a single official who forbids a speech in
the park because she believes that it is obnoxious to the prevailing or-
thodoxy. But such a case is rarely encountered.
Individual officials are unlikely to disclose impermissible motives,
leaving the courts to engage in historical psychoanalysis to uncover the
illegitimate motivation. More important, most allocation decisions are
made not be a single individual, but by a collective legislative body or
by a bureaucratic hierarchy through a series of determinations.
What can it mean to say that the legislature or the Department of
Parks acted with hostility to a given viewpoint? Must the hostility have
tainted the thinking of a majority of the legislature or only a majority
of the proponents of the legislation? If the legislation passed by a single
vote, is it sufficient that a single member harbored hostility to the views
at issue? Must the plaintiff show that, absent hostility, the legislation
would not have passed, or must a defendant prove that hostility played
no part in the decisionmaking process? What if all members were neu-
tral but responded to hostility expressed by their constituents?
The most tempting answer, absent an explicit official avowal of
the forbidden purpose, is to anthropomorphize the governmental entity
in question, treating it as an individual and applying to it the common-
sense tests by which courts interpret the purposes of persons.1 9 Thus,
if an individual in similar circumstances would not act in a given way
but for an illicit purpose, then we may ascribe that purpose to a gov-
ernment that acts in that way. This approach seems to be the basis of
Justice White's plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego.140 In determining whether the government had demonstrated a
sufficient interest in banning billboards to warrant banning those car-
rying noncommercial speech, he wrote, "Governmental interests are
only revealed and given concrete force by the steps taken to meet those
interests." ' Because the city's actions in the noncommercial field did
not match its preferences revealed, in the commercial field, the ordi-
Protection Clause, Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Wil-
liamsburg, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R1v. 725 (1977); Note, Making the Violation Fit
the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328
(1982); Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De
Facto/Dejure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
139 Cf J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 468-69 (1971) (describing cognitive
development of ability to ascribe motives to others).
140 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion by White, J.); cf. Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 465 & n.9 (1980) (overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness impeaches state's
rationale for regulation).
141 453 U.S. at 521.
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nance was invalidated, with the intimation that an illegitimate purpose
was present.142 Justice White's argument roughly followed this struc-
ture: (1) by excepting certain commercial billboards from regulation,
the city demonstrated that commercial speech was more important than
esthetics; (2) by constitutional mandate, noncommercial speech is more
important than commercial speech; (3) therefore, noncommercial speech
is more important than esthetics. Failure to act in accord with this pri-
macy was a constitutional violation.
There are at least two difficulties with this argument; both arise
out of the anthropomorphic inferences behind it. First, to act in a way
that suggests greater weight is given to certain modes of discourse is not
tantamount to intentional censorship. Simple incompetence and random
error may generate the observed actions on which Justice White deter-
mined legislative preferences, without any illegitimate priorities or bi-
ases. Even individuals often carry out a series of actions without com-
paring the values in each line of endeavor. In organizations this
tendency is exacerbated because human errors combine with failures of
communication. What might reveal purposes or preferences in an indi-
vidual may simply reveal random error in an organization.
Second, even a well-constructed and comprehensively rational pro-
cess may produce inconsistent outcomes when more than one individual
is involved. Justice White's logic rests on an assumption about transi-
tive143 preferences that-however intuitively appealing when applied to
individuals-is often misleading when applied to organizations. Major-
ity voting, as has been long since demonstrated, may often yield intran-
sitive"'" results. 45 If we posit three voters-Esthete, who prefers
beauty to politics and politics to commercial speech; Merchant, who
prefers commercial speech to beauty, and beauty to politics; and White,
who prefers politics to commercial speech and commercial speech to
beauty-two out of three may have the "legitimate" preference of valu-
ing politics more than commercial speech, while two out of three also
prefer beauty to politics. Treating political preferences as the result of a
single anthropomorphic process does not in fact defer to the political
process. Rather than taking the values that resulted from a majority
142 Id. at 515-17, 520-21.
143 As used in this context, "transitive" describes the internal consistency of the
ranking of preferences. A ranking of preferences x, y, and z is transitive if x is at least
as preferred as y, y is at least as preferred as z, and x is then at least as preferred as z.
See A. SEN, COLLECTVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE, 2 (1970). Were x less pre-
ferred than z, the ranking would be intransitive.
1" See supra note 143.
145 See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); A. SEN,
supra note 143,'at 33-46, 161-86.
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voting procedure, Justice White imposed his own.
The problem is generalizable: whenever a case involves multiple
decisionmakers, or a single decisionmaker who declines to admit an il-
licit purpose, the court must infer purposes from government actions.
In order to infer that a decision was tainted by an impermissible pur-
pose, the court must determine what the government would have done
in the absence of that purpose. But in order to make that determina-
tion, the courts must have a model of the way that a proper government
would act. Implicit in the constructing of such a model is precisely the
weighing of values that purpose analysis promised to avoid. The pre-
diction of what a government would do becomes the norm against
which the government is judged. 46 A focus on purpose, therefore, en-
courages the court to smuggle its own preferred values into the analysis
without the discipline of expressly articulating the content or underpin-
nings of those values.
Implementation-The ambiguities of definition in purpose analy-
sis are mirrored by the difficulties in its implementation. If the pur-
poses at issue are the thoughts running through the minds of individual
decisionmakers as they adopt policies that impinge on constitutional
rights, then the door is open for the cross-examination of individual
legislators. Factual determinations by the trial court will be virtually
unreviewable 1,47 If, on the other hand, the court adopts a metaphorical
conception of purpose as an invalidating residual divergence from the
norm of good government, they embark on exactly the flight of norma-
tive prescription, almost unconstrained by concrete factual reference,
that the purpose analysis sought to avoid.
In this regard, the inquiry into intent suffers from an analogue of
the ahistoricity of the greater and lesser argument. Justice Harlan
could, with a straight face, maintain that a McCarthy era prohibition
against payment of vested Social Security benefits to deported commu-
nists was animated by the purpose of aiding the country's balance of
146 In the equal protection area there may be some greater justification for exam-
ining whether the government has acted in a way that appears to involve invidious
intent. To the extent that the guarantee of equal protection proscribes actions that stig-
matize a "suspect class," the possibility of denigrating a minority may itself be grounds
for constitutional review.
147 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) ("Discriminatory intent need
not be proven by direct evidence."; upholding trial court's inference of intent on basis of
facts virtually identical to those held insufficient to establish intent in City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285-90 (1982)
(applying "clearly erroneous" standard of review to findings of discriminatory intent
under Title VII). But cf. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534-37
(1979) (upholding appeal's court reversal of trial court's finding of discriminatory pur-
pose). See generally Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard
and Equal Protection, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 348-49 (1982).
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trade, 48 while Justice Brennan, with equal seriousness, could advance
the thesis that legislation that explicitly denied the recently impeached
President Nixon access to his papers, just happened to be the fortuitous
result of the timing of congressional interest. 4  Courts that upheld the
termination of Medicaid funds for abortions found the purpose of the
statutes was to encourage childbirth rather than to prevent abortions.
And this past Term, Justice White held that union contracts denying
rival unions access to employee mailboxes was untainted by any inten-
tion "to discourage one viewpoint and advance another.
1 5 0
In part, this insensitivity to reality results from the vulnerability of
the boundaries of purpose to the "principle of double effect.""' Where
a statute accomplishes two effects, one permitted and one that would be
proscribed if it were intended, the government may freely argue that it
intended only the permitted effect. The unconstitutional result is said to
be merely an unfortunate by-product. If purpose is the sole test of con-
stitutional validity and the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the as-
tute will usually survive. Almost any statute has a myriad of effects,
and the government will usually be able to claim that it intended only
the constitutional ones.
152
Problems of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness-Purpose
analysis is not only ill-defined and difficult to apply, it is over-inclusive
and under-inclusive as well. It simply does not answer objections to the
imposition of unconstitutional conditions.
Picture, for example, the National Endowment for the Arts
(NEA) choosing among applicants for grants in oil painting. No appli-
cant is entitled to the grant. However, if the NEA excludes all Repub-
lican applicants, most would agree they have been subject to an uncon-
stitutional allocational sanction. It is easy enough to attribute this result
to an illegitimate purpose on the part of NEA to prefer one exercise of
first amendment rights to another.
148 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
149 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
150 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 957
(1983).
15 See generally Boyle, Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90
ETHICS 527 July (1980) (discussing moral and philosophical problems presented by
actions that produce both good and evil consequences).
12 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948,
954-59 (1983) (effect was to exclude rival teachers union, but purpose was to keep
labor peace). While it is possible to conceive of statutes that would serve no rational
purpose other than penalizing constitutional rights, the nature of allocational sanctions,
in particular, suggests that this will rarely be the case in the areas at issue here. At the
very least, denial of benefits would almost always serve the purpose of conserving gov-
ernment funds. And the same sanction can usually be characterized as the grant of
benefits to an alternate activity rather than as a denial to the victim.
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On the other hand, if the grants are awarded only to pointilists
and denied to cubists, the NEA also has a purpose of preferring one
exercise of first amendment rights to another. Nonetheless, the cubists'
complaint is substantially more tenuous.
Recent cases further illustrate the over-inclusiveness of purpose
analysis. An intent to discourage interstate migration is equally present
whether a state gives better service than its neighbors-and thus dis-
couraging emigration-or alternatively imposes a tax upon emigrants.
Yet the former apparently would be constitutional and the latter imper-
missible.' 53 The threat to fire a presidential spokesman who criticizes a
foreign affairs blunder betokens a hostility to that criticism no less than
imposition of a fine. Yet few would question the propriety of the for-
mer or assert the validity of the latter.' T The refusal to acquire and the
agreement to remove an offending book from a school library are
equally motivated by objection to the ideas expressed. Nonetheless, the
Court has apparently accepted a distinction between the two acts.155
Something other than purpose must be the deciding factor.
On the other hand, the under-inclusiveness of purpose analysis is
equally apparent. In Sherbert v. Verner,156 the Court declared that a
state that conditions unemployment benefits on an activity that violates
the applicant's religious beliefs violates the free exercise clause. Twenty
years later in Thomas v. Review Board'57 the Court reaffirmed its
holding. 158 In neither case did the Court determine that the state had
any intent to deter religious practices.'89
153 Cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (holding unconstitutional state allo-
cation of royalties from Alaskan pipeline to residents of Alaska based on length of
residence).
25 Cf Lefkowitz. v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
The First Amendment protects the individual's right to speak and
believe in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. But if he
believes in peace at any price and speaks out against a strong military, the
President may decide not to nominate him for Secretary of Defense...
[or] may remove him as a result of his exercise of First Amendment rights.
Id. at 810.
155 See. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (4-1-4). Justice Brennan's
plurality suggestion on the issue may, however, be dictum.
1- 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963).
157 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
158 Id. at 720.
15 For other cases where the impact on constitutional rights was crucial without
reference to censorious government intent, see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432-33
(1978); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) ("As a condition of driving the
automobile-a virtual necessity for most Americans-the Maynards must display "Live
Free or Die.' "); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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Similarly, in Branti V. Finkel,"' the intent of a county employer
in declining to renew the plaintiffs' patronage positions for want of
their sponsorship by the prevailing political party was not to coerce the
plaintiffs into changing parties, but was simply to reward those who
supported an electoral campaign. As the court held last Term, re-
warding supporters is an element of electoral politics that may be con-
stitutionally protected.16' Nonetheless, firing an individual because she
associates with the "wrong" party is unacceptable.1
6 2
Most recently, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue,163 Justice O'Connor's opinion invalidated a sales
tax that treated newspapers differently from other goods, despite the
absence of invidious intent.'" To find a workable principle that accept-
ably orders both our intuitions and the case results, we must look be-
yond the search for illegitimate governmental purposes.
2. Unconstitutional Impact
The second major doctrine of active review accepts the notion that
the "consequence is the measure of the condition," but views the conse-
quence in question as the effect of government action on constitution-
ally protected areas of choice. If the consequence impinges upon a pro-
tected area in a way that would be unconstitutional had the same result
flowed from a direct governmental command, this "impact analysis"
would invalidate the condition. A $10,000 reduction in benefits for ex-
ercising a constitutional right is said to be no more permissible than a
$10,000 fine. The evil in each case is a government-imposed penalty for
the exercise of a constitutional right.
This analysis claims to be rooted in the very essence of constitu-
tional guarantees. If the purpose of the guarantee is to reserve certain
areas of conduct to the untrammeled choice of citizens, then permitting
government to use its conceded powers to manipulate decisions in those
areas ultimately undermines the autonomy that the Constitution seeks
to protect. The entire society may become subject to indirect govern-
mental control.
The argument was fully formed at least as early as the onset of the
struggle over the use of state licensing power to regulate out-of-state
corporations. Justice Day championed the position that permitting an
160 445 U.S. 507, 516-17 (1980).
'~ Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54-59 (1982).
162 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
163 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983).
I" Id. at 1372.
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impact on a constitutionally protected area
amounts to a practical nullification in respect to such corpo-
rations of the supreme law of the land and places important
constitutional rights at the mercy of the several States ...
[T]here is nothing to prevent the State from applying
the same doctrine to any other constitutional right. . . .In
pursuance of the principle announced in this case, . . . the
State may say to the foreign corporation,-You may do busi-
ness within this State, provided you will yield all right to be
protected against deprivation of property without due process
of law; or provided you surrender your right to have com-
pensation. . .[or] to the equal protection of laws; and so on
through the category of rights secured by the Constitution
and deemed essential to the protection of people and corpora-
tions living under our institutions.16 '
On this theory, the defect in the unconstitutional condition is not
the purpose of the government action but the impact of the action on
constitutionally protected prerogatives. "[Tihe disavowal by the State of
any purpose to burden interstate commerce cannot conclude the ques-
tion. . . .If the statute, reasonably interpreted, either directly or by its
necessary operation, burdens interstate commerce, it must be adjudged
to be invalid, whatever may have been the purpose for which it was
enacted ... ."16
1 Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 266-67 (1906) (Day, J.,
dissenting). In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910), Justice Harlan
wrote for the Court,
To hold otherwise is to allow form to control substance. It is easy to be
seen that if every State should pass a statute similar to that enacted by
Kansas not only the freedom of interstate commerce would be destroyed,
the decisions of this court nullified and the business of the country thrown
into confusion ....
Id. at 37. See also Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 83 (1913); Pull-
man Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56,63 (1910); cf. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York,
119 U.S. 110, 120 (1886) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Sutherland picked up the torch in rejecting an attempt to impose common
carrier status on private contract carriers as a condition of using public roads. Although
part of the opinion in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926), spoke of the unconstitutional purpose that was found to underlie the statute, see
id. at 591-93, it also emphasized that "[i]f the state may compel the surrender of one
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surren-
der of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence." 271 U.S. at 594, quoted in
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 337 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 27 (1910). See Terral v. Burke
Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) (statute "necessarily calculated to curtail" access
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In Stephenson v. Binford,'167 Justice Sutherland retreated from this
position, adopting instead a more limited rationale looking to the pur-
poses of the statute."' 8 This latter line of inquiry predominated through
the demise of Lochner v. New York '6  and federalism doctrines that
underlay much earlier constitutional invalidation. With the re-emer-
gence of the unconstitutional conditions problem in the form of loyalty
oath enactments in the late 1940's and early 1950's, however, impact
analysis was resurrected by opponents of the oaths. In addition to argu-
ing that the true purpose of the oath requirements was the suppression
of unorthodox ideas, dissents by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan
all based claims of unconstitutionality on the impact of the loyalty pro-
grams on the exercise of first amendment liberties."'
Speiser v. Randall"7 was a watershed, the first major case since
the Civil War invalidating a loyalty program by repudiating the greater
and lesser argument. Justice Brennan's opinion looked both ways on
the issue of intent and effect. While distinguishing other loyalty pro-
grams that had been upheld as not having been "frankly aimed at the
suppression of dangerous ideas,"' 72 Justice Brennan also emphasized
that the denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech "will
have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed
to federal court is invalid); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding
unconstitutional statute prohibiting interstate trade in products of child labor because
its "necessary effect" was to regulate intrastate commerce); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 458 (1874) (statute excluding company that refused to waive right
of access to federal court "is an obstruction to this right" and therefore "repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States"); see also Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 592 (1926) (asking "whether the state may bring about
the same result by imposing the unconstitutional requirement as a condition precedent
to the enjoyment of a privilege"). Antecedents of this position may be found in Civil
War loyalty oath cases. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327
(1866) (oath requirement will effectively "produce the same result ... as though the
crimes were defined").
167 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
'8 See id. at 267-68.
169 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
170 See Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 418 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("[C]lose judicial scrutiny is essential when state action infringes on the right of a
man to be accepted in his community, to express his ideas in an atmosphere of calm
decency, and to be free of the dark stain of suspicion . . . on account of his political
beliefs and associations."); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) ("Fearing condemnation, [the teacher] will tend to shrink from any
association that stirs controversy. In that manner freedom of expression will be sti-
fled."); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 446 (1950) (Black,
J., dissenting) ("Freedom to think is inevitably abridged when beliefs are penalized by
imposition of civil disabilities.").
17- 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
171 Id. at 519 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
402 (1950)).
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speech."' 73 This emphasis formed the groundwork for his later opinion
in Sherbert v. Verner,174 which revitalized impact analysis.17 5
Although in Sherbert there was no evidence of animus directed
against Seventh Dy Adventists and no direct prohibition of their ob-
servances, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court took the position that
not only [does her] declared ineligibility for benefits derive[]
solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure
upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits. . . . [This constitutes] the
same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine .... "
Speiser was cited for the proposition that "conditions upon public bene-
fits cannot be sustained, if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as
to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.' 17 7 The
state, it was said-in reliance on Speiser-had acted improperly by the
"imposition of such a condition . . . [that] inevitably deterred or dis-
couraged the exercise of First Amendment rights . . . and thereby
threatened to 'produce a result which the State could not command
directly.' "'"
A concern for the impact of allocational sanctions on constitutional
rights predominated throughout the next decade, and opinions fre-
quently invoked the shades of the early corporate rights cases.179 Yet,
173 Id. at 519.
174 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17 Admittedly, inquiries into purpose and effect overlap. Under the anthropomor-
phic interpretation of purpose, the same factual elements are relevant in roughly the
same way whether the plaintiff claims that there is an illicit effect and no interest of
sufficient weight to justify the impact or claims that there is an illicit purpose because
no legitimate purpose adequately explains the government's actions. The theoretical
roots of the two complaints are distinct, however. If impingement of constitutional
rights establishes a prima fade violation that might subsequently be justified, then the
evil is the restriction of autonomy. If inadequately explained impact is used to infer
purpose, then the underlying evil is the purpose of the governmental action.
176 374 U.S. at 404.
177 Id. at 405 (refering to Speiser, 357 U.S. at 513) (emphasis added).
178 Id. (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526). Both citations were ambitious uses of
precedent. Speiser seemed to hold that a proper purpose could legitimate "deterrence"
of first amendment rights and the language regarding the "result which the State could
not command directly" referred to the effect of an oath required to qualify for the tax
benefit in shifting the burden of proof to the claimant. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526.
Nonetheless, the revisionism was in tune with the emerging line of analysis, which
recalled the pronouncements of the first Justice Harlan and of Justice Sutherland.
179 In Harman v. Foissenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), the Court invalidated a provi-
sion requiring advance registration of voters to avoid a poll tax. Although the statute
could plausibly have been represented as an attempt to promote advance registration,
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interwoven with a reaffirmation of the importance of the impact of de-
this legitimate purpose did not save it from conflict with the twenty-fourth amendment.
The unanimous opinion declared that "[any material requirement imposed upon the
federal voter solely because of his refusal to waive the constitutional immunity subverts
the effectiveness of the Twenty-fourth Amendment and must fall under its ban." Id. at
542.
In the same year, the Court invalidated a provision that communist propaganda
would be delivered only on the recipient's written notification to the post office of the
desire to receive such materials. Though no penalty was attached to the notification, the
Court found this to be an "unconstitutional abridgement of the addressee's First
Amendment rights ...[because this] requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent
effect, especially as respects those who have sensitive positions." Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). See also id. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("in-
hibition as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights
is a power denied to government").
Succeeding Terms saw the invalidation of a previously approved loyalty program
for public school teachers because of the "danger of [a] chilling effect upon the exercise
of vital First Amendment rights[,]" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604
(1967); cf. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (public employment
does not compel relinquishment of all first amendment rights); the invalidation of a
requirement that policemen waive fifth amendment rights as a condition of employment
because "[tihere are rights . . . whose exercise a State may not condition by the exac-
tion of a price[,]" Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); and the invalida-
tion of a kidnapping statute that imposed the death penalty only after trial by jury
because "[t]he inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage asser-
tion of the Fifth . . .and Sixth Amendment right[s]," United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 581 (1968); see also id. at 582 ("The question is not whether the chilling
effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional . . ").
These cases did not rest on a determination that the government had no power to
set registration requirements, to decline to deliver mail, to discharge teachers and po-
licemen, or to set criminal penalties. Nor was there any finding that the purpose of the
actions taken was to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. They were, rather,
holdings that the consequence of the challenged actions in each case was to penalize and
impermissibly discourage the exercise of such rights.
A similar approach was applied to invalidate the denial of government employ-
ment for unpopular speech. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[I]f
the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally pro-
tected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized
and inhibited. This. . . '[it] could not command directly.' ") (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S.
at 526 (1958)). So too, the Court invalidated restrictions on access to campus facilities
for unpopular associations. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) ("There can
be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college organiza-
tions burdens or abridges that associational right."). The same reasoning was applied
in the case of denials of public employment that were rooted in patronage practices. See
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.) ("The
cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and
association."); see also id. at 356 (The "individual's ability to act according to his be-
liefs ...is constrained."); id. at 358 n.11 ("This Court's decisions have prohibited
conditions on public benefits, in the form of jobs or otherwise, which dampen the exer-
cise generally of First Amendment rights, however slight the inducement to the individ-
ual to forsake those rights.").
Similarly, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), relied in part on the argu-
ment that durational residence requirements for welfare recipients served as an "effec-
tive penalty" on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right to travel. "[A]ny clas-
sification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at
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nied benefits on constitutional rights is a perception that not all alloca-
tions that provide inducements in constitutionally protected areas con-
stitute proscribed burdens. If the NEA refuses to fund cubists, cubism
may wither, yet there is no constitutional mandate to fund cubists. The
cessation of welfare payments by one state upon emigration to another
state lacking similar funding constitutes a severe disincentive to inter-
state travel, yet it is clear that such a scheme is not unconstitutional. 80
A tax deduction for dependent children constitutes an incentive to
forego one's right to remain sterile, and favored tax treatment upon
marriage is an incentive to marry, yet both are uncontroversial." 1 An
offer of $100,000 to a small town newspaper to run an anti-smoking
campaign is an inducement to print what could not be required, but it
seems an acceptable one. Some limiting principle is necessary. Unfortu-
nately, no satisfactory one has been adopted.
At the high-water mark of impact analysis, Justice Marshall made
an effort to build a stopping place into the doctrine by specially defin-
634.
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court struck down a one-year
residency requirement for voting. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, reiterated
that "'any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right'" triggers a
compelling state interest requirement. Id. at 340 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969)). Characterizing a focus on legislative purpose as a "fundamental
misunderstanding of the law," id. at 339, he identified the evil of the requirement as its
effect in forcing "a person who wishes to travel and change residences to choose be-
tween travel and the basic right to vote." Id. at 342. See also Memorial Hosp. v. Mari-
copa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974) (striking one-year residency requirement for
medical care for indigents as a penalty on interstate migration and as an indirect
method of accomplishing an unconstitutional result); ef. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 387 & n.12 (1978) (finding unconstitutional requirement for court order establish-
ing ability to support children of prior marriage before new marriage license will be
issued as direct and substantial interference with right to marry).
In 1981, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981), reaffirmed Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In holding
that a state may not deny unemployment benefits to a pacifist discharged for refusing to
work on military equipment, Burger wrote,
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
And in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), the Court repeated its commitment
to the right of interstate mobility by striking down an Alaskan statute that discrimi-
nated against newer residents in the distribution of oil royalties. See id. at 58-65 & 60
n.6; see also id. at 66-68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stressing right to travel and mi-
grate), id. at 71-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (expressly invoking privi-
leges and immunities clause of fourteenth amendment).
180 See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1978).
11 See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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ing the "penalty" that would trigger constitutional review. Attempting
to distinguish cases upholding a durational residency requirement on
in-state college tuition from the residency requirement on free medical
care at issue, Marshall suggested in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County18 2 that the forbidden penalty was an allocation that deprived
the victim of a "fundamental political right" or the "basic necessit[ies]
of life."1 ' A deprivation of "sufficient importance"18 would constitute
a penalty, while the allocation of lesser goods might still be conditioned
on residence. Leaving aside this peculiar use of language-that a ten
dollar fine might not be a penalty-Justice Marshall's proposal has not
been adopted. Just as the ranking of interests Justice Marshall sug-
gested in equal protection analysis has not prevailed, 8 ' the Court has
declined to make its impact analysis turn on the importance of the dep-
rivation. On one hand, in Sosna v. Iowa,18 6 decided a year after Mari-
copa County, the Court held that one's ability to obtain a divorce could
be conditioned on duration of residence, 187 and in Maher v. Roe 88 and
Harris v. McRae,189 the majority held that withholding medical assis-
tance-concededly necessary for indigents to exercise their rights to
abortions-did not penalize their exercise of those abortion rights.1 90
On the other hand, in Zobel v. Williams,191 the Court struck down an
oil revenue distribution scheme that pegged payments to the number of
years residents had lived in the state as a violation of interstate travel
rights, though it is difficult to characterize such a bonus as a "necessity
of life." '92 The Court has similarly invalidated the conditioning of tax
exemptions, 193 access to the mails,'" unemployment compensation, 95
and government employment, 98 without any suggestion that these
18a 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
183 Id. at 259.
18 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 419 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185 But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982) (considering the impor-
tance of education in determining the appropriate standard of review).
188 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
187 Id. at 404-10.
18 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
189 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
8 See Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-74; Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17.
191 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
192 Compare the Alaska Supreme Court's opinion, Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d
448, 455-57 (Alaska 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), in which Chief Justice Rabino-
witz, who cast the deciding vote to uphold the statute, was misled by taking seriously
the analysis used in Maricopa County.
191 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
9 See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
198 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
'" See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
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items were either fundamental rights or basic necessities.
If analysis of the importance of the right affected reaches the
wrong answers, the other proposal occasionally advanced-that the per-
missibility of constitutionally questionable allocations turn on the di-
rectness or substantiality of the impact -7-provides no answers at all,
for it invites ad hoc constitutional balancing. We now turn to consider-
ation of this balancing.
3. Balancing and Reasonableness
A number of judges and commentators have been unable to accept
the total immunity of allocational sanctions to constitutional review ad-
duced by the greater and lesser argument, and yet have been left with
the belief that allocational incentives are somehow different, without
being able to pinpoint that difference.19 Out of this clash of intuitions
has come a variety of "balancing" or "reasonableness" tests.
The most general of these was Justice Frankfurter's reconstruction
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in his concurrence in Watson
v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp."'9 Complaining that prior cases
had expressed their analysis "in a jumble of loose generalizations,"2 '
Justice Frankfurter undertook to winnow the grain from the chaff in
some hundred opinions dealing with "so-called 'unconstitutional condi-
tions.' ",201 It is not one of Frankfurter's better efforts. After four pages
of exposition-it can scarcely be called analysis since it consists
predominantly of block string citations quoted from earlier deci-
sions-in which he sought to enlist Justice Holmes in his cause,
202
(1976).
"" See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 971-73 (1982) (State's interest in
preventing officeholders from vacating office before end of term is sufficient to outweigh
de minimus interference with first amendment rights caused by "resign-to-run" provi-
sion.); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177 (1978) ("incidental effect" of denial
of social security benefits on right to travel does not render it unconstitutional);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (Denial of marriage license to divorced
parents who had not paid child support was unconstitutional because it "directly and
substantially" interfered with the right to marry.); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-
54 (1977) (denial of Social Security benefits upon marriage is acceptable despite possi-
ble impact upon decision to marry); cf. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 408 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he extent of the burden imposed by this statute [does not] so differentiate
it from that considered in Jobst as to warrant a different result.").
1' See supra text accompanying notes 67-97 for a discussion of the, to my mind,
misgaided claim that the difference consists in the absence of coercive violence per se.
199 348 U.S. 66, 78-81 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
200 Id. at 79 n.2.
201 Id. at 78.
202 Justice Frankfurter entirely ignored Justice Holmes's advocacy of the greater
and lesser doctrine and cited City and County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co.,
246 U.S. 178 (1918), without so much as an intimation that the language quoted was
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Frankfurter concluded that "[tihe standard of reasonableness . . . im-
posed on the power of a State to admit a foreign corporation on condi-
tions, embraces all prior instances of denial of state power." Reasona-
bleness was to be judged by applying the test "in diverse contexts in the
light of all relevant factors" to determine whether the "conditions im-
posed are fairly related to the interest which [the state] may appropri-
ately protect ... " 03
The test does explain the prior cases. So would any formulation
that carries both a cachet of legitimacy and a quality of infinite mallea-
bility of content. But, being without content, the test yields neither
guidance nor prediction; "natural justice," "what judges thought best,"
or "class interest"2 °4 are equally descriptive and equally unilluminat-
ing. Yet Justice Frankfurter apparently found some bite to the concept
for he relied on the prohibition of "unreasonable" conditions in dissent-
ing from an opinion sustaining a requirement that individuals disavow
affiliation with subversive organizations."'
Assuming that Frankfurter had something of substance in mind,
his reasonableness requirement can in turn be reconstructed in two
ways. First, reasonableness understood as rationality may be an irre-
ducible sine qua non of legitimate government action. The difficulty is
that such a requirement is either empty or a package for other values.
What is reasonable for Justice Frankfurter may not be reasonable for
either Justice Marshall or Justice Rehnquist.
2 0
Second, the conclusion that a condition is reasonable may be the
outcome of an incremental balancing process measuring the extent to
which public interests are advanced by the condition against the degree
to which constitutional rights are infringed. 07 This procedure at least
written in dissent.
208 348 U.S. at 82; see id. at 78 (approving the condition because it was part of a
"fair bargain").
204 As used by those who alternatively attribute any legal phenomenon either to
exploitation by the ruling class or attempts to legitimate the entrenched regime.
215 See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 724-29 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20 See generally Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpreta-
tions of Equal Protection, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1029 (1980).
20. Indeed, one example of such balancing may be found in the employment cases.
See Connick v. Myers, 103 -S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (upholding the discharge of an assistant
district attorney for distributing a questionnaire regarding office morale problems after
a balancing of the employee's first amendment interests against the state's interest in
promoting efficiency); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414
(1979) (stating that a discharged employee's interests must be balanced against the
state's in cases involving private speech by employees, as well as public speech); Mount
Healthy School Dist. City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (whether
the speech of a government employee is constitutionally protected must be determined
by balancing the employee's interest in commenting on matters of public concern
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has the virtue of being a candid exercise of judicial discretion. Though
a generation of critics of balancers has exposed the weaknesses of its
intellectual foundations and the limits of its protection against govern-
ment oppression, 08 candidness and commonsense are not virtues to be
sneered at. Most modern commentators on unconstitutional conditions
doctrine have devoted themselves to an elaboration of precisely which
factors should be balanced. Professor Van Alstyne recognizes that the
Court "attempts to balance competing public and private concerns to
determine whether the regulation as applied has a sufficient connection
with important enough state interests to outweigh the incidental effect
on the constitutional rights of the affected class."20 9 Professor O'Neil
recommends the balancing of eight considerations," 0 and Mr. French
suggests an inventory of the interests on both sides to be followed by a
"weighing,"'" a technique also suggested by Professor Westen.2"2 A
against the state's interest in promoting efficiency of public services); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (same).
208 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137-46 (1959) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (attacking the use of a balancing test to identify infringements of first amend-
ment rights); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? - A Reply to Professor Mendel-
son, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961) (criti-
quing the view that the first amendment creates "absolute" rights).
209 Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 43, at 1449.
210 O'Neil, supra note 54, at 463-77 (whether the object of the condition could be
achieved directly, whether it is germane to the purpose of the program, whether less
onerous alternatives are available, the importance of the benefit to the individual,
whether the benefit is a government monopoly, the psychological effect of the condition,
the degree of disclosure of the condition to the victim, and the procedures by which the
condition is called into effect). Because his analysis is avowedly tentative, Professor
O'Neil should not be faulted. See also the stimulating discussion of Professor Shiffrin in
Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rzv. 565 (1980).
211 See French, supra note 30, at 247. Mr. French suggests that the nature and
extent of the need that called forth a government program, the scope and degree of the
sovereign's interest in meeting the need, and the effect of the statute or administrative
directive in furthering the state's interests should be weighed against the individual's
constitutional interests, the direct and collateral effects of the state's action upon those
interests, and the degree to which those elements of the program that affect the individ-
ual further the state's interests.
212 See Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on
the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IowA L. REv. 741, 749 (1981) ("The state may condition
the person's doing of B on his surrender of his constitutional right to do X if by doing
B, he places himself in such a position vis-A-vis the state that his constitutional interest
in asserting X is outweighed by the state's interest in suppressing X." While Professor
Westen comments in this article that "the factors bearing upon the validity of constitu-
tional conditions are no different from the factors governing the resolution of ordinary
constitutional problems," id. at 751, elsewhere he has advanced the thesis that the Su-
preme Court was correct in Harris v. McRae because of the difference between the
allocational and criminal sanctions.); Westen, Correspondence, Regarding Perry, Why
the Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Com-
ment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113 (1980).
19841 1349
1350 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:1293
similar potpourri seems to have been adopted by the California Su-
preme Court.213
An "eclectic" approach-to use Professor Shiffrin's terminol-
ogy2 14-may be the only feasible analysis, but I am left with a hunger
for some theoretical construct that explains why these factors, and not
others, are chosen, and how they fit together. Further, I want answers
to two puzzles inherent in the balancer's analysis. First, why is there a
residual implication that it is relevant that restrictions on constitutional
freedoms are imposed via allocational sanctions rather than criminal
penalties?115 Why not just balance the state interest directly against the
Constitution? Or, to use the test proposed by then Professor Linde,
why not just ask whether a statute requiring that private employers
impose the same conditions would be valid?2"'
Second, why does there recur in the balancer's analysis a test for
the germaneness of the condition to the purpose of the benefit program?
There is a consistent perception that a condition that is unrelated to the
benefit is worse than a condition that is germane. 17 In the normal
1 See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 270,
625 P.2d 779, 789, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 876 (1981) (following a three-part inquiry: (1)
whether the conditions imposed relate to the purposes of the legislation that provide the
benefit; (2) whether the utility of the conditions imposed clearly outweighs the resulting
impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) whether there are no less offensive alterna-
tives available to achieve the state's objective); cf. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J.
287, 301-10, 450 A.2d 925, 932-37 (1982) (balancing the state's interest in protecting
potential life against the mother's interest in preserving her health and in privacy and
striking a statute denying state funding for nonmedically necessary abortions).
214 See Shiffrin, supra note 210, at 605.
215 See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 978 n.2 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that "greater deference may be due the State" because the "resign-to-
run" restrictions are imposed as a condition of public employment rather than directly
on all employees, public or private); see also Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1692
(1983) (allowing greater restraints upon speech rights in the context of government
employment than would be permitted in the form of direct criminal sanctions); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 957 (1983) (allowing
limitations on access to a public forum imposed by way of allocational sanctions that
would be unconstitutional if imposed by direct sanctions).
21I See Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Lib-
erty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10, 76 (1965); see also id. at 43 n.304
("[T]he validity of a governmental restraint in a publicly owned place depends on
whether government could, under the same conditions, and over the same objection,
validly impose the same. restraint in a similar privately-owned place.").
21 7 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better
life but if it affords them it cannot . . . exact surrender of freedoms unrelated to the
purpose of the facilities."); French, supra note 30, at 247; Hale, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321, 350-52 (1935); O'Neil,
supra note 54, at 466-68; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 782 (1964);
Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41
CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955); Note, Denying the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to
Public Ofcers, 64 HARV. L. REv. 987, 992-93 (1951); Note, Unconstitutional Condi-
ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
mode of constitutional balancing, an action's acceptability depends on
its relation to some governmental purpose. Why should the validity of a
condition attached to a government benefit be limited by its relation to
the particular purposes underlying the benefit in question?218
There is an intuitive appeal in the argument that the National
Endowment for the Arts may deny funds to pointilists but not Republi-
cans that is not accounted for by any of the theories canvassed. Since
this intuition does not seem to be limited to any particular area of con-
stitutional adjudication-or indeed to constitutional adjudication at
all-it is worth trying to explain and justify. 19
II. TOWARDS A REVISED ANALYSIS OF ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
We can begin to order our intuitions by recognizing that the prob-
lem of allocational sanctions raises two distinct problems. First, viewed
from the vantage of the recipient of governmental allocations, the sanc-
tion may or may not be an infringement on a constitutionally guaran-
teed liberty. The opportunity to receive government funding by not ex-
tions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1596 (1960); see also Linde, supra note 216, at 31
(speculating that claims against arbitrary disqualification might lead to a requirement
of "relevance"). But cf.-Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932) (even had the
required relation not existed between the condition imposed and the end sought, if the
state legislature concluded it did exist, the Court would defer).
218 See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1250-62
(1977) (arguing that the conditions must be "necessary and proper" to achieving the
objectives of the government-provided funding); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HARv. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (1960) (basing germaneness requirement on proposition
that "[r]egulation is valid only when employed to protect a social interest endangered
by activity in the regulated area"). But see O'Neil, supra note 54, at 467-68 (acknowl-
edging that if the condition is relevant to another valid state purpose, lack of relevance
to the program may be "less serious").
Professor Hale's attempt to relate the test to the purpose is successful only in areas
such as the taxing and commerce powers, which, at the time he was writing, permitted
the federal government to act only in furtherance of sharply limited goals. Hale, supra
note 217, at 352-53. Nongermaneness of a taxing program to revenue-raising cast
doubt on the validity of the legislation because of the presumptive illegitimacy of regu-
latory motives. With modern readings of the scope of federal power and with respect to
the state's plenary power to advance the public interest, such a presumption no longer
exists. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
219 Lest one believe the key in this example is the existence of a valid state pur-
pose in the case of the pointillist, consider the different reaction if food stamps were
denied to artists who chose to be pointillists. The state's purpose is the same in both
cases, but germaneness is lacking in the second one.
Professor Lyons, dealing with whether allocation decisions are coercive from the
perspective of ordinary language philosophy, similarly finds the "germaneness" re-
quirement an appealing but analytically problematic idea. See Lyons, Welcome Threats
and Coercive Offers, 50 PHiL. 425 (1975).
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ercising one's constitutional rights or the possibility of exchanging one's
right for some proffered benefit appears to expand, or at worst leave
untouched, the sphere of individual autonomy. In this way, the alloca-
tional sanction seems different from the threat of criminal prosecution.
The first issue that must be explored is the circumstances under which
this appearance is illusory. My conclusion is that the distinction be-
tween liberty-expanding offers and liberty-reducing threats turns on
the establishment of an acceptable baseline against which to measure a
person's position after imposition of an allocation. I propose three base-
lines that initially test the legitimacy of allocational sanctions. And, it
turns out, the relationship between the condition attached to the alloca-
tion and the purpose underlying the benefit program is of substantial
import in that context.
Second, even where the allocation at issue does not reduce consti-
tutional liberties, it may still be constitutionally unacceptable if the
right involved is inalienable. The inalienability of a constitutional right
turns on both the context of this offer and the nature of the right.
Rather than attempt exhaustively to analyze the permutations of right
and offer, I suggest the types of argument that support claims of ina-
lienability. The applicability of particular arguments to particular
rights will, of course, turn on one's underlying conception of the rights
and the society they safeguard.
Finally, courts must concern themselves with what follows from
the conclusion that a constitutional right has been infringed. While jus-
tifications have been offered for it, the assertion that a less strict stan-
dard of review should be applied to allocational sanctions is unwar-
ranted. The determination that an allocational sanction has infringed a
constitutional right should lead to the same process of balancing against
governmental interests or the same verdict of outright impermissibility
as does the determination that a constitutional right has been infringed
by a direct criminal sanction.
A. Of Threats and Offers
When the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) declines to
provide subsidies for musical comedies, we do not conclude that it has
infringed a right to free speech, though the decision might result in the
impossibility of producing "Hair." Similarly, if it provides a subsidy
for "Guys and Dolls," the NEA does not appear to infringe that right,
though "Hair" may still be unavailable. However, if it provides a sub-
sidy to every show except "Hair," or worse, if the IRS suddenly levies a
prohibitive tax only on the tickets to "Hair," a claim of impingement
on freedom of speech becomes more plausible. The basis for these com-
ALLOCATIONAL SANCTIONS
mon sense distinctions lies not in the different impact on freedom of
speech-"Hair" is unavailable in each case. Rather, the intuitive reac-
tion rests on a comparison of each case with the situations facing the
victim of the government's intervention to the situation she would have
been in had the course of events proceeded normally.
A prison term, a tax, and a license revocation all lower the net
advantages that a victim enjoys. By contrast, "mere" denial of benefits
can be said to leave the victim no worse off than if the government had
never intervened. We have the feeling that there is something coercive
about the prison term, tax, and license revocation that does not infect a
continuous outright denial of benefits. To threaten to move a victim
below the natural baseline is, in some measure, more coercive than de-
clining to faise her above it. Freedom is reduced in the former case but
not in the latter.
In defining coercion as an alteration of the position one would
have enjoyed in the normal course of events, I draw on the model used
by several recent political theorists to define "freedom" and "coer-
cion." 2 0 The argument for so defining violations of constitutional liber-
ties is twofold. First, these rights seek to protect individual choices. 221
220 For the locus classicus of this definition of coercion, see Nozick, Coercion, in
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 447 (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M.
White eds. 1969) (Coercion exists when the threatened action will make one worse off
than she "would have been in the normal or natural or expected course of events.").
Much has been written in tune with this theory of coercion. See, e.g., I. BERLIN, supra
note 67, at 122; A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 257-58 (1978); Alexander,
Zimmerman on Coercive Wage Offers, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160 (1983); Baker, supra
note 206, at 998-99; Day, Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty, 14 AM. PHIL. Q.
257 (1977); J. FEINBERG, The Idea of A Free Man, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 6 (1980); Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in Es-
SAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 65, 70-72 (T. Honderich ed. 1973); Lyons, supra note
219; Wertheimer, Freedom, Morality, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 8
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 203 (1979); Zimmerman, More on Coercive Wage Offers: A Reply
to Alexander, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165 (1983); Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers,
10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981).
221 The threat/offer distinction is, of course, inapplicable to the extent that we
believe a given constitutional right protects not a sphere of individual autonomy but
some other value. The government is not permitted to favor one religion over another,
regardless of whether the favor is administered by threat or offer. Likewise, the inter-
pretation of equal protection doctrine that traces back to a concern with the administra-
tion of laws with "an evil eye and an unequal hand," Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 373-74 (1886), would find irrelevant the particular variety of law to which the
hand and eye turn their attention, as would equal protection and due process doctrines
protecting against arbitrary decisionmaking. From this perspective, it is understandable
that the first modern breaches in the judicial bulwarks against review of allocative sanc-
tions came in the form of equal protection challenges, to which the nature of the sanc-
tion was irrelevant. See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (striking
down an ordinance that barred Jehovah's Witnesses from using a park that other reli-
gious groups were allowed to use); id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stressing
that the holding rested on the equal protection clause rather than the first amendment,
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Therefore, the evaluation of an intervention as either supporting or in-
terfering with that right can logically enough be phrased in terms of the
effect that the intervention has on the range of choices available to the
victim.222 The difference between a highwayman confronting a victim
with the dilemma of "your money or your life" '23 and a street vendor
propositioning a pedestrian with the offer of "your money or my
watch" is not that the highwayman removes the possibility of choice.
The bold, greedy, or foolish victim still has the choice of refusing to
part with his funds at the risk of death. Rather, the distinction lies in
the fact that the highwayman has narrowed the range of choices; the
victim no longer has the opportunity, which existed before the interven-
tion, of choosing to retain both money and life. The street vendor, by
contrast, enlarges the range of choice. Before the offer, the pedestrian
could not have chosen to make the trade. If freedom is choice, a reduc-
tion of the range of options associated with speech can be said to
abridge freedom of speech in a way that an offer increasing the range
of choices cannot.224
These definitions are also supported by the argument that one
who is not rendered worse off by an intervention has no right to com-
plain of it. The vendor has not harmed me in any way. Should I wish
to decline his offer, I can walk away without sanction. I thus have no
right to complain. The highwayman, on the other hand, significantly
decreases my welfare if he carries out his threat to kill me when I
refuse to give him my money. My complaint is manifest.2 5 This dis-
and thus did not abandon the right-privilege distinction); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561,
571 (1945) ("Of course ... men could not be excluded from the practice of law...
simply because they belong to any of our religious groups .... ") (dictum); Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1938) (If a state furnishes higher
education to white residents, it must provide substantially equal advantages to black
residents.).
The validity of laws that violate structural constraints imposed by the Constitution
does not depend on the field in which they operate, see, e.g., Immigration and Natural-
ization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
and to the extent that the limitations of the first amendment are means to guard against
government censorship that undercuts the premise of democracy, it appears irrelevant
in what manner censorship is exercised. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
222 See I. BERLIN, supra note 67, at xxxix-xl, 130 n.1 (one's range of choices is
the measure of her freedom); Day, supra note 220, at 259-62; J. FEINBERG, The Inter-
est in Liberty on the Scales, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BoUNDS OF LIBERTY 36-38
(1980).
222 This example is tattered by decades of use, see, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE 95 (1981); Nozick, supra note 220, at 453, but it is still illuminating.
224 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("[T]he State
may not. . . contract the spectrum of available knowledge.").
225 Professor Nozick suggests that the crucial question is whether the highwayman
has made me an offer I would have preferred not to have been made. See Nozick, supra
note 220, at 459. When this is the case, the highwayman's will has in effect been
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tinction between threats and offers gives an initial answer to the other-
wise troubling question of why, in the first instance, a plausible distinc-
tion can be drawn between criminal and allocative sanctions. A
criminal sanction is in most cases an unambiguous threat, for the nor-
mal course of events in the absence of such a sanction is not incarcera-
tion or payment of a fine. 26 Whether an allocation involves a threat or
an offer, by contrast, is a more difficult question.
As a number of commentators have noted in different contexts, the
words "normal course of events" mask an array of difficulties 2 7 Take,
for example, the case of Speiser v. Randall,22 Justice Brennan's earli-
est venture into the field of allocative sanctions. There, the Court re-
viewed a provision' of the California constitution denying tax exemp-
tions to individuals and institutions that advocated the overthrow of the
government by unlawful or violent means. As applied to plaintiffs who
refused to certify their qualifications, the provision resulted in the de-
nial of a veteran's property tax exemption on the first $1000 worth of
substituted for my own, and I have been used for another's ends. For my purposes
here, this argument is not central.
Professor C. Edwin Baker, in private conversation, has suggested to me that since
any reduction in wealth reduces the scope of options that would otherwise have been
available to the victim, when the reduction violates the right to a proportional share of
those benefits to which all citizens are morally entitled, it should be regarded as a
coercive, and hence unconstitutional, limitation on other constitutional rights that pro-
tect liberty, such as the right of free speech.
I disagree with Professor Baker on this point. While it is certainly true that the
deprivation of wealth reduces the victim's options, she is not worse off than she other-
wise would have been because of the exercise of her constitutional rights. There is a
difference between the highwayman depriving me of my watch at gunpoint and his
depriving me of my cash, as a result of which I am forced to sell my watch. My
retention of the watch in the former instance would result in my being significantly
worse off than I would have been in the normal course of events (i.e., dead). In the
latter case, whether or not I decide to retain my watch, I am worse off to the degree of
the initial deprivation. It is awkward to say that the highwayman has deprived me of
my watch. The other line of argument that supports the same intuition is that in the
former case, the highwayman has control over whether or not I retain my watch and
hence is clearly responsible for my losing it, while in the latter, whether I sell my
watch, my shoes, or my tie is beyond the control of my assailant.
226 Of course, where the normal course of events is incarceration, as in the case of
plea bargains, a lesser prison term may constitute an offer rather than a threat. See,
e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 379 (1982) (" '[A]dditional' charges ob-
tained by a prosecutor [cannot] necessarily be characterized as an impermissible 'pen-
alty.'. . . [C]harges brought in an original indictment may be abandoned by the prose-
cutor in the course of plea negotiation--in often what is clearly a 'benefit' to the
defendant . . ... "); see also Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amend-
ment: When Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 45
(1981) (offering an excellent overview of the courts' reactions to offers of probation
conditioned on impositions on constitutional rights).
227 C. FRIED, supra note 223, at 95-95; Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargain-
ing Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652, 658-60 (1981); Nozick, supra note 220, at 447-53.
228 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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personal property. In striking down the denial, Justice Brennan began
his analysis with the comment that "[t]o deny an exemption to claim-
ants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them
for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to
fine them for this speech. '2 29 On its face, this looks straightforward
enough, and Justice Brennan's argument has been often repeated.230
Closer examination, however, takes us into a hall of mirrors.
If the "deterrent effect" of a fine is a direct function of the income
or wealth foregone, any refusal to provide income has such an effect.
The government that offers to buy advertising time for anti-cigarette
commercials for $1000 but that declines to pay when the offer is not
accepted produces the same deterrent effect as a regime that fines a'
network $1000 for not running a similar advertisement gratis.2"1
There are, however, differences both normative and positive. Peo-
ple do,232 and should, regard the two deterrents differently. The first
seems to be an example of bargaining, the second, one of "coercion."
The force of Justice Brennan's position is his assignment of the Cali-
fornia provision to the second category; the denial of the exemption is,
he says, a penalty.
But why a penalty to veterans who refused to take the oath and
not a "bonus for loyalty" to veterans who did, as the California Su-
preme Court characterized the exemptions granted to oath takers?2"' If
the normal situation is exemption from taxes for all taxpayers, the de-
nial of an exemption results in a tax, leaving the noncomplying taxpay-
ers worse off. On the other hand, Californians do pay property taxes.
229 Id. at 518.
230 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)
(one-year waiting period before immigrants become eligible for welfare deters interstate
travel).
231 I leave aside the possibility that the gain or loss of $1000 will substantially
alter the network's preferences. The wealth effects of such small amounts are likely to
be minimal.
232 J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-
ISLATION 3 n.a (1970) ("It is worse to lose than simply not to gain.") (emphasis omit-
ted); Kalmeman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, Sci. AM., Jan. 1982, at
160-73.
233 See First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 438,
311 P.2d 508, 520 (1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 545 (1958) ("[T]his legitimate objective [of
encouraging loyalty] is sought to be accomplished by placing in a favored economic
position ...those particular persons and groups of individuals who are capable of
formulating policies relating to good morals and respect for the law."); cf. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 (1983)
("[W]hen [an] exemption selects. . . a narrowly defined group to bear the full burden
of [a] tax, the tax begins to resemble more a penalty for [the few burdened taxpayers]
than an attempt to favor [those taxpayers who are exempted].").
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Having refused to swear that he did not advocate the government's
overthrow, Mr. Speiser was no worse off than most of his fellow citi-
zens. The government, after all, did not have to exempt veterans.
Speiser was, of course, worse off than veterans who signed the oath, but
the network that declines to run the ad seems to be worse off, and it
was not coerced. To explain the distinction between the two situations,
we must specify the appropriate baseline or position against which to
compare the victim's position after governmental intervention.23
One possibility is the "existential counterfactual: ' 2 35 Is the victim
worse off than if the government had never existed?2"6 Compare with
Speiser the situation of a Philadelphia newspaper that finds advertise-
ments traditionally placed by the city withdrawn because of a series of
stories critical of the mayor's conduct.237 Obviously, if there were no
city, there could be no ads. Hence, when the ads are pulled, the news-
paper is no worse off than if the city had never existed. By contrast, if
California did not exist, Speiser would pay no taxes. He is worse off.
However, there are manifest difficulties here, for the argument
proves too much and too little. If Hobbes is right, anything beyond a
poor, nasty, brutish, and short life still leaves the victim better off than
if the government had not existed. 8" For most victims, the deprivations
that would count as infringements on constitutional rights would be
limited to summary executions. On the other hand, if the victim is a
24 Professor Clark suggests the necessity of a zero point or status quo ante by
reference to which we can judge whether state intervention is action or inaction. See
Clark, supra note 138, at 1017-19. He never explains how the status quo should be
identified (although he mentions temporal, predictive, and counterfactual considera-
tions) or why it is necessary.
235 For a basic discussion of counterfactuals, see N. GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION,
AND FORECAST (1973).
"36 See Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Lib-
eral State, 28 UCLA L. REV. 816, 837 (1981) (suggesting that "the correct approach
for a libertarian" is to adopt the principle that "B cannot end up better off were B in a
world without A through an award of [resources] that makes A worse off than were A
in a world without B").
The Court has at times engaged in counterfactual speculations. See United States
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1981), in
which Justice Rehnquist suggested that the civic association would be far worse off if
no postal service existed than it is having to pay postage costs to use mailboxes; see also
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If there
were no Constitution and no Congress, [the states'] power to cross the [state] line would
depend upon their neighbors.").
237 See Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1979). Once again, the tactic is not
a new one. During the first half of the nineteenth century, United States Presidents,
beginning with Thomas Jefferson, used government printing contracts and advertising
to support or encourage favorable press coverage. F. MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM
178 (1941); I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 78 (1983).
23 See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 104 (rev'd Amer. ed. 1950).
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Hobbesean survivor-let us say a black belt in karate or a lineman for
the Denver Broncos-denying the individual what he would be able to
seize or hold in the state of nature would be coercive.23 9 Hobbes may
not be right,24° but we have no way of knowing. This is the shortcom-
ing of the existential counterfactual as a baseline; in our 0World, the
government does exist, and we lack the theoretical or investigative ap-
paratus to determine what the world would look like in its absence.
This also is the flaw in Justice Powell's suggestion in Maher v. Roe 41
that "[the state] has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that
was not already there. '242 Without the state, we have no idea of what
would be "already there."
If not Hobbes, what of Locke? Equipped with a strong enough
theory of natural rights that antecede the establishment of government,
we could denote the deprivation of those rights, or the failure to extend
or protect them, as an illegitimate inducement to forego a constitutional
right. But at this point, the existence of the constitutional right is su-
perfluous. Everything turns on whether there is a natural right to the
benefit in question, and the impact of the deprivation on other constitu-
tional rights is irrelevant. If there is a natural right to obtain advertis-
ing, the failure to purchase advertising because of fiscal constraints is as
impermissible as the refusal to purchase advertising because of criticism
by the press.
Under such a theory, to answer the question of allocational sanc-
tions, one would have to construct a comprehensive system of moral
entitlements to government allocations. The failure of consensus regard-
ing theories of distributive justice in other areas bodes ill for such an
enterprise. Moreover, for purposes of the problem before us, such a
comprehensive system may be both unnecessary and misleading. The
fact that no one has yet argued for the creation of a right to receive
city-sponsored advertisement does not intuitively disqualify the newspa-
per's claim that Mayor Rizzo cannot cut off city advertisements in re-
taliation for criticism. The newspaper appears to say something credi-
ble when it claims an abridgment of its first amendment rights. What is
it?
Our problem, at least in separating threats from offers, lies in the
289 Cf J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMrrS TO LIBERTY 47-50, 77 (1975) (seriously ad-
vancing the proposition that the legitimate distribution of property in a society corre-
sponds to the "threat advantage" of the participants in the state of nature).
1"0 Cf E. GELLNER, MUSLIM SOCIETY (1983) (describing a society in which the
role of the state as protector of its citizens is limited and clan hierarchies are the basic
guardians of individual freedoms and property).
241 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
242 Id. at 474.
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challenge to specify an appropriate normal course of events from which
to judge deviations. While no single baseline is determinative, three to-
gether express the relevant factors. An action that pushes a victim be-
low the position she would have occupied on all three scales is easily
characterized as a coercive threat subject to full constitutional scrutiny.
An action that raises its subjects above the normal course of events, as
characterized by all three baselines, is recognizable as an offer free
from the limits on coercive government authority. Where the scales con-
flict, we confront difficult cases.
1. History as a Baseline
If it is difficult, both practically and conceptually, to distinguish
action from inaction in allocative contexts, 4" it is nonetheless practica-
ble to distinguish change from inertia. Losing a benefit previously pro-
vided seems different from simply never having been provided the bene-
fit in the first place. If for each of the last twenty years the mayor has
provided city patronage to the advertising department of a newspaper,
the threat to stop doing so unless the newspaper changes its editorial
policy would legitimately be viewed as coercion. On the other hand, if
the mayor announces the intention to provide previously unavailable
advertising revenues conditional on a change in policy, the announce-
ment, while perhaps unconstitutional on other grounds, does not seem
at first glance like a threat to penalize the existing policy, for it does
not reduce the range of choices available to the newspaper.
The use of the status quo ante as the baseline from which to judge
allocation decisions runs through a number of recent opinions. Most
prominently, the freedom of the government to allocate access to gov-
ernment facilities has turned in recent years on whether such facilities
are historical "public fora." 2" In areas that "by long tradition ...
have been devoted to assembly and debate,"245 like streets and parks
that have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, com-
municating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions," 246 any limitation on the exercise of first amendment rights is
24S See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
'" See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948
(1983); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
245 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 954
(1983).
248 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion by Roberts, J.).
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presumptively unconstitutional, for the limitation reduces the range of
freedom of speech and assembly in comparison to the freedom available
before. By contrast, on government property that is newly opened to the
public, speech and assembly can be limited because the opening of the
new forum-even to a limited extent-increases the range of expressive
activity available over the historical baseline.247 In either situation,
what is at issue is not the hypothetical uses to which the property could
be put, but the concrete history of the forum at issue.24 In such situa-
tions, the court at least nominally adopts Justice Holmes's suggestion
that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." '249
47 Indeed, this in part explains the dedicated forum doctrine. Because the govern-
ment is creating a forum that is, from the start, restricted to particular uses, the oppor-
tunities for expressive activities are being increased rather than cut back. See Minnesota
State Bd. v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1064-70 (1984) (allowing university to "meet and
confer" with only the representatives of its employee association because the statute
ordering it to do so does not create a forum for nonmembers of the employee association
to "meet and confer" with the university); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (be-
cause of the special nature of a military base into which only selected speakers were
invited, government need not allow political campaigning that might be disruptive);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding provision of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 that provides funding only to major parties
because it "is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather
to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the
electoral process").
Minnesota State Bd. is a problematic example, however, because before the adop-
tion of the statute in issue, the authorities consulted with both members and
nonmembers.
248 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (1983) ("Traditional
public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protec-
tion and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts
government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public
expression."); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 133 (1981) ("Congress. . .may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public
forum' status of streets and parks which have historically been public forums . . .);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (" '[B]efore you could say
whether a certain thing could be done in a certain place you would have to know the
history of the particular place.' ") (quoting Lord Dunedin in M'ara v. Magistrates of
Edinburgh, 1913 Sess. Case, 1059, 1073-74) (Scotland).
24' United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 120-21(1981) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
Unfortunately, having announced his allegiance to history, Justice Rehnquist proceeded
to ignore it. His opinion treats the criminal prohibition of placing unstamped matter in
a postal box, adopted in 1934, as an integral part of the postal system necessary to
protect against "activities . . .wholly incompatible with the maintenance of a nation-
wide system for the safe and efficient delivery of mail." Id. at 130 n.6. He fails to
mention that, from 1790 to 1934, the system survived without the statute, the enact-
ment of which clearly must have decreased the range of possible first amendment
activities.
A similar one-eyed view of the status quo ante infected Justice White's opinion in
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983), in which an
agreement excluding PLEA, the rival union, from access to employee mailboxes to
which they had previously had access, was upheld. Justice White dismissed PLEA's
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A similar conviction explains Justice Brennan's position distin-
guishing removal of a book from a library shelf from failure to
purchase that book in the first place.250 The removal reduces the range
of choice available to students, as compared to the historical baseline,
while the failure to purchase a book leaves unchanged the information
available.
2 51
The strength of the historical baseline is its grounding in the real
world. Whether or not a benefit has been dispensed in the past is an
historical fact. Rather than introducing implicit assumptions about the
political viability of particular actions, as do the greater and lesser ar-
gument and the anthropomorphic purpose analysis, or speculating
about whether the state could have denied benefits entirely in the past,
the historical baseline focuses on whether the state in fact did so. If the
benefit has not been previously provided, selective failure to provide it
now is a politically proper subset. The state has exercised the greater
power in the past, and it is plausible to suggest it can do so in the
future. Thus, the political underpinning of the greater and lesser argu-
ment has a basis in experience. On the other hand, the fact that the
benefit has been available casts doubt on a claim that the denial neither
expands government power, nor reduces citizen options. The status quo
carries within itself its own defense: it is costly for the government to
devote its resources to altering the current situation. Change, by con-
trast, requires justification.252 It is always a legitimate question for a
citizen to ask why she is being treated differently from her
argument that its prior access to the school mail facilities had rendered them a limited
public forum by pointing out that, at that time, the union was not the rival of the
exclusive bargaining representative and therefore "had legitimate reasons for use of the
system." Id. at 956. Apparently, PLEA's new status as rival to the dominant union
made its history of free access irrelevant.
250 See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) ("[N]othing in our deci-
sion today affects in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose books to
add to the libraries of their schools.").
251 Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 n.22 (1982) (rejecting the state's attempt
to characterize its exclusion of illegal alien children from the schools as a "residence
test," by changing its historical test of residency, under which illegal aliens would have
qualified as residents); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 50-55 (1977) (defending elimi-
nation of disability benefits upon marriage to a nonrecipient of benefits by stressing
that the provision of such benefits had occurred as a gradual expansion of the program
over a period of years); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (striking a require-
ment that veterans take a loyalty oath to qualify for tax exemption, when the exemp-
tion had previously been available without the taking of an oath); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 33 (1910) (striking statute requiring that foreign corpora-
tions pay charter fee to qualify to do business in the state, when no such fee had been
exacted previously).
252 See 0. PERELMAN, LAW AND ARGUMENT, supra note 54, at 91 ("[O]nly
change, always, everywhere and in anything, requires justification."); see also id. at
159.
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predecessors.
So, too, a citizen may reasonably come to rely on past practice and
justifiably regard a change as a deprivation, different in kind from a
mere failure to provide a benefit. Once the government decides upon a
course of action, it should be held to account for the impact of its deci-
sion on constitutional rights. As Justice Holmes commented on the gov-
ernment's "declining to provide the benefit" of postal service,
The decisions thus far have gone largely if not wholly on the
ground that if the Government chose to offer a means of
transportation which it was not bound to offer it could
choose what it would transport; which is well enough when
neither law nor the habit that the Government's action has
generated has made that means the only one. But when habit
and law combine to exclude every other it seems to me that
the First Amendment in terms forbids such control ....
And government's disavowal of responsibility for a given outcome
sounds more plausible if that government has never intervened in the
field at all than if it suddenly withdraws.
Finally, there is a recurring philosophical and psychological per-
ception that losing a good is worse than not receiving it.'" The vision
of nonexistence resulting from death is much more troubling than the
fact of nonexistence before birth,255 and a brain injury that reduces an
adult to the level of a three-month old seems more tragic than a birth
defect that prevents any further development.256
It must be admitted that, taken alone, the historical baseline is not
a sharp-edged analytical tool. If one government official grants benefits,
only to be reversed by her superiors, has a baseline been established? If
not, how long must the allocation persist to qualify as the status quo?
On another tack, if the government is not to be permanently straitjack-
2" Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 141 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
United States ex tel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S.
407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The United States may give up the Post
Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a
part of free speech as the right to use our tongues . . ").
I" See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 232, at 160-73; Kahneman &
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECoNOMETRICA
263 (1979); Slovic & Lichtenstein, Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective, 73
AM. Eco N. REv. 596, 600 (1983); Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. EcoN. BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION 39 (1980).
255 See J. BENHrAM, supra note 232, at 3 n.a (emphasis omitted); T. NAGEL,
MORTAL QUESTIONs 8-10 (1979); White, Negative Liberty, 80 ETHICs 185, 188-93
(1970) (distinguishing the kinds of situations in which it can be said "that a person is
unfree to do something because it is-or has been made-impossible for him to do it").
I" T. NAGEL, supra note 255, at 5-6.
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eted, changes in surrounding circumstances must in some instances be
sufficient to allow the government to start over again. Conversely, the
historical baseline provides no initial protection to citizens in the con-
text of changing social or technological conditions that necessitate or
facilitate the provision of new benefits. These difficulties dull but do
not entirely blunt the persuasive force of history. They do suggest,
however, that other factors must be considered.257
2. Equality as a Baseline
Even if there were no history of public advertising, the mayor's
decision not to place advertising in one paper while placing it in all
others looks significantly different from a decision simply not to place
ads. Similarly, Mr. Speiser's exclusion from benefits accorded other
veterans because of his failure to disavow membership in subversive
organizations looks like a penalty even if veterans' property were previ-
ously fully taxable.
The normal course of events, under this interpretation, is the
course of events that is the statistical norm: what happens to everyone
else. Thus, for example, in Zobel v. Williams,258 Justice Rehnquist
could suggest that interstate travel to Alaska was not deterred by a
grant of oil revenues proportional to the length of residency by implic-
itly comparing the grant to a newcomer to the immigrant's situation in
his previous residence.2 59 Viewed in comparison with the benefits
granted to established residents, however, the program was interpreted
by justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell as a penalty
257 Professor Clark, in Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Consti-
tutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. Rlv. 953, 1023 (1978), rejects the historical baseline
for three reasons. First, he suggests that it would establish an "essentially arbitrary
difference between communities." For the reasons given in text, see supra text accom-
panying notes 252-56, the difference in history seems far from arbitrary. Second, he
argues that such a baseline would be misleading because the motivation of the entity in
question can be disguised to evade the Court's objections. This, however, would only be
the case if motivation were, in faci, the touchstone of constitutionality. For reasons
mentioned above, see supra text accompanying notes 135-64, I believe that motivation
analysis is largely misguided. Third, Professor Clark suggests (as does Justice Burger's
dissent in Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)) that the historical baseline
would "freeze the community" into an irreversible decision, once a program were un-
dertaken. One solution to this difficulty is to allow the presumptive validity of an his-
torical baseline to be impeached by changes in circumstances. Absent such changes,
however, the baseline would stand. A second response-given in text-is that consider-
ations of history must be combined with those of equality and prediction to set the
baseline. Finally, it may be that this is simply the price that must be paid. It is not
unreasonable to require a greater justification for decisions that decrease the options for
the exercise of constitutional rights than those that increase the options.
258 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
1'9 See id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that made those who exercised the right of interstate travel worse off
than those who had not.260 Similarly, the line of cases following from
Police Department v. Mosley,26 which granted the government a theo-
retical right to prohibit picketing or other first amendment activity in
certain areas but barred it from selectively prohibiting such activities in
only some of the areas, sets a baseline of equality. Exclusion of all
speech leaves one no worse off than she would have been in the normal
course of events, while exclusion of only some speech makes the disfa-
vored speech worse off than the favored. Similarly, the importance of
history as a baseline in the public forum cases may in part result from
the claim of present citizens that they have a right to be treated on an
equal basis with their predecessors.
These examples are not isolated ones. If, as Justice Rehnquist
suggested in Clements v. Fashing,2 62 it would be a "perversion of the
Equal Protection Clause were we to conclude" that when a state exer-
cises conceded powers to contract the scope of autonomy rights, it must
do so uniformly, then the Court has indulged in a veritable orgy of
equal protection analysis.268 To deprive a citizen of a benefit available
260 See id. at 76 n.6 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The 'burden' imposed on non-
residents is relative to the benefits enjoyed by residents.").
261 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
262 457 U.S. 957, 969 (1982).
2- See Zobel, 457 U.S. 55 (striking grant program that discriminated in favor of
longterm residents); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state may not deny
unemployment benefits to one who quits her military-related civilian job because it
conflicts with her religious beliefs); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974) (state may not set up a one-year durational residency requirement for eligi-
bility for free medical care); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (city may not
prohibit only certain kinds of peaceful picketing); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (state may not deny welfare benefits to otherwise eligible persons who have not
lived in the state for one year); see also Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975).
A majority of the court in a number of recent cases has tended to separate artifi-
dally the equality analysis from the analysis to determine whether a protected right has
been infringed. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997
(1983) (by granting a tax exemption to veterans' organizations that lobby while deny-
ing an exemption to other nonprofit organizations that lobby, Congress merely declined
to fund the exercise of certain organizations' first amendment rights, therefore no con-
stitutional right is infringed and the classification is only subject to minimum rational-
ity review under the equal protection clause); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 957 (1983) (because there is no "obligation per se to let any
organization use the mailboxes," refusal to extend the privilege granted to the estab-
lished teachers' union to its rival need not be evaluated by strict equal protection scru-
tiny); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 960 (1982) (because the "resign-to-run"
statute is not a "significant barrier" to the exercise of political rights "it is no argument
that. . . it burdens only [certain] office holders"); cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Conm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
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to those who are similarly situated because of her exercise of constitu-
tional rights is to impinge on protected liberties.
The principle of equality of distribution as the baseline from
which allocational decisions can be judged has one root in principles of
virtual representation. As Professor Kalven argued,
The point should have considerable practical significance.
Everyone at some time or other loves a parade whatever its
effect on traffic and other uses of public streets. Municipali-
ties pressed by concern with the protest movement may be
inhibited in any rush to flat nondiscriminatory prohibitions
by the difficulty of distinguishing between the parades we
like and others. Equal protection may, therefore, require
freedom for the parades we hate.2 '
Equality of treatment can also be seen as a moral requirement,
necessary to achieve a society that accords equal respect to its citi-
zens,26 5 for the presumption of equality of treatment, absent reasons to
the contrary, is deeply rooted in the traditions of liberal democracy.
Moreover, a peculiar psychological pain attaches to being singled out or
senting) ("To my knowledge this Court has never subjected governmental action to the
most stringent constitutional review solely on the basis of 'differential treatment' of
particular groups."); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding denial
of abortion funding to medicaid recipients despite inequality between ability of poor
and better-off women to obtain pregnancy-related medical procedures); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (same).
Such analysis fails to recognize that claims of equality themselves may set the
baseline for determining whether the right has been infringed. Whether the allocation
in question is an offer or a penalty depends on the validity of claims that the allocation
has been unequal.
2 Kalven, The Concept of a Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT.
REv. 1, 30.
285 See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN =H LIBERAL STATE 55-58, 168-
69, 238-39 (1980) (arguing that equality is always justifiable in neutral dialogue by
reference to equality of personhood, while inequality requires justification); A. GUT-
MANN, LIBERAL EQuALr 12, 104, 106, 170, 222 (1980) (arguing that equality of
persons is a basic presupposition of liberal political theory); see also R. DwORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY (1977); Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect:
The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1983); Baker,
supra note 206; Karst, In Defense of Equality, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 248 (1983) (argu-
ing that equality is necessary to preserve "the chief citizenship value [of] respect"); see
also Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 879 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The due
process] clause is implicated when the State singles out one person for adverse treat-
ment. . . . For an essential attribute of the liberty protected by the Constitution is the
right to the same kind of treatment as the State provides to other similarly situated
persons.") (footnote omitted); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) ("The Equal
Protection clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based
and invidious class-based legislation."); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 71 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(With respect to discrimination based on the length of residency within a state, the
Court has rejected the notion that "'some citizens are more equal than others.' ").
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pointedly excluded.266 Similar treatment can always be justified by ref-
erence to the equality of persons; it insults no one. Differences in treat-
ment require further explanation.
267
Despite the central role of equality in our political traditions, a
particular objection can be raised to its use as a baseline for assessing
the constitutionality of allocational sanctions. It is generally agreed that
in the field of criminal sanctions the state may not selectively burden
the exercise of constitutional rights. However, some argue that in any
allocation decision, inequality is inevitable. If the resources to be allo-
cated are limited, some potential recipients must, by definition, be de-
nied, and the cut-off point may well be random. 6 ' Thus, using equal-
ity as the baseline for allocation decisions involves a difficulty that does
not arise with criminal prohibitions. 69
Courts should be cautious in using this rationale, however, for
there are instances where it is manifestly inapplicable. In situations
where there is no real resource cost to including all of the proposed
class, the government cannot justify excluding part of that class by ar-
guing that it must make choices. Where public good is involved and the
provision of the benefit to additional recipients would be no more costly
than the provision to the initial recipient, 70 or where the cost of pro-
viding the benefit has already been expended, 7 1 or where provision of
2 J. FEINBERG, Noncomparative Justice, in RIGHTs, JUSTICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBw RY 286 (1980).
267 See generally Berlin, Equality, 56 PROc. OF THE ARiSTOTELiAN SOC'y 301
(1955-56).
I See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878 n.1 (1982) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (stating his belief that standard created for dealing with library book removals
is not applicable to curricular decisions because "[tihe school's finite resources ...
require that education officials make sensitive choices ... ; subjects generally are ex-
cluded simply because school officials have chosen to devote their resources to one
rather than another subject"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (court
does not "question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how
best to allocate scarce resources or 'to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.' ") (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)); Schwieker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 n.23 (1981) ("When a legal
distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be, between night and day,
childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to
be drawn. . . to mark where the change takes place.") (quoting Louisville Gas Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
269 Cf C. FRIED, supra note 77, at 37-38.
170 See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (hold-
ing that a city's refusal to lease its auditorium, which had already been constructed, to
a theatre company that wished to present the musical "Hair" in it violated the first
amendment).
171 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (removal of library
books that had already been purchased violated the first amendment if done with intent
to suppress ideas).
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the benefit will in fact save resources, 72 the validity of the baseline of
equality cannot be challenged with a claim that linedrawing is inevita-
ble. Even when the provision of the benefit to additional recipients en-
tails real resource costs, the necessity for choice does not negate the
claims of equality.
Not all inequalities are equally offensive, and the government may
recognize some claims to limited resources without diverging from the
appropriate baseline. Our reactions differ significantly depending on
whether the victim's position is unlike that of most others who are simi-
larly situated or whether her position is comparable to that of the ma-
jority of other members of her class. The force of a claim that equal
allocations of benefits represent the normal course of events turns on
the prevalence of the benefit.
If, rather than excluding the offending paper from access to city
advertising, the mayor gives a "best paper of the year" prize to one of
ten competing newspapers-the one that has been most favorable to the
city in its reporting-an inequality certainly exists between the winner
and the losers. However, it is difficult to characterize this inequality as
a penalty to the losers.
On the other hand, the more a government's necessary choices tend
to single out for exclusion from otherwise available benefits those who
exercise a particular right, the more that choice appears to penalize
that exercise. As Professor Chafee put the matter,
[a] testator is not obligated to leave property to his children
at all in many states; but if he divides his estate among all
his children except one, this is morally a penalty on the
omitted child. You cannot argue to the child who is cut out
of the will that he has merely failed to receive a favor. 73
Thus, in Widmar v. Vincent,27' Justice Powell emphasized the
discriminatory exclusion of only religious exercises from the use of fa-
cilities that were generally available for other activities. 7 5 And in Ply-
272 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Congress's refusal to expend
Medicaid funds for abortions results in the expenditure of funds for childbirth, which is
more costly).
273 Z. CHAFEE, 1 GovFNmENr AND MASS CommuCANSo 306 (1947). See
also Z. CHAFEE, 2 supra, at 709-10 (1947).
274 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
275 Id. at 273 ("[T]he question is whether [the college] can now exclude groups
because of the content of their speech."); see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
(A university may not deny use of its facilities to the Students for a Democratic Society
because of disagreement with their beliefs, though it may if the group violates reasona-
ble regulations that are generally applicable.)..
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ler v. Doe' 76 he suggested that the vice of denying public education to
the children of illegal aliens was that it "deprives a group of children of
the opportunity for education afforded all other children";277 the disfa-
vored children were "singled out by the state and then penalized be-
cause of their parents' status. '278 Similarly, in Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,27 9 Justice
O'Connor emphasized that the weakness of the tax scheme at issue was
that it "singled out the press for special treatment."'2 80
This distinction between singling out a group for treatment less
favorable than that accorded most comparable groups and singling out
that same group for treatment more favorable than that accorded other
comparable groups might account for the outcomes in Greer v. Spock281
and the earlier dedicated public forum cases. 2 2 In Greer the Court up-
held regulations excluding political campaigning from a military train-
ing camp despite the fact that certain outside speakers were permitted
to address the troops. The fact that the bulk of outside speakers were
excluded, however, lent credence to the proposition that the exclusion of
the plaintiffs did not reduce their communication options beyond the
normal course of events. Similarly, in the public forum cases, the Court
conferred special status on forums "dedicated to" particular uses.2"' A
"dedicated" forum can only accomplish its purposes by restricting itself
to a narrow class of uses and excluding the great majority. It thus can
plausibly be characterized as a bonus to the included class, rather than
as a penalty to the many classes excluded.
The distinction also provides a viable rationale for Regan v. Taxa-
- 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
27" Id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 239 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
279 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983).
'80 Id. at 1370. The Court pointed out that the state had created a "special use
tax, which ... [was] without parallel in the State's tax scheme." Id. It distinguished
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), because "[tihe ex-
empt enterprises in Oklahoma Press were isolated exceptions and not the rule. Here,
everything is exempt ...... Id. at 1371 n.5. See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 879 n.2 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I find crucial the State's decision to
single out an idea for disapproval .... "); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981) (A state may not "exclude [the adherents of any particular religion], because of
their faith, or lack of it, from receiving . . . benefits .... ") (quoting Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (emphasis deleted)); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969) (school may not "singl[e]
out for prohibition ... one particular opinion").
11 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
181 See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
181 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-03 (1974).
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tion With Representation,;"' which would otherwise rest uneasily with
Minneapolis Star and Speiser v. Randall. According to the Court in
Regan, tax exemptions granted for lobbying by veterans organizations
did not penalize nonveterans organizations because, being an anomaly,
the veterans exemption did not represent the normal course of events
and therefore was properly treated as a subsidy.2" 5 In contrast, the ex-
emptions in Speiser were generally available to veterans, and those in
Minneapolis Star excused all but 16 out of 374 newspapers from pay-
ing the sales tax at issue.288
Reference to the position of most potential beneficiaries as a base-
line finds support in both practice and theory. As a practical matter,
[w]hen the State imposes a generally applicable [burden or
denial], there is little cause for concern. We need not fear
that a government will destroy a selected group. . . by bur-
densome [imposition] if it must impose the same burden on
the rest of its constituency. When a state singles out the
press, though, the political constraints that prevent a legisla-
ture from passing crippling taxes of general applicability are
weakened, and the threat of burdensome [denials] becomes
acute.28 7
Similarly, the more anomalous the denial, the more likely it is to be
perceived as a punishment for the exercise of rights and, hence, the
more likely it is to deter that exercise 88 and the less likely it is to be
the result of an appropriately impartial weighing of costs and bene-
fits.2 9 So, too, the fact that the government has been active in a number
284 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
285 Id. at 2001.
"' Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980), present problems for analysis under the equality baseline. In each case the
norm was the prohibition of speech, and favored uses were granted exceptions. Both
cases, however, involved situations where the benefit in question had been historically
granted (the sidewalk public forum), and where, at least arguably, there was no limited
benefit that had to be parcelled out. The use of the sidewalk by the favored group did
not preclude, or even raise the cost of, use of the sidewalk for the disfavored uses. Thus
the defense of necessary choice was unavailable, and the baseline of history suggests a
contraction of benefits.
287 Minneapolis Star, 103 S. Ct. at 1372 (citation omitted). See also J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-82 (1980); Kalven, supra note 264, at 30; Karst, supra
note 263, at 23-25.
28" This is particularly the case when the disfavored recipient is in competition
with the favored. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publishing
Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 431 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (The government
may decline to subsidize the cost of distribution of all newspapers, but it may not
choose to subsidize some newspapers and not others.).
289 Brest, Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 138, at 6-8; Brest, Unconstitu-
tional Motive, supra note 138, at 95, 107-09, 120-23.
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of comparable areas undercuts the claim that it has no control over the
outcome or distribution in this instance and, hence, should not be held
responsible.
As all lawyers are aware, of course, any two instances can be simi-
lar or different in an almost infinite number of ways. The standard by
which a court judges whether an excluded recipient is a member of a
group whose members have not been excluded-whether she is "simi-
larly situated"-presents a difficulty for the equality baseline, as for
any claim of comparative justice.2 10 Assume that radio stations-all of
which are critical of the mayor-are denied tax benefits granted to
newspapers-all of which tend to be supportive. The broadcasters
claim they have been excluded from benefits available to "news" media,
while the mayor staunchly maintains that all "newspapers" are treated
identically. In the abstract, there may be little that allows us to identify
which claim accurately characterizes the denial. An examination of the
concrete circumstances surrounding the denial, however, may provide
more leverage on the problem. If television stations and museums also
receive benefits, we are drawn to one conclusion; if they are excluded,
we are drawn to another. The more striking the similarities between
the excluded and included, and the smaller the class of the excluded,
the more powerful the claim of the equality baseline.291 Thus, in the
example of a tax benefit program affecting the media, the equality of
excluding radio stations as a group might be debatable, but exclusion of
a single critical newspaper would be a clear violation of the equality
baseline.
Moreover, when there are discernible purposes to a benefit pro-
gram, the equality of treatment accorded to individual potential benefi-
ciaries can be evaluated with reference to these purposes. Discussion
would focus explicitly on the degree to which discernible (and hence
popularly approved) goals are furthered by the proposed distinction.
Resting as it does on analogical reasoning, the equality baseline
290 The fact that a claim for equality presupposes some criterion by which the
similarity or dissimilarity of the cases at issue may be judged has led Professor Westen
to suggest the abandonment of claims of equality as modes of legal discourse. See Wes-
ten, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HAuv. L. REv. 537 (1982). The suggestion has
not received universal acceptance. See Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas": Logical
Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L. J. 1136 (1982); Chemerinsky,
In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 Mic-. L. REv. 575 (1983);
D'Amato, Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MIcH. L. Rnv. 600 (1983).
The dialogue continues. See Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math,
and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REv. 604 (1983); Westen, On Confusing Ideas:
Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982).
291 Cf G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 127-31
(1982).
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can be neither exact, determinative, nor value-free. It is old news that
the concept of equality presupposes a measuring rod to determine
whether cases should be treated as alike or different.2 9" Thus, the base-
line of equality calls forth the question of the relative merits of compet-
ing conceptions of desert. To some extent, the question can be answered
internally, by referring to the criteria that the underlying benefit pro-
gram announces as relevant.
Nonetheless, in many cases, normative controversy will be una-
voidable. This, however, is one of the strengths of the approach. Rather
than presuming an analogy, like the argument of the greater and the
lesser, or implicitly importing a standard for evaluating government ac-
tions, like the anthropomorphic purpose model, the application of a
baseline of equality calls for explicit justification of the claims that the
victim is "like" the recipients who obtain the benefit. If we are willing
to say that Mr. Speiser is unlike other veterans who obtained the tax
exemption, not because of his assertion of his constitutional rights, but
because of other characteristics, he may lose, but we must be willing to
defend the proffered distinction. Similarly, in the abortion funding
cases, a crucial issue becomes what weight should be given to claims
that abortions are unlike the medical treatments which receive funding.
3. Prediction as a Baseline
Assume that the city is about to build a superhighway, and has
available two possible routes. Route 1 runs by the river. Route 2, the
technically more desirable of the two, runs directly by the offices of the
city newspaper most critical of the mayor; selection of Route 2 would
considerably improve the paper's distribution network. The city plan-
ners have recommended Route 2. The mayor, however, sensing a
chance for a political advantage, announces to the editor of the newspa-
per that unless the newspapers' stories on city politics become more
flattering, the highway will follow Route 1. While the proposition con-
templates neither taking something the newspaper had before nor deny-
2 See ARIsTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF AmSTOTLE 129 (E. Barker trans. 1958)
(footnote omitted):
The good in the sphere of politics is justice; and justice consists in what
tends to promote the common interest. General opinion makes it consist in
some sort of equality. . . . In other words, it holds that justice involves
two factors-things, and the persons to whom things are assigned-and it
considers that persons who are equal should have assigned to them equal
things. But here there arises a question which must not be overlooked.
Equals and unequas-yes; but equals and unequals in what? This is a
question which raises difficulties, and involves us in philosophical specula-
tion on politics.
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ing something available to members of any comparison class, it still
seems to be a threat to freedom of the press."'8 If it does not comply,
the newspaper will be worse off than it would have been in the normal
course of events.
Under this characterization the normal course of events is the
course of events that would follow if the government could not impose
the condition in question, or could not take the exercise of constitu-
tional rights into account. If, without taking into account potential re-
cipients' exercise of their constitutional rights, the government would
deny the benefit, then the conditional allocation in question has in-
creased the options available to the right-holder, and there is no consti-
tutional violation. By contrast, if, without taking into account potential
recipients' exercise of their constitutional rights, that same government
would provide the benefit, the conditional allocation is not an offer that
expands options, but rather is a threat that contracts the right-holder's
scope of autonomy.29
In the example of the city's offer to build Route 2 on the condition
that the newspaper adopt a friendlier editorial stance, the constitution-
ality of the condition, according to this baseline, would turn on what
would have happened had the city ignored the newspaper's editorial
policies. If the city still would have built the highway along Route 1,
there would be no violation because the conditional allocation would
provide the newspaper with an option it would not otherwise have had.
However, if the city would have built along Route 2 had it not been for
the newspaper's chosen speech, then the condition would decrease the
options available to the paper and would, consequently, be an unconsti-
tutional threat.
This baseline has the happy property of forcing the government to
pay fair measure for the forfeiture of rights. It cannot purchase rights
by granting benefits that the victim would receive anyhow. One of the
2' That the mayor's intent is not the key can be demonstrated by changing the
hypothetical. If Route 1 is the technically more desirable, then the mayor's proposal
appears to be an offer, though the intent is identical.
294 Cf Lyons, supra note 219, at 436, stating that an offer by P to trade his x for
Q's y is coercive if Q agrees to the exchange and "Q knows that P would have given x
to Q, on easier terms, if the chance had not arisen to trade x for y." Professor Lyons
suggests that the importance of this condition is that a clever tyrant would "take away
people's rights wholesale, in one stunning coup, and then dribble them back retail, as
conditional privileges. The tyrant could hope that people would forget that he probably
would have to restore many of these privileges with or without complete compliance
from the citizens, say, to prevent economic collapse." Id. at 435-36. Compare the tech-
nique of "short zoning" described in Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRAcusE L.
REV. 719, 734-49 (1980), by which a municipality zones all land at a lower use level
than is ultimately desired and grants variances to developers based on criteria it could
not have taken into account in its original zoning plan.
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dangers of allocative sanctions arises from the fact that, while the gov-
ernment must expend resources to find the victims of penal sanctions,
the recipient of benefits seeks out the government. In a case in which
the government would offer the benefits in the usual course of events,
the additional coercive power implicit in a condition is essentially
free.295 The predictive baseline eliminates this feature.
Moreover, if the benefits would be granted in the normal course of
events, this supports the conclusion that the public interest favors the
grant of the benefits in question and undercuts the presumption that
the denial is supportable by any balancing test. In these circumstances,
the government appears to be exploiting the particular need of the re-
cipient rather than advancing a public interest.
29
Admittedly, this baseline gets the courts into the risky business of
predicting what the government would do, and the courts' normative
vision of the public interest will inevitably intrude. Still, forcing the
courts openly to focus on their conception of how the government
should work is preferable to allowing them to employ the sub rosa sub-
jectivity implicit in purpose analysis that purports to focus on a ficti-
tious legislative intent. Furthermore, an inquiry into whether the state
would have provided the benefits in question had the state not been
able to take into account the exercise of constitutional rights is better
grounded in concrete, observable factual premises than is an inquiry
295 Cf R. DAHL, DiLEMM AS OF PLURALiST DEMOCRACY 31-54 (1982). Professor
Dahl suggests that the cost of enforcing compliance is an important safeguard against
the domination of citizens by their rulers and that this "rationing of domination" ac-
counts for the residuum of freedom in substantially totalitarian states. If domination is
rendered less costly by piggybacking regulations on already committed expenditures, its
scope will increase.
"2 This combination of the presumptive legitimacy of what would have happened
had the exercise of constitutional rights been disregarded and had the public interest
been given paramount consideration was apparently persuasive in Justice Powell's con-
cluding in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1978) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing), that the prosecutor's having strayed from that "normal course of events" consti-
tuted coercion. The prosecutor had decided not to charge the defendant as a habitual
criminal, then threatened to do so unless the defendant pleaded quilty. Justice Powell
wrote,
The deference that courts properly accord the exercise of a prosecutor's
discretion perhaps would foreclose judicial criticism if the prosecutor origi-
nally had sought an indictment under [the recidivism act], as unreasonable
as it would have seemed. But here the prosecutor evidently made a reason-
able, responsible judgment not to subject an individual to a mandatory life
sentence . . . I think it may be inferred that the prosecutor himself
deemed it unreasonable and not in the public interest to put this defendant
in jeopardy of a sentence of life imprisonment.
Id. at 370-71. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 873-75 (1982) (fact that school
board removed five books, rather than the two that were recommended, taken as evi-
dence that unconstitutional content discrimination had influenced removal decision).
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into the intent behind governmental actions. Although similar evidence
may be adduced for both predictive analysis and purpose analysis, pre-
dictive analysis will focus not on illicit bureaucratic purposes, but on
the nature of the program at issue-how a "rational" government
should be expected to act under the circumstances-and on the impor-
tance of the contribution made by suspect conditions. It will, moreover,
directly confront the claim made in support of the argument of the
greater and the lesser-that the condition constitutes no expansion of
governmental intrusiveness.
4. Constitutional Triangulation
Pleasant as it would be to have a single barometer that infallibly
distinguished threats from offers, the best that I can offer at this point
is three plausible ways of looking at the baseline of benefits that should
characterize the normal course of events. Even this, however, is an ad-
vance over a position that simply throws courts into the problem and
asks them to balance as best they can. As an initial matter, the baseline
analysis gives a structure to the discussion that enables courts and liti-
gants to differentiate among cases in terms that are subject to dialogue.
More important, in the category where two or more of the baselines
can be clearly drawn, we need not worry about which of the three most
accurately characterizes the allocational sanction in question. And a
number of interesting cases fall within this category.
We now have the conceptual apparatus to answer, for example,
the puzzle of the recurring discussion of the germaneness of a condition
to the purpose of the benefit program. Let us look again at the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts, a fund established for the purpose of
fostering good art. Imagine that there is a consensus within the artistic
and critical community that cubism is important and valuable and that
pointillism is self-indulgent and insignificant. As an intuitive matter,
the decision of the NEA to fund only cubist painters would appear
permissible, despite the fact that by exercising their first amendment
right to paint in their own style, pointillists forfeit their opportunity to
receive benefits. By contrast, a failure to fund Republican painters
would intuitively seem to violate first amendment norms.
In the former case, the relevance of the condition to the purpose of
the benefit program is of two-fold significance. First, identifying the
purpose of the benefit program makes application of the baseline of
equality easier because it helps identify the intended beneficiary class.
If the purpose of the NEA is to fund good art and cubism can reasona-
bly be considered "good" art while pointillism can reasonably be con-
sidered "bad" art, then pointillists and cubists are not similarly situated
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for the purposes of the program, and a condition excluding the pointil-
lists from receiving benefits does not violate principles of equality. Be-
cause no painters who are similarly situated to the pointillists receive
benefits, the pointillists cannot claim to be penalized. The normal
course of events under the NEA program is the exclusion of pointillists
("bad" painters) from the receipt of benefits. By contrast, were the
NEA to deny benefits to all Republican painters, the attachment of the
condition that recipients be Democrats could not be characterized as
germane to the program's purpose of encouraging good art.
Second, the germaneness of cubism is a guidepost for a predictive
baseline analysis. The germaneness provides some evidence of what the
normal course of events would be if the government were unable to
take into account the style of the painter. Choice in such a situation
would be either unintelligible or random, and it is unlikely that Con-
gress would appropriate money to support artists at random. The best
prediction would be that, in the normal course of events, the pointillist
would have no expectation of receiving funds.
On the other hand, in the case of a nongermane condition-that
recipients be Democrats-an endowment for the arts that did not take
into account political affiliation could at least arguably be expected to
provide grants to artistically worthy applicants. The Republican could
plausibly argue that she is worse off than she would be in the predict-
able or normal course of events and thus is suffering a penalty for her
political affiliation.
The proposed baseline analysis also allows us to understand why,
as Professor Perry put it, "the Supreme Court was plainly wrong in
the Hyde Amendment case"' 29 and why every state court that has re-
analyzed the issue under state constitutions since Harris v. McRae " 8
has come to agree with the dissenters in that case.299 The Hyde
Amendment, 00 at issue in Harris, provided that women who chose to
exercise their constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy for medical
reasons would be denied funding from an otherwise comprehensive
197 Perry, supra note 212.
298 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
'9 See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625
P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 382 Mass.
629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925
(1982); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Dep't of Human Resources, 63 Or. Ct. App. 41,
663 P.2d 1247 (1983); Fischer v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. 283C.D.1981 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. March 9, 1984) (invalidating Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, which
barred public funding of medically necessary abortions, as violative of the state and
federal constitutions), reh'g granted en bane, argued May 1, 1984.
s0 Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS (93 Stat.) 926.
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medical assistance program, while those who did not exercise that right
would be reimbursed for the costs of childbirth.
As a matter of history, before the Hyde Amendment, abortions
were funded. Thus, the elimination of funding from the medical assis-
tance program reduced the scope of autonomy of those who sought
abortions. Similarly, at least in Harris, where medically necessary
abortions were at issue,301 all reproduction-related, indeed, all other
medically necessary, services were funded. In terms of the purpose of
the Medicaid program, abortion was no different, thus the refusal to
fund abortions established a nongermane condition for the receipt of
Medicaid. Analyzing the case under the equality baseline, it would be
difficult to characterize the Hyde Amendment as providing a bonus for
childbirth, rather than exacting a penalty for abortions.
Finally, as a matter of prediction, the best estimate of what would
obtain if the government were unable to distinguish among benefi-
ciaries on the basis of the exercise of constitutional rights is that the
benefits would continue. The normal course of events is the provision of
free medical care to indigents. The denial of that care to those who
choose abortions gives them fewer choices because the receipt of benefits
is conditioned upon failure to exercise their constitutional liberty to
seek an abortion.
So, too, using the baseline analysis, one can understand how the
Supreme Court could dismiss a challenge to expenditure limitations as
conditions for public financing of political campaigns in a footnote in
Buckley v. Valeo,° 2 without mention of the cases proscribing penalties
on the exercise of constitutional rights. 03 Historically, public financing
301 In Maher v. Roe plaintiffs sought funding for nontherapeutic abortions, while
in Harris v. McRae plaintiffs challenged the exclusion of medically necessary abortions.
For Justice Stevens, who had joined the majority in upholding the act in Maher, the
distinction was crucial. In Harris, Justice Stevens dissented: "[11n Maher, the plaintiffs'
desire to exercise a constitutional right gave rise to neither special access nor special
exclusion from the pool of benefits created by Title XIX." Id. at 350. By contrast, in
Harris a recipient's "exercise of [a constitutional right could not] provide the basis for
the denial of a benefit to which she would otherwise [have been] entitled." Id. at 351.
'02 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976). The footnote reads,
For the reasons discussed in Part III, . . . Congress may engage in public
financing of election campaigns and may condition acceptance of public
funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations. Just as the candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the con-
tributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fund-raising
and accept public funding.
Earlier in the opinion, the Court struck down direct expenditure limitations as violative
of the first amendment. See id. at 51.
303 Professor Easterbrook takes this to be an abandonment of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Priv-
ileges and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 348. It is not. See
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had been unavailable; the proposal to provide it on a condition in-
creased the recipient's options to receive campaign funding. Political
parties that abide by expenditure limits differ substantially from those
that violate them. Because the purpose of the act in question in Buckley
was to equalize the opportunities of various candidates and parties by
eliminating certain disparities in the availability of funding,304 the con-
dition that recipients abide by expenditure limitations was a germane
one, and noncomplying parties could claim to be similarly situated to
complying parties. Finally, in the absence of expenditure limitations,
public funding would accomplish none of the purposes for which it was
established because each party would simply start the competition for
large contributors from a higher level of wealth. It can be predicted
with relative confidence that, absent the ability to distinguish between
complying and noncomplying parties, no funding at all would have
been provided. Thus, the denial of funds upon violation of the condition
would leave the recipients with no fewer choices than they would have
had in the normal course of events.
Not all allocational sanctions, however, can be so easily analyzed.
The other allocational sanction at issue in Buckley was Congress's pro-
vision of funds to only the two major parties. Members of minority
parties claimed a violation of their first amendment rights, arguing that
they were being denied funding because of constitutionally protected
choices they made.80 5 This claim is less clearly resolved by the baseline
analysis.
As with the conditioned expenditure limitation, the historical base-
line would support the statute. However, in terms of the legitimate
purposes of the statute-purposes other than the entrenchment of the
existing party structure-majority and minority parties seem to be sim-
ilarly situated. One could claim that the funding for the Democratic
and Republican parties is really a bonus and that the statistical norm is
the denial of funding to Nazis, Communists, Socialists, and other less
popular parties. In terms of the values of virtual representation that
support the notion of equality, however, this claim is of dubious merit
given the fact that the majority of the population, if not the majority of
political parties, receives the bonus. On the other hand, looking to the
predictive baseline, if the government were unable to exclude minor
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking as unconstitutional a state univer-
sity's policy of permitting only nonreligious groups to use its facilities); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a state unemployment
board's decision denying benefits to one who quit his job fabricating military equipment
because it conflicted with his religious beliefs).
304 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54-56.
305 See id. at 33-35.
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parties, it is not improbable that the entire scheme would have been too
expensive to adopt at all. In the normal course of events, as the Court
suggests,3086 it is not clear that, absent the program, minor parties
would have been better off. The result seems to be that the discrimina-
tory funding program passes muster under two of the three baselines.
What should a court do in such a situation? The point comes
when judges must "close their eyes and choose," according to their best
estimates of statesmanship and the public weal. As with many of the
Buckley issues, reasonable persons will frequently differ on the outcome
of a given case. Still, the courts are, under the baseline scheme, no
worse off than under a scheme that calls for unstructured balancing,
and they will at least have identified the relevant factors. The idea that,
as in the case of discriminatory funding, "two out of three wins" is an
appealing one. The case would certainly have appeared in a substan-
tially different light if previously available subsidies to minor parties
had been eliminated.
B. Inalienable Rights?
This part began with an attempt to describe the reason underlying
the intuition that some allocational sanctions should be treated differ-
ently from criminal sanctions. When, by application of the three base-
lines, a conditional allocation can be identified as a noncoercive offer
that expands rather than narrows the options of the recipient, the intui-
tion has proved reliable. Such an offer is treated differently from the
threat of criminal punishment regulating protected conduct because the
offer does not reduce the scope of the right-holder's autonomy.
In such a situation, is the discussion over and the allocation consti-
tutional? Certainly, there appear to be sound reasons for reaching that
conclusion, for if a citizen believes it is to her benefit to sell her consti-
tutional rights, why should the courts object? The answer, it turns out,
varies depending on the rights at issue. The second string to Justice
Holmes's argument against judicial intervention in the field of alloca-
tional sanctions serves as the starting point of my analysis.
Police officer William McAuliffe, having engaged in forbidden po-
litical discourse, threw himself on the mercy of the mayor of New Bed-
ford with the cry "I admit I am guilty; what's the penalty?" 07 Holmes
306 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95, 99. The Court's professed inability to determine
whether denial of funds to minor parties actually operated as a disadvantage, however,
is less than entirely credible. See id.
307 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 219, 29 N.E. 517, 518
(1892).
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rejected McAuliffe's subsequent objection that removal from the police
force "invaded his right to express his political opinions." Holmes
opined,
[T]here is nothing in the constitution or the statute to pre-
vent the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a condi-
tion to the office of policeman, and making it part of the
good conduct required. The petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he had no constitutional
right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire
in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitu-
tional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the im-
plied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as
he takes the employment on the terms which are offered
him. On the same principle the city may impose any reason-
able condition upon holding offices within its control.308
The central phrase, concerning the absence of a right to be a po-
liceman, has been widely quoted over the years. For two generations it
formed the keystone of opinions rejecting challenges to governmental
actions.309 For two more, it has been the straw man attacked by opin-
ions sustaining constitutional rights. 10 Yet, for all the recent vitupera-
tion, the announcement of the demise of Justice Holmes's principle has
proved to be premature."1 Its strength comes not only from the un-
8 Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18 (emphasis added).
SO9 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 n.34 (1947);
Zaidins v. Demet, 287 F.2d 401, 402 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d
881, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
310 See, e.g., Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (city may
not terminate a policeman in the absence of a showing that his statement impaired
departmental efficiency); Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 496 F.2d 164, 173
(3d Cir. 1974) (holding unconstitutional memorandum prohibiting city employees from
discussing a public tenants' meeting); Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 473 (5th Cir.
1971) (holding unconstitutional ordinance provision restricting the electioneering activi-
ties of firemen); Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding uncon-
stitutional exclusion of an employee from an Army base because of her antiwar activi-
ties); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 1966) (city hospital physician
entitled to notice and a hearing prior to discharge). But see Justice White's nostalgic
invocation of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517
(1892), as the beginning point of the "historical evolvement [sic] of the rights of public
employees," in Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1688 (1983).
"'1 Compare Van Alstyne, Right-Privilege Distinction, supra note 43, (arguing
that the concept of "privilege" is no longer alive) and Van Alstyne, Public Employees,
supra note 43 (same) with Appleton, supra note 98 (suggesting that the redefinition of
the "right" to an abortion in the abortion funding cases as a negative right may auger a
dilution of all individual constitutional rights). Compare Note, Civil Disabilities and
the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 861 (1969) (predicting that the Hatch Act,
which limits the political activities of government employees, would be found unconsti-
tutional as an impermissible burden on rights of association) with Broadrick v.
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doubted elegance of presentation, but from its appeal to common expe-
rience. And it is this appeal that must be met head on by those who
invoke the notion "inalienable rights" to prevent the government from
"buy[ing] up 'rights guaranteed by the Constitution.' ""
1. The Appeal of Analogy
Part of Holmes's exposition relies on the analogy between private
and public employment. In accepting any private employment, indeed
in executing any contract, a citizen sells rights. In Holmes's conception,
the contracting party agrees to be subject to sanctions for the exercise of
a right that would otherwise be immune from state interference. Those
sanctions are usually in the form of damages, but Holmes in other con-
texts saw nothing untoward in attaching criminal penalties to the
breach of an employment contract."' 3 Whatever the Declaration of In-
dependence may say, such rights clearly are, quite literally, alienable.
Thus, Holmes's rhetorical question: If a private party can induce the
surrender of constitutional rights with monetary incentives, what is the
objection to the government engaging in similar practices? Indeed, the
implicit argument by analogy goes one step further: If government must
have employees to operate and employment by definition involves the
surrender of freedom, is not the allegedly unconstitutional transaction
inherent in any government that can enforce its decrees?
In its pure form the analogy applies only to employment relations.
There is nothing particularly self-contradictory about constraining the
government from requiring the waiver of constitutional rights as condi-
tion for receipt of welfare benefits, driver's licenses, or opera tickets.
The government can accomplish its goals in each area perfectly well
without the conditions. As a matter of analogy, outside of the area of
employment, Holmes's position depends on parallels between the gov-
ernment and private property holders in general. But the analogy is
faulty. The considerations supporting the right of a property owner
freely to dispose of her property are generally inapplicable to
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding Oklahoma's version of the Hatch Act) and
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973) (upholding the Hatch Act).
3'2 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 328 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926); Town-
send v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1, 12 (1821).
313 See Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (granting damages to the government
upon an employee's breach of an agreement not to divulge information without clear-
ance from the CIA).
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government. 14
Even in the central case of employees, moreover, Holmes's conclu-
sions are suspect. Whatever the situation in Holmes's time, it is far
from clear that most private employers today can penalize the exercise
of constitutional rights.3 15 The emerging doctrines of retaliatory dis-
charge 16 and the existing constraints in federal law 17 limit such be-
havior in the private sector. More importantly, under the impact or
threat of unionization, the prerogative of arbitrary or invidious dis-
charge has evaporated from major portions of the private sector, with-
out substantially impairing the ability of enterprises to function. 8 , To
the extent that the government attempts to impede unionization of pub-
314 See supra text accompanying notes 67-97.
315 See M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 151-70
(1981).
8I See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (discharge of an employee for refusal to participate in an
illegal pricefixing scheme constitutes a cause of action for wrongful discharge);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (cause
of action exists for wrongful discharge of employee for supplying information about
fellow employees to a law enforcement agency); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (employer may not discharge an employee to
avoid paying bonuses to him); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1974) (termination of contract of at-will employee activated by bad faith, malice,
or retaliation constitutes breach of the contract); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668,
428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (recognizing cause of action for a discharge attributable to the
filing of a worker's compensation claim by employee); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); see also Blades, Employment at Will vs.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM.
L. R v. 1404 (1967); Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions
Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329 (1982); Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Pro-
tecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
317 See, e.g., Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.) (allowing damage action
under Civil Rights Act for discharge of employee who was absent from work because of
jury duty), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976) and federal whistleblowing statutes have also proved to
be significant protectors of constitutional rights in the employment context. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (employment suit under § 1985);
Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (same); Larvadain v. Rapides
Parish School Bd., 348 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. La. 1972) (same); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a) (1976) (prohibiting retaliation or discharge for employee's support of other
employee's civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) (providing that no
employer shall discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee who has "as-
sisted or participated, or is about to assist or participate in any manner in . . . a pro-
ceeding under the [Energy Reorganization Act of 1974] or, in any other action to carry
out the purposes of [the Act]. . . ."); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (providing
that an employer may not discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee
because the employee commenced, caused to commence, or testified at a proceeding
against the employer for violation of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act).
318 Ninety percent of collective bargaining agreements limit the employer's right
of arbitrary discharge. Note, supra note 316, at 1832.
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lic employees yet desires to retain an alleged immunity from constitu-
tional constraints,319 it seeks to enjoy the benefits of public status while
avoiding the burdens.
The example of private unionization suggests that the disregard
for most constitutional rights is far from essential to the proper func-
tioning of government. The real question raised is not analogical, but
substantive: How much does recognition of the constitutional claim im-
pair other legitimate public goals? Analogy yields no support for the
suggestion that the significance of this answer should differ depending
on whether the sanctions for assertion of constitutional rights are crimi-
nal or allocative. 20 In itself, the employment relation neither compels
nor forbids the conclusion that offers to purchase constitutional rights
are acceptable.
2. The Problem of Waiver
Not only is there nothing untoward about an employer attempting
to control otherwise constitutionally protected aspects of the employee's
life, says Holmes, but "[tihe servant cannot complain"3 21 since he has
agreed to the exercise of that control. In accepting the benefit, the bene-
ficiary has freely accepted the condition and cannot now be heard to
disavow his bargain: "[H]e takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him."31 2 2 It is true, of course, that a bargain might be voided
for fraud or duress, but here we have neither. The condition was
clearly attached to the employment, and the employee was not forced to
'" See supra text accompanying notes 67-97.
320 The mischief of a misused analogy is illustrated by Justice White's opinion in
Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983), which approved the dismissal of an assis-
tant district attorney for circulating a questionnaire without "'any evidence. . that
the plaintiff's work performance was adversely affected,'" id. at 1700-01 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 759 (E.D. La. 1981)) and
where, according to the factual determinations of the district court, the petition "had no
adverse effect on [the plaintiff's] relationship with her superiors." Id. at 1700-01.
The thrust of the opinion is the "common sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter," id. at
1688, and that the first amendment "does not require a grant of immunity for employee
grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the
state," id. at 1690. Unfortunately, common sense and fact tend to diverge since it seems
unlikely that Myers's behavior would have warranted dismissal in a unionized setting
or, in any event, substantially threatened any employment interest.
The Court's suggestion that only comments on matters of public policy are pro-
tected, id. at 1688-90, seems patently misguided since even Justice White would pre-
sumably hold statements regarding the morality of atheism, for example, to be
protected.
321 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518
(1892).
3 Id.
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accept.
This essay is not the place for a full analysis of the role of waiver
in constitutional rights, an area in which substantial ink has been
spilled 2' and in which substantial thought remains to be expended.
Nonetheless, whatever the precise prerequisites for a valid waiver of
constitutional rights, 24 some fact patterns clearly preclude the use of
the waiver argument to justify disparities between criminal and alloca-
tive sanctions.
We begin with the appeal of the arguments for waivers: they ap-
pear to respect individual choices. If the constitutional right in question
is designed to secure an area of autonomy for the citizen against the
state, it would seem that the exercise or nonexercise within that area
should be in the hands of the citizen. If she wishes to waive her rights,
to refuse her that option appears to limit rather than extend her
choice. M  Likewise, if a right is intended to secure the welfare of a
citizen, it requires a paternalism that is on its face incompatible with a
vision of constitutional rights as protecting individual choice to warrant
limiting the citizen's ability to waive the right should she believe that it
would leave her better off to do so."'
A doctrine respecting individual choices, however, requires that
such choices should at least result from conscious choice. Thus, in situ-
3" See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Dix, Waiver in
Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysis, 55 Tx. L. REv. 193 (1977);
Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 473 (1978); Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Con-
stitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 24-27 (1970); Westen,
Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1214 (1977). Recently, Professor Rubin engaged in
an ambitious attempt to integrate the law of constitutional waiver and waiver in the
contracts and torts contexts. See Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28
UCLA L. Rnv. 478 (1981).
"' Compare Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972) (relaxed
waiver standard applicable to confession of judgment by corporation; at least where
waiver of right to notice and a hearing was voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made,
it will be considered a valid waiver) with Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)
(an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege of the right of a criminal
defendant to be represented by counsel must be intelligent and competent to be valid).
35 Goodin, The Political Theories of Choice and Dignity, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 91, 92,
94 n.19 (1981).
0' See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 323, at 1113-14. There is also an argu-
ment, in some situations, that a waiver should be enforceable because of the reliance of
the government; the citizen should not be able to retain both the advantages of assertion
and nonassertion. See, e.g., Simons, Rescinding a Waiver of a Constitutional Right, 68
GEo. L.J. 919 (1980); Westen, supra note 323. Whatever the merits of predicating a
constitutional doctrine on the necessity of protecting the government from exploitation
by its citizens in a criminal context, it seems that it should be limited to, at most, the
facts that give rise to it.
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ations where no real choice exists vis-a-vis the proffered incentive, one
cannot claim comfort from discussion of waiver. In Fleming v. Nes-
tor, 1 7 for example, the disqualification from Social Security benefits at
issue was imposed years after the plaintiff had become a member of the
Communist Party. It is difficult to characterize the plaintiff as declin-
ing an offer to sell his constitutional rights, for the condition in ques-
tion was imposed after he had violated it. Even had the plaintiff been
fully informed of the contemporary consequences of his actions at the
time he joined the party, he could not have known of a consequence
that was yet to be imposed.
Where all the consequences of an action are identifiable when the
recipient acts, there is a strong tradition that she must be told of them
before her waiver of constitutional rights is deemed knowing.32 Al-
though in particular situations efficiency requires the imputation of
knowledge, the normative power of the waiver doctrine lies in its at-
tempts to recognize the conscious exercise of individual autonomy.
Thus, courts relying on waiver to justify a lower level of constitutional
scrutiny should be attentive to whether an actual exercise of conscious
individual choice is present.
Such attention was distinctly absent in United States Postal Ser-
vice v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,329 where Justice
Rehnquist justified a ban on placing unstamped matter in home postal
boxes on what appeared to be grounds of waiver. Although recognizing
that postal customers might have a right to receive unstamped mail
Rehnquist argued,
Anyone is free to live in any part of the country without
having letters or packages delivered or received by the Postal
Service by simply failing to provide the receptacle. ...
What the legislation and regulations do require is that those
persons who do wish to receive and deposit their mail at
their home or business do so under the direction and control
of the Postal Service.
330
Leaving aside the question of whether the government could, on this
theory, also criminalize Federal Express deliveries to postal patrons,
many postal customers would no doubt be surprised to learn that they
"[agree] to abide by the Postal Service's regulations in exchange for the
827 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
318 See supra note 324.
329 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
380 Id. at 125-26.
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Postal Service agreeing to deliver and pick up [their] mail." ' They
would have thought they were simply being provided a public service,
and certainly they had no knowledge of the rights that they were waiv-
ing in accepting it. Such a contrived waiver hardly provides substantial
support for relaxing protection of constitutional rights.33 2
Nonetheless, there are events where it appears that a real choice is
made, events resembling the classical sale of a widget. Assuming that a
valid choice is present, the argument that such a choice constitutes an
effective waiver presupposes that the constitutional right violated is in
fact waivable in the circumstances at issue. 33 Three elements are logi-
331 Id. at 128.
332 Cf Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983), in which Myers violated no
existing job norm. Compare McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29
N.E. 517 (1892), in which McAuliffe at least knew he would be fired.
"I I specifically exclude from this discussion the issue of the voluntary nature of
the waiver. At one level, the requirement of a "voluntary" waiver blends into the prob-
lem of the definition of the appropriate baseline. If the argument in favor of waivers is
that recognition of the waiver is thought to expand the scope of individual options, then
response to an offer that in fact contracts those options should not be recognized as a
waiver. If the argument in favor of recognition of the waiver is that such recognition
vindicates the will of the individual whose rights are to be protected, then this is an
additional argument in favor of considering offers as previously defined to be voluntary.
Presumably, the subject of the offer would choose to have the offer made since it makes
her better off than she would be in the normal course of events. On the other hand the
sacrifice of a right in response to a threat would be considered involuntary because,
given the choice, the subject would prefer the normal course of events. Making the
threat fails to recognize the subject's will. See Nozick, supra note 220. However, if it
does not duplicate the baseline problem above, the concept of voluntariness seems to me
extremely problematic. See generally Dix, supra note 323; Rubin, supra note 323.
I do not mean to say that the issue of voluntariness has been absent from discus-
sions of waiver. On the contrary, discussions of voluntariness have been omnipresent
and overused. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 (1983) (stating
that when the state offers one a choice between taking a blood alcohol test or having
her refusal to take the test used against her, the state presents a "true choice," rather
than a coerced one); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-91 (1937)
(stating that the states are not coerced by the tax imposed by Title IX of the Social
Security Act of 1935, but rather are provided with a "motive" to participate in the
cooperative plan). Indeed, even Justice Holmes on occasion utilized the concept as an
escape when he found a governmental action too intrusive. See Union Pac. R.R. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1918) (Holmes, J., for the Court) (stating
that the Court must be certain that a right has been voluntarily waived before it consid-
ers the waiver valid, in order to prevent the imposition of "an unconstitutional burden
by the threat of penalties worse than it in case of a failure to accept it").
Two recent commentators apparently seek to limit the use of waivers with an
inchoate requirement of equality of bargaining power or a refusal to allow government
conditions where the government holds a monopoly of the services conditioned. See
Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The
Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. Rnv. 69, 116 (1982); Terrell, "Property,"
"Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis,
70 GEO. L.J. 861, 901-03 (1982). The questionable clarity of commercial law's analy-
sis of "disparities in bargaining power" does not seem to recommend its transfer to the
constitutional context.
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cally necessary to validate such a presupposition.
First, the right in question must be waivable; the victim must be
able to choose not to exercise the right. The peonage cases,'" for exam-
ple, establish that thirteenth amendment rights cannot be waived. Slav-
ery is forbidden whether or not a person "consented" to it.
Second, the right in question must be alienable; the power not to
exercise the right must be transferable to another party in exchange for
the proferred benefit."' 5 That the two elements are not identical is il-
lustrated by the status of voting: a citizen may either vote or not vote,
but it is illegal to sell the exercise of the right."3 6
Third, it must be permissible for the state to attempt to obtain
such a waiver or transfer. Uncle Felix may make his bequest condi-
tional on the beneficiary attending church. Uncle Sam may not.
At first glance, a belief that constitutional rights serve to protect
the freedom of the citizen implies that the citizen should be entitled to
dispose of that freedom as she chooses. On the other hand, the concept
of inalienable rights is scarcely foreign to constitutional thinking,"3 and
a distaste for those who trade their birthrights for messes of pottage has
a still longer genealogy. Repetition and age, of course, do not guarantee
the truth of the maxim, but there are constitutional rights that we do
regard as inalienable.
To identify each of these rights and the degree to' which the gov-
ernment is constrained from purchasing the waiver of each is beyond
the scope of this paper. Rather, what follows is an attempt to identify
the kinds of arguments that, in any particular case, can support a claim
of the impropriety of government purchases. The success of an argu-
ment in a given case will turn on the appropriate relation between citi-
zen and government, the nature of the rights at issue, and the funda-
mental nature of an acceptable society. My goal at this stage is not to
I" See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207 (1905); see also the excellent discussion of the peonage cases in Schmidt,
Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2:
The Peonage Cases, 82 COLuM. L. Rsv. 646 (1982).
"' This understanding of the meaning of alienability is in accord with the useage
of "unalienable" in the Declaration of Independence. See J. FEINBERG, Voluntary
Euthenasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS
OF LIBERTY 240-41 (1980); M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN
REvOLUIoN 196 (1978); Richards, Inalienable Rights: Recent Criticism and Old Doc-
trine, 29 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REsEARcH 391, 398 (1969).
ss 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1976) (making it illegal to pay or to offer to pay or
accept payment for registering to vote or for voting).
'3 See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776); Home Ins. Co. v. Morse,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("A man may not barter away his life or his
freedom, or his substantial rights."); Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1, 12
(1821) ("Constitutional rights are vested, unexchangeable, and unalienable.").
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decide cases, but to structure inquiry.
a. Waivable and Non-waivable Rights
The case for recognition of waivers rests on the conviction that
constitutional rights protect individual choice. But many constitutional
rights protect other values or protect individual choice only as a means
to the realization of other ends. For such rights, there is no paradox in
asserting that the choice of the individual should not decide the applica-
bility of the right in question. Thus, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Companie des Bauxites de Guinee,38 Justice White distinguished be-
tween article III limitations on jurisdiction, which cannot be established
by estoppel or action of the parties, and the personal jurisdiction re-
quirement that "recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest"
and can be waived."' 9 The latter "represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty. . . . [The fact that] the requirement of personal jurisdiction
may be intentionally waived . . . portray[s] it for what it is-a legal
right protecting the individual."840 To the extent that a right is the
result of a definition of the structure and power of government, an indi-
vidual decision to waive it is irrelevant.
Similarly, it may be that the right defines not the structure of gov-
ernment, but the structure of a decent society. A decent society does not
tolerate cruel and unusual punishment. If a state were to grant inmates
a choice between tolerable prison conditions and a five-year shorter
term in an unreconstructed Arkansas prison farm, 41 it seems unlikely
that a court would sustain the program, however beneficial the inmates
thought it.- So too, one of the messages of the Reconstruction Era was
that a decent American society does not allow slavery. The burden of
the thirteenth amendment was not only the protection of individual lib-
erty, but the eradication of a social practice deemed incompatible with a
3- 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
339 Id. at 702.
340 Id. at 702, 704.
341 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (upholding district court order that
confinement in punitive isolation in an Arkansas prison be limited to 30 days maxi-
mum because of conditions so deplorable as to violate the eighth amendment).
1"2 When I initially constructed this example, I thought it moderately farfetched.
As it turns out, my imagination was less fertile than that of the South Carolina judici-
ary. See Castration or Incarceration?, TIME, Dec. 12, 1983, at 70 (reporting sentencing
of three defendants in a rape case to either 30 years imprisonment or castration); Rap-
ists Having Second Thoughts on Choosing Castration, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, § 1
at 35, col. 1; see also Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1983) (challenge to state
judge's conditioning award of property in divorce proceeding on husband's obtaining
vasectomy).
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free society. If one believes that a purpose of the fourteenth amendment
was to eliminate the caste system that had grown up around slavery, a
plausible belief, the assent of any given member of the "underclass"
would not waive her equal protection rights.3 43 And the right to educa-
tion, resurrected in Plyler v. Doe, might well not be subject to waiver
by its beneficiaries.8
44
Thirteenth and fourteenth amendment rights, as well as the educa-
tion right, raise yet another reason why a right might not be deemed
waivable: paternalism. For education, the argument is easy. Children
may not know what is in their own best interest, and the relative com-
petence of parents and the state is problematic." 5 For fourteenth
amendment rights, one might argue that victims of a caste system
would be so beset by false consciousness that their choices would be
unreliable. The latter argument, however, lies uneasily with most of
the presuppositions of the rest of the American legal system and not
least the underpinnings of many constitutional rights. 8" The "false
consciousness theory," therefore, seems an unlikely candidate for pre-
cluding waiver of constitutional rights. 47
"' Compare the strand of Lockean thought current at the time of the American
Revolution that held that certain rights were granted by God and that, therefore, any
attempt by a person to alienate them would be invalid and J. FEINBERG, supra note
335, at 241-42 (describing Samuel Adams's views) and A. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND
PERSONS 178-79 (1977) (describing the influence of Locke's natural rights theory on
the authors of the Declaration of Independence) and R. TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS
THEORIES 173 (1979) (describing Locke's views) and M. WHITE, supra note 335, at
205-13 (describing the views of Jefferson and Locke) with the alternative interpretation
of Locke that held that the inalienability of rights flowed from a duty not to attempt to
interfere with others' rights or to allow others to act in a way inconsistent with their
rights and R. TUCK, supra, at 172-73 and M. WHITE, supra note 335, at 201 (inter-
preting Jefferson as having argued that the freedom of belief rested on a duty imposed
by God "to desist from trying to alter the fact that human opinions are necessarily
brought about by what is taken to be evidence").
"4 If the basis of the holding in Plyler is a constitutional aversion to the establish-
ment of a permanent "underclass," 457 U.S. at 219, reminiscent of the caste system
imposed by slavery, the willingness of a particular child to decline education may be
irrelevant.
Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (resting the decision that Amish
children cannot be required to attend school beyond a certain age on the religious Be-
liefs and desires of their parents rather than themselves). Compare id. at 241 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the children's rights should be more fully recognized).
40 There seems to be substantial support from both sides of the aisle for the view
that the attempt to choose for another what that person "really wants" in the name of
freedom has a tendency to degenerate into totalitarianism. Compare I. BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 133-34 (1969) with C. MACPHER-
SON, Berlin's Division of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL
111-17 (1973).
M But see the arguments in favor of safety regulation that are based on the pub-
lic's inability to evaluate and process low level risk information in G. CALABRESI, THE
COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS (1970); R. GOODIN, Po-
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Finally, with respect to thirteenth amendment rights, one might
argue for what Professors Calabresi and Melamed have termed "self-
paternalism." ' If selling oneself into slavery is the type of transaction
that is usually regretted, however tempting it seems at the time, a ra-
tional citizen might well wish that she not have the power to enter into
such a transaction." 9
b. Alienable and Inalienable Rights
Even when a right is waivable, there may be aspects of the aliena-
tion of the right that would overcome any presumption of legitimacy
arising from a desire to vindicate individual choice. First, the transfer
of the right from one party to another might have undesirable ramifica-
tions for other members of society. Assume a three-person society gov-
erned by a majority vote. Arafat owns W, and Meir wants W, while
Hussein is indifferent about ownership of W. If votes are inalienable,
in order to obtain W, Meir must either obtain Arafat's consent and
compensate him for his loss or else convince Hussein that she is entitled
to W. However, if votes are alienable, as long as Meir can outbid
Arafat for Hussein's vote, she can obtain W without consent, compen-
sation, or persuasion.3 50 Moreover, there may be something unseemly,
LICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC PoLcY 49-50 (1982).
"6 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 323, at 1113-14.
34 Id.; see also R. GOODIN, supra note 347, at 37-49. This may also be an expla-
nation for the holding in NLRB v. Magnovox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974), that the union
cannot waive the free speech rights of its members under the NLRA. The union's
political composition may change sufficiently from the time of the waiver that it seems
inappropriate to bind members who join after the waiver or members whose opinions
change.
Our refusal to allow the alienation of rights by others because of our belief that
they would wish to protect themselves from the temptation to alienate those rights may
arise from less admirable motives, however. As Professors Calabresi and Bobbitt point
out, society's desire to prohibit peonage might arise as much from its discomfort at
witnessing "[tihe willingness of a poor man, confronting a tragic situation, to choose
money rather than the tragically scarce resource, [a choice that] always represents an
unquiet indictment of society's distribution of wealth," G. CAIABRRSI & P. BoBBrrr,
TRAGIC CHOICES 33 (1978), as from its wish to facilitate the realization of an individ-
ual's desire to prevent herself from being confronted with such a tempting, but unwise,
choice.
350 Meir will bargain for Hussein's vote rather than directly for Arafat's W be-
cause, by drawing Arafat into the bidding for W, she can be sure that the bidding will
stop when it reaches a price equal to Arafat's real valuation of W. Meir thus avoids
paying more for the vote than she would have had to pay to buy W from Arafat. If
imperfections enter the picture, such as disparities in wealth, wealth effects and imper-
fect capital markets, or organization costs for the Arafat tribe, cf. M. OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBIC GOOD, AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1971), Meir may get W for much less than Arafat would ask.
A similar analysis might apply to Arafat's sale at Ti of his right to engage in
political debate to attempt to influence Hussein in the future. Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox
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disquieting, or destructive about the process. Once the precedent of bid-
ding is established, future attempts at persuasion are less likely to pro-
ceed on a plane of disinterested reason, and a market in babies, blood,
or bodies may reduce respect for closely-held values.351
Even where there are no effects on third parties, it may be that we
have constitutional preferences regarding the distribution of the right in
question. If our conception of democracy requires that voting power be
distributed equally, 52 or if our view of justice requires that punishment
be imposed according to guilt, the opportunity to exchange the power to
vote or the freedom from punishment for government favors will result
in deviation from those norms. The rights will then be distributed ac-
cording to which right-holders have particular need of the government
favors in question. This will violate the appropriate distribution of the
right. 53 More, it may be a particularly obvious double-disadvantaging
of the already disadvantaged, for a member's chance of political success
is related to the political strength of other members of her interest
group.
3 54
Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (union cannot waive the free speech of its members).
3" See R. Trrmuss, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SO-
CIAL POLICY 158 (1971). But see Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
343 (1972).
Indeed, one of the "externalities" that may result from the sale of votes or political
power is the demise of the market system itself, for an effective market presupposes the
definition of property rights by some means external to the market. See Arrow, supra,
at 351, 357.
352 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972). Of course, Rawls's point that
an equal distribution of liberties fosters a sense of social solidarity cuts both ways in
this context. It could be argued either that making political liberties inalienable would
foster a sense of self-respect among even the least well-off or that the inalienability
assures an apparently equal distribution of rights that distracts attention from the truly
important disparities in power outside the symbolic sphere.
Alternatively, it may be that we accept the outcome of market transactions despite
the unequal distribution of wealth precisely because the equal distribution of voting
power provides a check on unacceptable outcomes resulting from market exchanges. See
Rose-Ackerman, A New Political Economy?, 80 MICH. L. REV. 872, 879 (1982); Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, Working Paper No. 3,
Center for Law and Econ. Studies, Columbia Law School 36-37 (Oct. 1983).
3" See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 19 (1983) (defining tyranny as the distribution of goods according to inap-
propriate criteria).
'" The point here is a combination of the free rider and prisoner's dilemma
problems. If an economically and socially disadvantaged group is to improve its collec-
tive lot, political actiori is necessary since, by definition, the group lacks economic and
social resources. The government deals primarily in public or quasi-public
goods-sewers, antidiscrimination legislation, and the like. It is advantageous for any
given member of the least well-off group, if votes are alienable, to sell her vote rather
than use it to attempt to obtain a public good for her group. If others sell their votes,
she is no worse off for having sold her vote, and if other members of her group retain
their votes and vote for the public good, she will obtain the good in any event. On the
other hand, if she retains her vote and her compatriots do not, she will have gained
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c. The Propriety of Government Requests for Waiver
Rights that may be alienated to private parties may still be un-
available for sale to the government. If the right in question exists be-
cause the government is constitutionally prohibited from placing a value
on exercise of that right, then it would be similarly inhibited from seek-
ing a waiver. The establishment and free exercise clauses prohibit gov-
ernment from favoring one religion over another. Thus, even if a pa-
rolee were to agree to a parole conditioned on regular church
attendance, the condition would be ineffective, for the government
would be barred from seeking such a waiver.355
A similar result obtains if the government is prohibited from at-
tempting to affect exercise of the right in question because of effects on
the structure of the society. If Justice Brennan is right in Zobel that the
right to travel is not a personal one, but an element of the national
union, 5 then one explanation for the Zobel opinion is that the right in
question could not be waived by newcomers since it was not theirs to
waive.
Most importantly, the government may be barred from attempting
to obtain waivers of constitutional rights because such attempts may
constitute an unacceptable accumulation of power over the right in
question. 57 If federalism dictates that certain decisions be withheld
from the federal government and entrusted to the states, a state waiver
nothing, and she knows that her compatriots, faced with the same choices, will proba-
bly "rationally" choose to sell.
It is apparently a variant of this concern that causes Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel, in Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395, 411 (1983), to support the
traditional restraints on alienability of votes in the corporate contest. They state,
Because no voter expects to influence the outcome of the election, he would
sell the vote (which to him is unimportant) for less than the expected dilu-
tion of his equity interest. He would reason that if he did not sell, others
would; he would lose on the equity side but get nothing for the vote. Thus
any non-zero price would persuade him to sell.
S55 This seemed obvious to courts even in the heyday of the right-privilege distinc-
tion. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946) (state may
not grant probation contingent on defendant's attending Sunday school and church).
457 U.S. at 55.
357 With respect to the government, one of the standard justifications for the free
transferability of rights is inapplicable. Although it may be argued that in a private
market, free transferability ensures that property rights will migrate to their most pro-
ductive use, this result hinges on the suggestion that the offering price offered by a
buyer represents the economic value of the right to the buyer. Given that the govern-
ment accumulates resources for the most part not by production, but by taxation, the
amount that the government is willing to offer does not reflect anything about the eco-
nomic value of the right in question. Since it is precisely the desire to shield individual
liberties from the will of the majority that justifies the establishment of constitutional
rights in the first place, it is hardly a persuasive argument that the majority very much
wants to have its rights remain unexercised.
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should be irrelevant. In a like manner, if the government is to be re-
sponsive to the outcome of public debate, it is hardly entitled to manip-
ulate the discussion. The fact that those manipulated may consent to
the manipulation makes the government's actions no less than an at-
tempt to fix the prices in the marketplace of ideas.
All of this, again, turns on the precise roles played by the right in
question in the political and constitutional scheme and on a practical
evaluation of the impact of allowing sales to the government. Consider,
for example, the differing treatment accorded the requirements of party
loyalty and political neutrality as conditions for government employ-
ment. The requirements of the Hatch Act... have been repeatedly up-
held, 59 while patronage requirements have been disapproved. 6
From the perspective of individual autonomy, there seems to be
little difference between the two situations. Justice Powell may have a
substantial argument in his suggestion that patronage employees have
waived their right to object to further patronage activities. 61 However,
given the opportunities for an expanding public sector to lock in politi-
cal support for a self-perpetuating hierarchy, requiring party affiliation
as a condition of public employment is incompatible with the checking
values of the first amendment. 6 2 Moreover, patronage cannot function
without the government taking a position on the orthodoxy of political
affiliation. To the extent that the first amendment stands for the propo-
sition that governmental evaluation of citizens' beliefs is an evil in and
of itself, patronage is constitutionally suspect.3 63
By contrast, the Hatch Act entails neither a censorial evaluation of
"' Hatch Act, ch. 410, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1147, 1148 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 7324 (1982)).
$59 See Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946).
... Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
381 Id. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring).
362 See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521; see also Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983)
(suggesting that an employee's political speech is more highly protected than her speech
regarding "nonpublic" concerns).
36 Similarly, the legality of the proposal to require pre-publication review by the
government of publications by former officials who had access to classified documents,
see Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (awarding the government damages
against a CIA agent for his breach of an agreement not to exercise his speech rights);
National Security Directive-84 on Safeguarding National Security Information (Mar.
11, 1983), cited in H.R. REP. No. 578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 n.2 (1983) (directing all
executive agencies to restrict the speech rights of employees who have had access to
"sensitive compartmented information"), should turn not only on the characterization
of the condition as a threat or an offer, but on the effect and nature of the decisions it
places in the hands of government. An effective veto over criticism by former officials is
a powerful tool for manipulating the availability of information to the electorate, even if
the former officials have in some sense freely surrendered their rights.
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speech nor the establishment of a self-entrenching limitation on infor-
mation flow. The silence of public employees in election campaigns is,
in most cases, unlikely to perpetuate the power of those currently in
control of the federal government."6 '
C. The Problem of Remedy: The Right to Be a Policeman Revisited
Whether rooted in a conclusion that the government has
threatened to deny benefits or has offered. to purchase inalienable
rights, the decision that a given conditional allocation is unconstitu-
tional faces a final hurdle. In the case of most constitutional rights, the
courts have adopted the position that such rights may be infringed upon
an appropriate showing of governmental justification. In this Article, I
will proceed on the basis of this traditional understanding. 65 Nonethe-
less, once it is clear that a constitutional liberty has been infringed or
that a right should be treated as inalienable, there is no reason to apply
a lower standard of justification to the prima facie unconstitutional gov-
ernmental action than would be applied to a more traditional violation.
Not every allocational threat to constitutional interests is unconstitu-
tional, any more than is every criminal sanction. But, given the simi-
larly grave potential impact of the allocational sanction on the victims,
3" Of course, the actual political situation may indicate that a political hysterec-
tomy of public employees is also a substantial distortion of political discussion. If a
large and distinctive voice is excluded from the political marketplace by means of em-
ployee waivers, a reevaluation may be called for. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 518-19 (1981) (White, J., for plurality of four) (government
restriction is impermissible if it eliminates certain topics from discussion); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a statute that criminalized corpo-
rate expenditures aimed at influencing votes in referendums).
365 I do so, however, without prejudice to the absolutist strand in constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., the positions of Justice Black: Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting), Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First
Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REv. 428 (1967); Professor Baker: Baker, Realizing Self-
Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's Value of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 646 (1982); Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of
the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 293 (1981), Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); and Professor
Meiklejohn: A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERN-
MENT (1948); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment as an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245 (1961); Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean, 20 U. CI. L. REv.
461 (1953). I suspect, however, that while there is no necessary connection in logic
between absolutism regarding justifications for impingement on protected speech and
the sanctions against which speech is protected, many absolutists will feel uncomforta-
ble with the scope of sanctions that raise prima facie constitutional violations under my
analysis. Given an absolutist approach, the definition of a prima facie violation is the
only way to protect against undesirable invalidations of acceptable government actions.
See Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 265, 276 (1983) ("[A]bsolutism exerts an inward pull on the boundaries of
coverage.").
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a similar requirement of justification seems appropriate. Even if the
interest in close employer-employee relationships is compelling, Justice
Rehnquist's "wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment" '66
in evaluating the potential adverse impact of employee speech is
unwarranted.
There may, however, be an institutional reason to be reluctant to
find an allocational decision unconstitutional. Holmes's assertion that
there is no right to be a policeman can also be seen as something more
than a tautology. In addition to whatever import it carries for the limits
of government power, the assertion that there is no right to be a police-
man conceals remedial concerns. If Officer McAuliffe's contract violates
the Constitution, the court must decide whether to void it entirely or to
enforce it without the unconstitutional condition. If it adopts the former
course, McAuliffe is not helped, he now has no job. If the latter path is
taken, the court has judicially established a contract for services be-
tween the city and its police force, which it will enforce by injunctive
decree or damages.
Whether because of a majoritarian disinclination to meddle in in-
ternal processes of elected government or because of a justifiable skepti-
cism about the abilities of courts to allocate resources among competing
claims, the judiciary has been reluctant to intervene in these sorts of
decisions.3 67 If the plaintiff has a right to his job, that is one thing;
there is no choice to be made. But if no absolute right can be pointed
to, the court must make a comparative judgment, and the award of
relief to the plaintiff will come at a definable cost to the rest of society.
To pay McAuliffe damages will necessitate raising taxes or reducing
services elsewhere. To reinstate him means that his replacement loses
her. In contrast, simply enjoining prosecution saves resources.
Once again, this rationale is limited to its factual presuppositions.
If granting the proposed benefit involves no incremental expenditure of
funds-as in the case of access to an existing public facility-no reallo-
cation is necessary. 6 ' If the violation in question is a result of a reduc-
tion from a clearly defined baseline, then the baseline defines the ap-
propriate remedy. Indeed, in the case of either a reduction in.historical
benefits or a singling out of protected activities, there is reason to expect
that funds are already there to pay for the proposed relief. And some
'" Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1692 (1983).
317 See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); 0.
Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1, 38-45 (1978); Frug, The Judicial Power of
the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 732-57 (1978).
11" Where the facility is privately owned, the problems multiply. See Karst, supra
note 263, at 51.
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rights carry with them their own defined distributive choice."" 9
Similarly, the increasingly pervasive judicial vindication of institu-
tional rights may undermine this argument against granting full protec-
tion from allocative sanctions. The first Justice Harlan, who elsewhere
rejected the argument of the greater and the lesser in support of alloca-
tional sanctions"' 0 adopted an uncharacteristically deferential posture in
response to an equal protection challenge to an all-white high school in
Georgia.37 1 In 1899, he reasoned, "It being in [the Board's discretion to
establish high schools], they could, without a violation of the law or of
any constitution, devote a portion of the taxes collected for school pur-
poses to the support of this high school for white girls . . ."s. But
this conclusion seems more rooted in his discussion of the remedial
difficulties:
The substantial relief asked is an injunction that would ei-
ther impair the efficiency of the high school provided for
white children or compel the Board to close it. But if that
were done, the result would only be to take from white chil-
dren educational privileges enjoyed by them, without giving
to colored children additional opportunities . . . .
For a court limited to use of a prohibitory injunction, the difficulties of
righting an unconstitutional allocation might be sufficient to bar relief.
But for a court operating after a generation of institutional relief,1 4 the
problems seem smaller.
Nonetheless, depending on the depth of one's skepticism regarding
the exercise of the judicial "power of the purse,13 7 5 there may be rea-
son to be reluctant to embroil the courts in allocative disputes. The cost
of this reluctance, however, is a willingness to tolerate increasingly seri-
ous infringements of constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The dangers to liberties posed by a modern state reside as much in
what it refrains from doing as in what it does. Once the government
involves itself deeply in the economic and social life of its citizens-as
369 See supra text accompanying notes 352-68.
370 See supra note 17; text accompanying note 165.
371 See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
372 Id. at 542.
373 Id. at 544.
37, See 0. FISS, supra note 367, at 5; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979).
'7' See Frug, supra note 367.
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decency, efficiency, and fairness dictate that it must, in order to meet
the challenges of contemporary life-the state is in a position to manip-
ulate its citizens as effectively by withholding largesse as by threatening
prison. A constitutional jurisprudence that is to retain its vitality in the
later twentieth century must deal with this reality. Courts should not
insulate allocative sanctions from judicial review by accepting mislead-
ing afortiori arguments, false analogies to private property holders, or
gossamer distinctions between purportedly positive and negative rights.
This essay will have succeeded in part of its purpose if it leaves the
reader with the conviction that courts seeking to protect constitutional
liberties run severe risks if they exempt allocational sanctions from con-
stitutional scrutiny.
Yet, at the same time, past approaches to review of allocational
sanctions are themselves flawed. A search for illicit governmental pur-
poses leads into quandaries of definition and application, defines the
constitutional right in terms of the government's intent rather than the
citizen's liberties, and provides far too ample an opportunity for covert
and unreviewable incorporation of value choices under the guise of
factfinding. In counterpoint, an exclusive focus on the impact of the
allocation at issue fails to account for the variety of impacts that alloca-
tional sanctions may, in fact, generate. Those who have urged a balanc-
ing approach to the problem have perhaps suggested answers that most
frankly acknowledge the difficulties involved, but such suggestions have
thus far been so loose as to be of little assistance in shaping arguments
in the area.
The enterprise of this Article has been to develop a structure of
inquiry that allows courts to incorporate the best of prior analyses. I
have sought to disentangle two issues: first, the question of what condi-
tional allocations may be said to be threats that reduce the autonomy
guarded by constitutional liberties and, second, the question whether an
allocation, be it threat or offer, should be viewed as an impermissible
effort by government to induce sale of inalienable rights. It is my hope
that this distinct will allow courts more easily to order intuitions and
values and force them to discuss more explicitly the conflicts that arise.
In distinguishing threats from offers, I have shown that the adoption of
the appropriate baseline is crucial and problematic, but not so intracta-
ble as to leave the courts with no choice but resort to ad hoc
categorization.
I do not pretend that analysis of history, equality, and prediction
will compel outcomes in the most difficult cases. Nonetheless, the ap-
proach serves its purpose if it facilitates clearer dialogue, more pointed
factual development, and more mature consideration of the moral and
[Vol. 132:1293
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political choices involved than courts have been able to attain under the
current regime.

